Nournews: For years, whenever the term “shadow fleet” was mentioned, it evoked a familiar image: tankers switching off their tracking systems to bypass sanctions on Iran, operating under complex flags and ownership structures, and in some cases resorting to ship-to-ship transfers to move their cargoes. But a different picture is now emerging around the Strait of Hormuz. Practices resembling those of the shadow fleet are being used not to evade sanctions on Iran, but to circumvent the risks and restrictions associated with transiting Hormuz. Methods once portrayed as signs of Iran’s efforts to counter sanctions pressure are now becoming part of more routine behavior in parts of the region’s maritime trade.
A recent report by The Telegraph on the tanker Singapore Prosperity provides a clear example of this shift. The tanker disappeared from tracking systems after heading toward Hormuz and reappeared two days later near Fujairah. Such behavior—switching off AIS and sailing beyond the visibility of public tracking systems—is a well-known indicator of “shadow fleet” activity in the oil shipping industry. Today, it can be argued that concerns over new risks in Hormuz are prompting some players to adopt the same tactics.
The development becomes more significant when viewed alongside a strategy announced by Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, about two weeks ago under the title “encircling the blockade.” On September 7, Rezaei said Iran would establish a “prohibited zone” outside the Strait of Hormuz and that vessels entering the area with the aim of transiting the strait and operating without coordination with Iran would be placed under sanctions. He also referred to some vessels sailing at night and switching off their transponders to evade Iran’s detection net.
This is where the meaning of “encircling the blockade” becomes clearer. The strategy does not necessarily mean physically stopping every vessel. If a ship’s owner, insurer or operator knows that transiting Hormuz could expose it to sanctions-related consequences, its behavior may change even without the vessel being seized or sunk. Routes may be altered, AIS may be switched off, transit times may change, ship-to-ship transfers may increase, and shipping companies may seek routes carrying lower risks.
Under such circumstances, the main question is no longer simply: “Is Hormuz open or closed?” The more important question is: At what cost can ships transit Hormuz?
Shipping data published by Reuters show a sharp decline in visible traffic through the waterway, although AIS shutdowns mean that tracked figures do not necessarily correspond to the actual number of vessels making the crossing. At the same time, market reports point to an increase in alternative routes and changes in shipping companies’ behavior. In this high-risk environment, rates for large oil tankers have also surged. Reuters has reported that orders for VLCCs in 2026 have exceeded 217 vessels, with their total value surpassing $20 billion. Part of the increase in demand has been linked to changes in oil shipping routes and longer voyages.
This means that even if oil flows are not completely halted, the cost of transit can rise. War-risk insurance becomes more expensive, ships have to travel longer distances, transit times increase, more fuel is consumed, and cargoes may sometimes have to be transferred from one vessel to another at a different location. A cost initially created at the level of maritime security can eventually be passed on to freight rates, oil and gas prices and, ultimately, the cost of goods. Brent crude is currently trading at around $102 a barrel, while European gas prices have risen from around €30 to nearly €80 per megawatt-hour.
In the United States, the pressure has also spread from the energy market to transportation and agriculture. The average U.S. diesel price has reached around $6.29 per gallon, a level Reuters says is driving up the cost of agricultural machinery and transportation and raising the risk of higher food prices. In Europe, gas storage levels have been reported at around 68% of capacity, while reduced Persian Gulf LNG supplies, combined with the approach of the cold season, are increasing the risk of further gas price rises. In a severe cold-weather scenario, European gas prices could reach around €200/MWh.
As a result, rising risks around Hormuz are not merely a shipping issue. More expensive fuel, higher freight rates and costlier energy increase the cost of producing and transporting agricultural products and are ultimately passed through the supply chain to food prices. In the United States, this pressure takes on added significance ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. In Europe, its coincidence with the cold season could put additional pressure on households, industries and governments to contain energy costs. Reuters has likewise identified higher energy and transportation costs as factors exacerbating inflationary and economic pressures.
From this perspective, what is happening around Hormuz represents a notable reversal. In the past, Iran was accused of resorting to a “shadow fleet” to circumvent sanctions. Today, a significant part of regional trade is turning to similar methods to navigate the Strait of Hormuz. The key difference is that the objective was once to conceal the movement of sanctioned oil; today, the objective is to reduce the risk of detection, attack, seizure or restrictions along a tense maritime route.
Military threats, security warnings, rising insurance risks and broader disruptions to shipping are among the key factors behind this trend. The overall direction of current behavior is clearly consistent with the logic articulated in the “encircling the blockade” strategy: pressure does not have to be created by physically closing a route; sometimes it is enough to raise the cost of using it.
For this reason, the impact of Iran’s strategy should not be measured solely by the number of vessels stopped. If ships are forced to switch off their transponders, alter their routes, use intermediary vessels or accept higher insurance premiums and freight rates, part of the economic objective of counter-pressure is already emerging within the transportation chain itself.
In this equation, Hormuz may remain open on the map, but it is no longer necessarily the same Hormuz as before. The shadow fleet that was once portrayed as an Iranian tool for breaking through the wall of sanctions has now become an indication of changing trade behavior in response to the risks of sanctions and restrictions around Hormuz. In other words, “encircling the blockade” may manifest itself not in the complete halt of vessels, but first in making transit through the strait more expensive, riskier and more complicated—an effect that extends from oil and gas prices to diesel, transportation, agriculture and food costs, putting greater economic and social pressure on the United States ahead of the midterm elections and on Europe as winter approaches.
The spread of shadow fleet practices around the Strait of Hormuz—from switching off AIS systems and rerouting oil tankers to ship-to-ship transfers—has increased the risks and costs of transiting the strategic waterway. By driving up insurance, fuel and shipping costs, the trend is placing significant pressure on oil, gas and food prices across the U.S. and European economies.
Nournews