Any change to Iran’s nuclear doctrine should be debated at the national and historical level, without allowing the issue to become politicized along partisan lines. Scientific debate should not become taboo for researchers.
The dilemma in nuclear decision-making is that every sound argument has an equally compelling counterargument based on a different set of assumptions. Here, I seek to examine the competing perspectives on nuclear weapons, while recognizing how vulnerable such debates can be to misuse and misinterpretation, and how dangerous that can be in the hands of irresponsible actors or under poor management.
As I have noted in previous articles, given our emphasis on the religious prohibition against producing nuclear weapons, it is now necessary to examine how effective this strategy has been. Has its political, military and propaganda impact not, in fact, been counterproductive? Does retaining our current nuclear doctrine expose us to greater threats? Conversely, would changing it draw us into an even deeper predicament than the two-decade-old nuclear dispute? Would China and Russia oppose such a move? All these questions deserve serious consideration and cannot simply be brushed aside.
I addressed this issue in an article published in September 2022. The present discussion is a revised version of that analysis, examining the arguments for and against a change in policy.
1. Some are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, particularly among Arab countries. A nuclear bomb is a weapon that, above all else, entails international responsibility. Some argue that despite their towering skyscrapers, lavish palaces and vast reserves of wealth, these countries still exhibit a degree of inherent irresponsibility in their politics and lack the international standing and maturity required to possess nuclear weapons. Under such regimes, wealth and formal power can spread into Daesh-like networks, further fueling insecurity.
An Iranian bomb would provide justification for an Arab bomb. What guarantee would there be that, one day, we would not face the prospect of a Daesh-linked nuclear bomb, without the political regimes concerned being held internationally accountable?
The counterargument is that the Mossad and the CIA already have the capability to facilitate such a scenario, and changing Iran's nuclear doctrine would make no difference. Another argument is that transferring nuclear capabilities from a state-run program to a terrorist organization would require several conditions and stages to be met, including access to nuclear materials, the ability to secure and control them, the necessary technical expertise, and the ability to overcome security barriers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, considers the risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of criminals or terrorists a serious concern.
2. Another argument put forward by opponents of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is that doing so could provoke opposition from China and Russia, further restrict access to foreign technology and investment, complicate trade relations with many countries, and even push regional states toward new military cooperation arrangements.
Moreover, acquiring nuclear weapons would trigger severe international punishment, the costs of which Iran would be unable to bear, potentially trapping the country once again in a vicious cycle of sanctions — one even worse than North Korea's experience.
This argument, of course, is supported by past experience. The counterargument, however, is this: Have we managed to escape the grip of sanctions even without acquiring nuclear weapons? And given the complexities of the US constitutional and legal system, are we not likely to remain entangled in them for many years to come?
3. Supporters of changing Iran's nuclear doctrine argue that the possibility of the United States or Israel using nuclear weapons in a war against Iran can no longer be dismissed as far-fetched.
When I first raised this issue in 2022, a nuclear attack on Iran seemed highly unlikely. Today, however, the possibility is being discussed even in the United States and Israel, including in the media. Concerns were also raised in the United States about the potential use of nuclear weapons against Iran. However, the US president publicly stated that he saw no need to use nuclear weapons and, when asked directly about their possible use, ruled out that option.
Nevertheless, such a debate would not reach the media unless it had first been raised within government circles. The very fact that the issue has entered the public discourse suggests that it is also being considered within their decision-making systems — not because Iran is close to building a nuclear bomb, but because they have failed to defeat Iran in the two most recent wars.
This strengthens the argument that an Iranian nuclear bomb would serve the purpose of nuclear deterrence, rather than deterrence against conventional wars. More precisely, a nuclear bomb is not intended to deter the outbreak of a conventional war; it is intended to prevent a nuclear attack. Experience has shown that nuclear weapons do not prevent non-nuclear wars. Russia and Israel are clear examples.
That is the logic of nuclear deterrence: the adversary must believe that attacking a nuclear-armed country could entail an extremely high cost.
4. Another argument made by supporters of changing Iran's nuclear doctrine concerns the extent to which the international community would seriously oppose the use of a nuclear bomb to bring Iran to its knees. What about Europe, the Arab states, China and Russia?
Suppose, God forbid, that the United States or Israel launched a nuclear attack on Iran. What would happen the following day? At most, there might be a few statements of condemnation and several demonstrations in some countries. Would anything more happen?
Therefore, the only factor that could prevent a nuclear attack on Iran is nuclear deterrence. We should expect nothing from the international community in this regard.
From this perspective, if the adversaries' ambitions to devastate Iran with nuclear weapons and fragment the country are to become a real threat, the policy of "nuclear abstention" must be reconsidered.
The United States' use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not serve a military purpose in terms of winning the war, because Japan was already moving toward surrender. The significance of America's use of nuclear weapons lay particularly in consolidating and entrenching its global power throughout the 20th century.
Nuclear weapons serve a dual purpose: they are both status quo-oriented and hegemonic. In other words, they help preserve the balance of power while establishing and consolidating global dominance.
A counterargument, however, is that the actual impact of the atomic bombings on Japan's decision to surrender, the US government's military and political motivations, and the long-term consequences of using nuclear weapons for the international order, although interconnected, are not one and the same.
5. An important point emerges from these conflicting arguments: a nuclear bomb is not merely a "military undertaking." More fundamentally, it requires a form of "nuclear diplomacy" through which the necessary confidence-building measures are put in place to safeguard the strategic interests of other countries as well.
Other parties must understand that you, too, recognize that you are entering a club whose purpose is to preserve the existing international status quo. You must convey that you accept the current international order while safeguarding your own interests. You must make it clear that you intend to remain part of that order — as you are, without necessarily changing who you are.
This requires considerable diplomatic capacity and skill. You must be able to convince others that you have no intention of deceiving them. This is the very nature of an Iranian bomb, just as it is of any other nuclear weapon.
Convincing the other side that you understand the magnitude of the strategic bargain you are entering is no easy task. Nuclear diplomacy is not simply about explaining your position to others. It also involves managing commitments, building trust, reducing misperceptions, and balancing national security with the security concerns of other countries.
This calls for a special kind of persuasive diplomacy. Whether Iran's diplomatic establishment has the capacity to pursue such a course is, however, a matter worth examining. This is not to suggest that Iran lacks skilled experts; rather, its diplomatic establishment has gradually lost confidence in itself for various reasons.
6. The debate is open, and we are dealing with a complex, multifaceted and contradictory phenomenon. We need to keep the door open to expert discussion on this issue.
This is fundamentally not a partisan debate. A broader perspective can lend greater depth to both our opposition to and our support for nuclear weapons.
The central issue is the existence of asymmetrical arguments. In such cases, an argument cannot necessarily be countered on the same grounds on which it was presented. More often than not, it is an argument based on an entirely different premise that asymmetrically challenges and undermines the opposing position.
