Will there be a war? And if so, when and on what scale? This is a question that has repeatedly occupied the minds of Iranians, including economic actors, over the past 17 months, leaving virtually every aspect of life suspended in uncertainty and limbo.
Taking into account the use of media manipulation as a tool of warfare and the deliberate creation of uncertainty as a negotiating tactic, the following answers can be offered to these questions:
1. The first question is whether Trump has made up his mind to launch another full-scale act of aggression against Iran. Given Trump's incessant rhetoric and constant contradictions, his words cannot, as a rule, be taken at face value. Almost everything he says is of little value unless supported by corroborating evidence. It has been established that, beyond contradicting himself, he also lies without hesitation. During Trump's first four years in office, The Washington Post documented 30,573 false or misleading claims made by him.
Nevertheless, a statement he made last week can be taken seriously when considered alongside other indications. He said: “We can finish off the Islamic Republic, or we can let it gradually wither away.”
This remark, taken together with his other statements about continuing diplomacy, may indicate that he is still weighing the three scenarios I also highlighted in recent weeks. The first is resolving the issue through diplomatic means; the second is maintaining the naval blockade and intensifying economic pressure in an effort to erode Iran's resilience; and the third is resorting to another war of aggression.
Trump's remark, along with some of his other statements, may suggest that he has yet to make a final decision. Of course, the absence of a final decision does not preclude the mobilization of forces and military redeployments in the region. Such measures are usually taken to ensure that all necessary capabilities are in place when the time comes to make a final decision. News reports during his six years in office indicate that he decided to go to war on three occasions, only to call off the decision at the last moment.
2. If the path of war is chosen, the next important question is when it might begin. Speculation on this issue peaked over the past two or three weeks. Some even interpreted remarks by the US ambassador to Turkey as a sign that an attack would begin last Saturday or Sunday.
Nor can Netanyahu's bluster on the eve of Israel's elections be taken as a reliable indicator. His audience consists of hard-right voters who favor “regime change” in Iran. He knows better than anyone that a government cannot be toppled from a distance through air power alone. The clearest evidence is that, despite his extensive atrocities in Gaza, Hamas remains in control there.
Moreover, it is difficult to envisage Netanyahu launching military action without Trump's authorization. Trump, meanwhile, is deeply preoccupied with a pivotal election campaign that is unlikely to leave him much room to pursue another consequential course of action. Through next Monday, he is scheduled to spend every day campaigning and traveling to various US states. Under these circumstances, a major development concerning Iran would become plausible only if he canceled his campaign engagements and returned to the White House.
3. Amid the flood of grim predictions and detached analyses about war and its possible start date, I may be among the few who have argued that war is, as a matter of principle, logic and reason, avoidable. Why? Because the gap between the positions of the two countries is not so wide as to justify another devastating war.
Iran has announced its “seven-day plan,” and the United States has said it agrees with the provisions of that plan, all of which are reportedly contained in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. The apparent disagreement concerns only the order and sequencing of the implementation of these conditions and the way they are to be carried out. Iran wants the United States to implement the provisions of the seven-day plan first, with negotiations on nuclear issues beginning on the seventh day. The US proposal, by contrast, is to begin negotiations on all issues, including the nuclear file, on the very first day.
A disagreement of this magnitude is not worth triggering another devastating war between two major countries or plunging the region into a wider conflict.
Of course, the question of which concessions are made in exchange for which others matters. But when the stakes include a widespread, full-scale and enormously destructive war; when the lives of thousands of military personnel and civilians are at risk; and when such a war could cause damage that might prove difficult to repair even over the course of years and under sanctions, should the existing differences really be regarded as so profound and so bound up with national prestige that avoiding war becomes impossible?
