NOURNEWS - The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a state-level approach in some areas. The IAEA aims to increase confidence in the commitment of member states to the requirements of safeguards. This component, which is based on the state-level concept, relates to the general perception of the implementation of safeguards in a way that takes into account the activities and capacities of the country's nuclear program as a whole. That is, instead of focusing solely on specific facilities, the fuel cycle and all nuclear activities are considered. In other words, the IAEA has a clear understanding of the country's nuclear program and activities, and based on that, regulates sensitivity and issues such as inspections.
This safeguard can be used by all members, but has been used in 53 countries so far. Considering the "country as a whole" has been around for a long time, and dates back to the 1990s, but the IAEA's secretariat has used the term SLC since 2004. Certain components of SLC have been implemented to some extent.
Bargaining agreements and, if possible, additional protocols shall be considered as criteria for the implementation of the IAEA's safeguards against the country. Details of the SLA approach will be formulated in the internal safeguard document and in the IAEA's secretariat. The document sets out the objectives of the garrison and the security measures that the IAEA must take against that country, and it will achieves its goals based on the activities of the garrison. According to the SLA, countries are divided according to their specific factors, which affect the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of the IAEA's security activities against them.
The effect of third party information on SLA
Acquisition Path Analysis is used to design the SLA. The APA is about exploring the paths that a country can take in nuclear material over a period of time. This method is used to set up and compile the safeguard. These are the technical steps and legal considerations that will help. But the point is, open source information can be effective in this process and approach.
In the IAEA's relations with countries, one side of the story is the IAEA and the other side is the relevant country. That is, based on the interaction and cooperation between the Agency, an assessment and withdrawal of the country's nuclear program and activities will be made. But sometimes the source of information is third parties. This is where the discussion, the role, and the importance of open information come into play.
The use of the term "open information" clearly implies that it does not mean confidential information or spy documents of countries. Obvious information must also have a number of components. For example, scientific articles and books usually undergo a series of scientific analyzes and processes based on a specific logic to explain the propositions. Therefore, any irrelevant or irrelevant material cannot and should not be involved in this process; Otherwise, the ground for political play is provided by using technical and legal issues.
At the same time, the obvious information does not automatically evoke a concept about the country's nuclear program, but that information must be corroborated by the IAEA.
Disagreement between countries on espionage & intelligence
On the other hand, different countries disagree on the use of intelligence and documents. Due to their hidden nature, espionage documents can easily be forged and manipulated, and it is not easy to prove or disprove them. Some countries, such as Russia, Iran, and the like, believe that the IAEA should not be used as a place to verify documents and intelligence. Because this process can move the agency from its technical and legal direction to the political and security side. On the other hand, some Western countries believe that the IAEA should not stop receiving information, but should receive and review intelligence information. Given the developments that have taken place in the IAEA over the past few years, especially with regard to Iran, it is almost clear what is the reason for these countries' insistence on investigating the IAEA's intelligence and espionage claims.
Separating intelligence from explicitly confidential information is important, as it can affect the SLA approach if it interferes.
Needless to say, the members did not fully accept the same SLA, but the agency runs it as a "default". Naturally, its implementation affects the quality of the development and arrangement of the IAEA's bargaining agreements with countries. Combining it with allegedly secretive intelligence, it provides some countries with an amalgam of political tools to divert a technical entity from its original track.
Double collision on SLA ground
In simpler terms, the SLA debate itself provides the basis for the Agency's multiple approach to the country's nuclear program. Maybe that's why so many countries don't go under. This approach provides the basis for almost double and contradictory inspection and confrontation with countries. Adding spy information to this process makes it so political that it is not to the liking of human justice-seeking nature; Or in the slang phrase "you burst somebody's bubble".
The product of this Western-style cooking is the same salty lobster that holds the ownership of the nuclear bomb of some countries, such as the United States, but on the contrary, does not look at the peaceful nuclear program of some other countries such as Iran.
The reason for Iran's recent opposition to the IAEA's access request
Finally, it is possible to understand the basis of Iran's argument for not having access to the Agency's unreasonable request. The IAEA has made the two requests based on Israeli intelligence and allegations. Acceptance of these requests, in addition to laying the groundwork for future unsubstantiated requests, makes the IAEA a place for truth-seeking and the role of intelligence.
In other words, selecting confidential information, or providing fake information to the agency, can affect the SLA. The result of this impact is easy to imagine. In this case, the basis of the IAEA's reports will be the claims of certain intelligence services rather than the technical and independent actions of the IAEA.
Therefore, Iran's position and logic goes beyond the discussion of access to two places. In principle, Tehran is blocking the construction of a railway that will lead the IAEA from a technical point of view to a political destination.
The essence of the story and the claim made may be understandable and indigestible with a little reflection. The owners and users of the atomic bombs have complained about the country's nuclear program, which has accepted the IAEA's most unprecedented inspection system. Of all the member states, 20 percent of the IAEA's total inspections are related to Iran alone. So if Iran were to oppose the IAEA's access, it would be unlikely that it would accept such a level of IAEA inspections.
The announcement of two alleged locations is more of an excuse for political pressure or concessions from Tehran than a technical and legal request. Interestingly, the source of Israel's alleged information is that it is not a member of the NPT at all but has nuclear warheads. It is strange how the IAEA and Western and European countries can tolerate this contradiction.
TASNIM