The war between Iran and the United States, which erupted at dawn on June 13, 2025, after decades of tensions, sanctions and threats, taking the form of an all-out military confrontation, reached its peak on February 28, 2026, with the martyrdom of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution. How will this war end? Or, in the language of political circles, how should it end?
At least three broad answers to this question can be identified. With some simplification, they can be outlined as follows:
- An immediate compromise with the United States that removes the incentive for Washington to continue the war.
- Simply expanding the war.
- Continuing the war until the enemy's calculations change and the security threat is credibly removed.
The first approach: Since the beginning of the nuclear dispute, proponents of this approach have repeatedly advanced the idea that certain political currents within the United States could help establish an understanding between Tehran and Washington, resolving the nuclear issue first and other outstanding matters later.
The premise behind this idea is that Iran's power creates the conditions for compromise. However, the JCPOA (the 2015 nuclear deal) represented the most important and historic opportunity to put this argument into practice, yet the approach failed to deliver. The Rouhani administration was unable to defend its own position even under the Democratic administration of Barack Obama.
The then-governor of Iran's Central Bank under Rouhani summed up the situation when he described the country's gains from the nuclear deal as "almost nothing." Subsequently, contrary to the promises made by Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, the next US administration withdrew from the agreement with ease.
In a historic letter dated October 21, 2015, to then-President Hassan Rouhani concerning the implementation of the JCPOA, the late Leader of the Islamic Revolution raised a point that remains relevant to the entire history of the agreement, before, during and after its implementation:
"With your several decades of experience at the heart of the affairs of the Islamic Republic, you have naturally come to understand that the US government, in the nuclear issue and in no other matter either, has pursued no approach toward Iran other than hostility and obstruction, and it is unlikely to act differently in the future.
"The statements made by the US president in two letters to me, claiming that he had no intention of overthrowing the Islamic Republic, were quickly proven false by his support for domestic unrest and financial assistance to opponents of the Islamic Republic. His explicit threats of military and even nuclear attacks—which could provide the basis for an extensive indictment against him before international courts—also exposed the true intentions of US leaders. Political experts around the world and public opinion in many nations clearly recognize that the source of this unrelenting hostility is the very nature and identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which emerged from the Islamic Revolution."
This approach also resurfaced during the war. Its proponents soon sought to revive and repackage their earlier position while acknowledging the exceptional circumstances of wartime. Several speeches by Rouhani to gatherings of former government officials, who apparently had little choice but to attend, as well as several articles by Mohammad Javad Zarif in international media, reflect this line of thinking.
At its core, the proposal under the current wartime circumstances is to reach a compromise with the United States on the nuclear issue in a way that would allow Trump to present it as a victory and extricate himself from the current situation.
The problem with this approach is that Trump had openly threatened to destroy and dismember Iran and had even gone so far, during the events of January 2026, as to consider selecting a successor to lead the country. Those advocating this approach have no answer—or at least no clear and defensible one—to a fundamental question: After securing major nuclear concessions, would the United States actually leave Iran alone?
The second approach does not fully articulate its own proposal and tends to define itself primarily in opposition to the first. It is largely negative in nature, focusing on rejecting the first approach without offering a constructive alternative. Its proponents have held important positions and responsibilities at various points in history, but their lack of a positive, actionable agenda has prevented them from resolving the challenges facing the country.
The third approach, which appears to reflect the position of Iran's leadership, focuses on two priorities: first, the immediate removal of the security threat; and second, the development of a broader political framework for Iran that would enable the country to govern effectively.
Achieving both the credible removal of the enemy's threat and Iran's reconstruction and modernization is possible only if the country's fundamental sources of national power—including military and defensive capabilities as well as social capital—are maintained at their highest possible levels.
Under this approach, following the ceasefire on the 40th day of the war, Iran maintained and strengthened its military posture, turned the Strait of Hormuz into a strategic asset and a lever of pressure against the enemy, and rejected both the minimum option of surrender and the maximum option of an aimless, open-ended war.
So, in light of the experience of the two different manifestations of the US deep state under the Obama and Trump administrations, what should Iran do?
The Obama administration's iron fist in a velvet glove conditioned Iran's economy, imposed some of the most complex sanctions in history on the country and, through an extraordinary security and political strategy, sought to maximize social divisions within Iran. Its aim was to finish the job through a different-looking approach.
From this perspective, Democrats criticize Trump's administration for launching an all-out military war, arguing that it drained American taxpayers' pockets and damaged the US economy, but achieved little else. Democrats argue that Iran's political system cannot be brought down through military attacks and that such a campaign only imposes additional costs on Washington.
Accordingly, Iran's leadership views the turning point in the enemy's calculations as the moment when the US military and economic machinery loses confidence in its ability to achieve practical results.
This point can be reached sooner through military confrontation. Indeed, following the April 2026 ceasefire, Trump told the American public what would have happened to their economy had the wider war continued.
The situation is more complicated, however, when it comes to economic warfare and the sophisticated sanctions imposed on Iran.
The key point is that the formula promoted by those inclined toward capitulation, who often present themselves as defenders of Iran's interests, changes depending on which party holds power in Washington. When the Democrats are in power, their argument is: We should seize the opportunity presented by those who want to engage with Iran. When Republicans win, the message changes: We should make the most of the window of opportunity to contain tensions.
In light of this, rather than being more concerned about the Democrats' velvet gloves or the Republicans' sword-wielding hardliners, we should be more concerned about the "velvet ears" of certain figures inside Iran—those who are perpetually anxious about an alleged window of opportunity that the United States itself ultimately closes.
