With just three days to go before Israel’s Knesset elections next Tuesday, one thing appears clear so far: the ruling coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to secure the seats needed to form a government again.
Against this backdrop, one widely discussed scenario has been that Netanyahu could launch an attack on Iran before the election to overshadow the campaign’s central issues. By shifting the focus toward security, he could seek to mobilize wavering far-right voters in favor of himself and his coalition—or even push for the election to be postponed.
Indeed, postponing the election could give Netanyahu an opportunity to reorganize his electoral alliance, contain divisions within the ruling coalition, and regain the confidence of some Likud supporters. It could also allow him to replace the electoral issue of the “October 7 failure” with a new war against Iran.
But postponement is far from guaranteed. Under Article 19 of Israel’s Basic Law: The Knesset, delaying the election would require the approval of 80 of the Knesset’s 120 members, making opposition support essential.
Even if the war were to resume, it remains unclear whether its consequences could reshape the electoral landscape in such a short period and persuade far-right voters to turn out in large numbers. That would likely require a major shock capable of rapidly shifting the election in Netanyahu’s and his allies’ favor. Without such a shock, a new war would be a gamble—and the longer it continued, the more it could undermine Netanyahu’s current electoral position.
In any case, if a new war is to begin before Israel’s election, it would have to happen within the next two days, between the coming hours and Monday.
In this context, the notable rise in oil prices, the decline in the global price of gold, the withdrawal of U.S. diplomats from some countries in the region, security-related reports in U.S. media, and similar developments could be interpreted as signs of an imminent war.
But if no such conflict breaks out in the coming hours or over the next day or two, questions will arise about why these signs and indications emerged in the first place. One possible explanation is that the U.S. administration has sought to heighten the sense of insecurity—not only to influence Iran’s calculations, but also, potentially, to help Netanyahu electorally. By keeping Israeli society under the pressure of heightened security concerns and the prospect of war resuming at any moment, this strategy could encourage voters to once again support Netanyahu and the ruling coalition as a means of ensuring continuity in government.
It is worth noting, however, that recent polling has shown no clear indication that the wartime atmosphere has shifted the electoral landscape in Netanyahu’s favor.
Even if no war against Iran takes place before Israel’s election next Tuesday, does that mean conflict is off the table after the vote and before a new government is formed? The answer is no. The possibility remains very much alive.
There is a serious possibility that an electoral defeat for Netanyahu and his allies would not necessarily translate into a victory for the Jewish opposition or enable it to form a government. The opposition, too, would be unable to form a government without the support of the two Arab electoral alliances.
In short, under these circumstances, Netanyahu may continue to heighten security tensions after the election—whether through war with Iran or renewed conflict in Gaza and Lebanon—in an effort to prolong his hold on power, prevent his government from falling through an alliance between the Jewish opposition and the two Arab blocs, and, at the same time, pressure his opponents into accepting a power-sharing arrangement, potentially including a rotation of the premiership.
The question now is what Netanyahu will do in his final efforts to remain in power. Will a war break out in the coming hours, or will it not?
