Why Did Netanyahu Call the UAE “Israel of the Persian Gulf”?

On the eve of elections and amid mounting international isolation, Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to project strength and build regional alliances by portraying the UAE as the “Israel of the Persian Gulf.” Rather than bolstering Abu Dhabi’s standing, however, this approach could pose serious risks to the country’s security, international reputation, and future.

Why Did Netanyahu Call the UAE “Israel of the Persian Gulf”?
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Nournews: Netanyahu’s deepening political crisis ahead of elections in the occupied territories has prompted Donald Trump to openly back him. The costly political gamble could also deepen the Republicans’ own crisis. Against this backdrop, Netanyahu published a map of West Asia, highlighting the UAE and the Israeli regime in indigo and declaring: “The UAE is the Israel of the Persian Gulf.” In his accompanying remarks, he also referred to a “hexagonal alliance between the UAE and Israel.”

On the surface, the move appears to elevate the UAE’s position in regional security calculations. Developments on the ground, however, suggest that rather than rewarding Abu Dhabi’s extensive cooperation, Netanyahu is seeking to turn the country into a defensive shield for the Israeli regime. Such a move would put the UAE’s security at risk while undermining its international standing. The silence and indifference of Abu Dhabi’s rulers in the face of this trend could carry heavy political, economic, and security costs for the country’s future.

An Alliance with Abu Dhabi: A Sign of Strength or an Admission of Isolation?

As elections in the occupied territories approach, opinion polls point to a deepening crisis for Netanyahu and his Likud party. Under these circumstances, Trump has openly declared his support for his ally in an effort to prevent a major electoral defeat. Given widespread opposition among the American public to sacrificing US interests for Israel, however, this backing could deepen the Republicans’ political crisis.

Netanyahu has not only failed to deliver on his domestic promises, from ensuring security to improving economic conditions, but has also failed to achieve his declared objective of eliminating resistance from Gaza to Iran. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime’s international isolation has become increasingly evident. These setbacks have driven Netanyahu to exaggerate the significance of ties with the UAE in an effort to project strength.

His reported visit to Abu Dhabi to meet Arab officials, a flydubai flight allegedly intended to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel, the announcement that Iron Dome would be deployed in the UAE, and now his designation of Abu Dhabi as the “Israel of the Persian Gulf” can all be viewed within this broader context.

Rather than demonstrating strength, this approach points to Netanyahu’s weakness and desperation—a development that should serve as a serious warning to the UAE’s rulers. By tying their country’s security, economy, and regional and global ambitions to a regime mired in crisis, they are exposing its future to serious risks.

A New Security Architecture or a Project That Undermines Security?

Although Netanyahu’s remarks about the UAE are largely linked to electoral considerations, the broader implications of his efforts to forge new regional alliances cannot be ignored. Netanyahu previously spoke of a plan to establish a “hexagonal alliance” that would bring Israel together with India, Greece, Cyprus, and a number of Arab, African, and Asian countries, including Ethiopia and the UAE.

Meanwhile, Anwar Gargash, an adviser to the UAE president, has called for stronger security and defense cooperation and the revival of a regional collective security mechanism. The central question, however, is how collective security can be achieved when the actions of the Israeli regime and the UAE—from Africa to West Asia and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—are contributing to greater instability.

In reality, the conduct of the two regimes suggests that they seek to ensure their own survival by weakening other countries. Under such circumstances, claims by Netanyahu and Abu Dhabi that they are working to build security are more likely to pave the way for further threats to regional and global stability than to guarantee peace.

Netanyahu’s remarks can be seen as an acknowledgment of the UAE’s destabilizing role in regional affairs, underscoring the need for like-minded countries to strengthen cooperation and take joint action to counter this trend.

The Global Cost of Ties with Israel

Netanyahu’s remarks may appear to confer legitimacy on the UAE and assign it a new role in regional affairs. In reality, however, alignment with the Israeli regime is more likely to impose political and international costs on its partners than to deliver strategic benefits.

Growing public support for Palestine in Europe and the United States, mounting political criticism of the regime’s conduct, and calls for the enforcement of international judicial rulings against its leaders all indicate that the costs of aligning with Tel Aviv are rising.

The UAE may secure short-term benefits from its bilateral relations with the Israeli regime and the White House. Over the longer term, however, this course could deepen its international isolation and undermine its global credibility. A country that has spent billions of dollars over the years to improve its international image now faces the risk of sacrificing those gains through a costly alignment with Netanyahu.

What is presented today as an elevation of the UAE’s regional standing could therefore weaken its position on the global stage. Alignment with the Israeli regime and the United States is no longer a guarantee that Abu Dhabi will achieve its objectives. Instead, it could create problems whose consequences extend far beyond the UAE rulers’ short-term calculations.

The Price of Betraying Iran and Regional Security

Netanyahu and Trump have been promoting a new national security strategy, projecting strength against Iran and claiming the ability to destroy it, while formally positioning the UAE as an ally. The realities on the ground, however, paint a different picture.

Statements by Iranian political and military officials indicate that any miscalculation would be met with a swift, extensive, and forceful response—one that could extend across the maritime, land, and space domains. Any country that participates in aggression against Iran, they have warned, would face serious consequences and could become a target of retaliation under Iran’s right to self-defense. Missiles and drones, moreover, represent only part of Iran’s capabilities in such a confrontation.

The UAE may welcome Trump’s praise and take satisfaction in being dubbed the “Israel of the  Persian Gulf.” But tying its fate to aggression against Iran and threats to regional security could impose heavy and lasting costs on the country. Abu Dhabi cannot continue down a path of confrontation with Iran and the wider region while expecting to remain insulated from the consequences.

Iran, the resistance front, and public opinion across the region and the world will no more accept the transformation of the UAE into the “Israel of the Persian Gulf” than they accept the Israeli regime’s occupation of Palestine.

The message behind these developments is clear: alliance-building and political propaganda cannot change realities on the ground. Continuing along this path will carry a heavy price for both the Israeli regime and the UAE.

 

 

Source: Nournews
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