Wars generally end either in victory or defeat, or through exhaustion and attrition. The fundamental question facing Iran’s Supreme National Security Council is how long the current situation should continue, and which scenario for ending the war has been formulated among the options available.
For now, Iran appears to prefer continuing the “test of strength.” The balance of power is still shifting, but neither side has managed to pin the other down. Under such circumstances, the outcome of the war may ultimately be determined by the exhaustion of both sides.
The exhaustion-and-attrition scenario, however, would offer Iran no tangible gains unless it is accompanied by the lifting of sanctions and the blockade. Here, we briefly examine the arguments behind some of the views on the war’s possible outcome, in the hope that broadening the range of options and arguments can help facilitate decision-making with a clearer outlook.
1. Joining the “World Order”
One argument for resolving the war is that Iran should join the world order and, as Henry Kissinger argued, the only rational path available to Iran is to act as a “nation-state,” operate within the framework of the international order, and distance itself from “empire” or “religious ideology.”
The counterargument, however, is that if joining the world order might once have seemed justified when international rules were at least partially respected, it no longer makes much sense now because the “sheriff” himself is creating disorder.
Iran can hardly be expected to behave within the framework of the “international order” any more than Canada or Britain can, or to ignore its own national interests any more than the authorities in Jolani’s Syria or Iraq can. All these countries have been caught up in the “sheriff’s” madness.
The sheriff, of course, is not alone. A capitalist system and a racist norm stand behind him. Today, we are witnessing the collapse of international law in an overt and unmistakable form. Under such circumstances, any agreement—and indeed any order—is inherently unstable because its foundations have been undermined by the very actor who claims to uphold it.
2. The “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding”
Supporters of this memorandum, which has become known as an agreement, argue that the concessions secured are convincing, that Iran has won the war at both the strategic and tactical levels, and that the government remains firmly in place.
They argue that if the United States resumes the war after the agreement, Iran will have lost nothing and will simply return to where it is today. Moreover, a halt to the fighting would provide an opportunity to rebuild the country’s military and economic capabilities.
The counterargument is that experience has shown that agreements with the United States are unstable and lack sufficient guarantees, resulting instead in the “institutionalization of tension”—a state that is neither war nor peace. An unstable agreement, according to this view, would do little to resolve Iran’s underlying problems.
The institutionalization of tension is a situation in which hostility, sanctions, military threats, deterrence, economic pressure and security preparedness evolve from a temporary condition into a relatively stable equilibrium.
Institutionalized tension amounts to a “political existence in limbo”: permanently standing on the edge of war with a “madman,” leaving the country to undergo prolonged attrition without imposing meaningful costs on the other side.
There is no guarantee that Iranian officials would not once again be targeted in a surprise attack. Therefore, the argument goes, the costs for the United States should be raised “right now.”
An important idea lies at the heart of the opponents’ argument: Iran wants a stable peace, not necessarily a perpetual war, even if its slogans sometimes suggest otherwise.
3. An Agreement Backed by the International Community
One possible solution for Iran is to transform any agreement into a treaty embedded within an international framework and backed by a global consensus.
Trump cannot be trusted; “you cannot make a pact with an intoxicated sheriff.”
This clearly runs counter to the theory that, in any conflict, the greater the number of international actors involved, the harder it becomes to reach an agreement and achieve peace.
Distrust of the United States is pushing Iran toward this option, however tentative it may be: perhaps the United States can be bound to an agreement through international arrangements and commitments.
The agreement would not be guaranteed by John Kerry, Obama, Biden or Trump, but by a global coalition. Moreover, compliance could be monitored on a daily and weekly basis to determine whether the blockade and sanctions against Iran are actually being lifted in accordance with the agreement.
But an obvious question—and a plausible scenario—remains: What if the United States once again walks away from the deal?
The answer, according to this view, is that there is nothing to fear because Iran would simply return to square one. Particularly because Trump would have been stripped of international and domestic legitimacy. The fact that Trump has been willing to offer such concessions makes it highly likely that he would also accept the signatures of other powers and international institutions.
International guarantees, in any case, would represent a step forward.
4. “War Until Victory”
Another argument is that the United States is on the verge of defeat: do not retreat from the enemy’s tent. The war should continue until Iran passes through the “blood-stained pass” and reaches the dawn of victory, whatever the cost.
This, of course, requires the pressure on Iran’s adversaries to become so intense, and the global energy crisis so severe, that the United States is forced to surrender and accept Iran’s supremacy.
Assessing this view requires deep information about Iran’s and the world’s military and economic capacities.
Having said all this, however, one cannot overlook the need to strengthen asymmetric economic capabilities in the face of U.S. military and economic aggression.
The economic and security experience of the Persian Gulf states, Canada and Europe shows that the theory that national security can be ensured through integration into global economic supply chains does not necessarily provide countries with the guarantees required for stability.
Does this mean that a paradigm shift has taken place in today’s world? It is still too early to draw such a conclusion. At the very least, however, circumstances have developed in a way that puts endogenous growth based on national capabilities at the forefront for Iran.
In other words, Iran needs economic power rooted in its own domestic capabilities—much as it has done in the production of military equipment.
Achieving this in the economic sphere requires a coherent theory of endogenous growth and, more importantly, the emergence of political will at the center of government capable of building a “genuinely national” consensus.
Nournews