As the United States formally escalates its economic war against Iran through sanctions, isolation and economic pressure, the extent to which other major global powers—particularly China—are willing to resist or accommodate this policy has become increasingly important.
China, which has emerged as a global economic superpower, is Iran’s leading economic partner and an influential member of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has also played a constructive, balanced and responsible role toward Iran, at least during the recent war of aggression against the country.
Since June 2025, when the United States and Israel launched two rounds of illegal attacks against Iran, inflicting heavy damage on the country, China has supported Iran’s position in defending its national security and sovereignty. China’s Foreign Ministry and its Permanent Representative to the United Nations described the attacks on Iran as violations of international law, condemned the assassination of Iran’s leader, and called for an immediate halt to military operations and the resumption of dialogue.
In its latest official position, Beijing has also explicitly and firmly rejected unilateral and extraterritorial US sanctions, stressing that its relations with Iran are fully governed by international law and that China will make every effort to safeguard its legitimate interests in its relations with Tehran.
Despite these supportive positions, China’s legal and diplomatic resistance, and the importance of this Asian power to Iran—particularly during a period of war and economic sanctions—it is necessary to take a realistic and precise look at the practical dimensions of bilateral relations. Only by understanding the concrete realities governing ties between the two countries can Iran increase the effectiveness of its relationship with China during this period of pressure and sanctions.
China and Iran have been bound by a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership since April 2021. According to a document published by Iran’s Foreign Ministry, the 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Program was formulated and approved across three main dimensions: political-strategic, economic, and cultural.
Political and strategic cooperation includes strengthening bilateral coordination in regional and international organizations, as well as expanding defense interactions.
Economic cooperation includes Iran’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese investment in oil, gas, petrochemicals and renewable energy, and the development of transportation and transit infrastructure.
Cultural and social cooperation covers the expansion of academic exchanges, tourism, sports and media cooperation.
If, given the current wartime conditions, the third dimension is temporarily set aside, the other two deserve closer examination.
In the political and strategic sphere, China—as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of Iran’s key economic partners—has provided political support for Tehran’s positions in international forums. China’s recent declaration that its relations with Iran are legally legitimate could provide an important legal and diplomatic shield against the new wave of US sanctions.
At the practical level, however, Beijing continues to make cautious calculations regarding measures such as the use of its veto power or direct and openly declared defense and military cooperation. Chinese officials have also denied reports claiming that China has sold heavy weapons and defense equipment to Iran.
The economic dimension also reveals a significant gap between existing potential and operational realities in Tehran-Beijing relations. A recent report by the Research Center of the Iran Chamber of Commerce points to this disparity.
An examination of official data on Chinese investment in Iran between 2005 and 2025—including four years following the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement—shows that total Chinese direct investment in Iran over this 20-year period did not exceed $4.7 billion.
During the same two decades, however, Beijing injected hundreds of billions of dollars into the markets and economies of several regional countries, including Pakistan, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
According to the report by the Research Center of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, the main obstacles preventing Iran from attracting the maximum possible level of Chinese investment have included international sanctions, domestic banking and financial challenges, and the absence of stable institutions and reliable investment guarantees.
During the war, another major priority of Beijing’s economic policy has been protecting its domestic economy and shielding the global energy market from severe shocks.
China, the world’s second-largest crude oil consumer after the United States, consumes approximately 16.37 million barrels per day, compared with roughly 19 million barrels per day for the United States. At certain points following US and Israeli attacks on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, China reduced its direct imports and drew on its strategic reserves to manage the impact of the shock on the oil market.
While some analysts argue that these measures were primarily aimed at protecting China’s own economy, one of their indirect consequences was to prevent an astronomical surge in oil prices—an outcome that also helped Washington manage the economic consequences of the war.
Meanwhile, the eastern superpower has been developing a new shipping route through the Arctic Ocean, known as the “Ice Silk Road,” in an effort to establish alternative routes and reduce its vulnerability to disruptions along southern waterways. Although this route faces seasonal and environmental limitations, it nevertheless reflects Beijing’s broader effort to diversify its trade corridors.
Despite these limitations, Beijing’s renewed emphasis on safeguarding its interests in Iran and its categorical rejection of US sanctions indicate that China fully understands the geopolitical significance of Iran’s resilience against the United States.
By sustaining its defense and preventing an easy and rapid American victory, the Islamic Republic of Iran has played a key role in weakening US credibility and hegemonic standing while also imposing costs on the strategic military and economic resources of China’s principal rival.
It is an undeniable geopolitical reality that as long as Iran remains a powerful force in West Asia and continues to absorb a substantial share of US military, defense, financial and diplomatic attention, Washington cannot fully concentrate its resources on containing China in East Asia or seriously intensify its focus on Taiwan.
Against this backdrop, and building on China’s recent firm rejection of sanctions, Iran’s diplomatic establishment should actively engage Beijing in negotiations.
China’s latest position suggests that Iran’s bargaining position has improved. Tehran should therefore enter negotiations not as a “constrained actor,” but as a “decisive partner in maintaining the regional balance of power.”
Iran’s bargaining assets in such negotiations extend beyond cheap oil and its transit position. They also include its ability to help preserve the balance of power in the Middle East and to serve as a strategic variable in the timing and trajectory of the broader hegemonic competition between China and the United States.
Iran can convey a clear message to Beijing: now that China has officially rejected US sanctions and emphasized its determination to protect its interests in Iran, the time has come to translate these political positions into stable financial channels, infrastructure investment and guaranteed energy purchases.
Iranian diplomacy should remind Beijing that the cost of maintaining a stable and strong Iran is far lower for China than the price it could eventually pay if Iran were isolated and Beijing found itself facing a United States freed from its extensive commitments in the Middle East and able to concentrate more directly on the Pacific arena.
At the same time, relying on this geopolitical leverage alone cannot serve as a long-term strategy.
The sustainable path toward securing China’s maximum and most effective cooperation within the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership requires efforts to restore lasting stability and security inside Iran, reform banking structures, facilitate investment regulations, expand and balance economic and trade relations with both East and West, and create conditions in which China’s presence in Iran’s market and geographical space becomes a low-risk strategic necessity, rather than a costly option pursued in defiance of the United States.
NOURNEWS