Nournews: Donald Trump has once again put the option of military action against Iran on the table. He speaks of a “major decision” and claims he is nearing a decision on whether to resume large-scale attacks. At the same time, he says Iranians have contacted the United States and are interested in reaching a deal, while he is expected to consult the leaders of the six Arab Persian Gulf states about Washington’s next step. This apparent contradiction may hold the key to understanding the White House’s new approach: military threats are not necessarily the opposite of negotiations; they may be part of the negotiations themselves.
The central question, however, remains unanswered: If the U.S. military option has failed to shift the equation in Washington’s favor over the past six months, what is another attack supposed to change? During this period, the United States has used military force to exert direct pressure on Iran, but that pressure has not produced the political outcome Washington expected and has also generated unpredictable political, military and economic consequences for the United States. If the objective was to force Iran to accept U.S. demands, returning to the same course requires an explanation beyond the claim that “the pressure will be greater this time.” Increasing the intensity of an instrument whose effectiveness is already seriously in doubt does not necessarily make it more effective.
On the political front, Washington has also yet to reach its desired outcome. The Islamabad agreement has failed to bring the dispute to an end, and fundamental differences remain. The United States, therefore, has achieved neither a final result through military means nor a political outcome that would turn the war into a lasting agreement on its terms. This is what gives Trump’s latest threats their significance: Is the threat of war intended to start another war, or to extract further concessions in negotiations?
In the main theater of the confrontation — the Strait of Hormuz — conditions have also become more complicated for Washington. Efforts to exert pressure through a blockade and restrictions on Iran’s shipping and exports have been met with an Iranian counter-response. Iran’s strategy of “besieging the siege” has effectively shifted the cost of U.S. maritime pressure onto the United States itself and its partners. As a result, each new escalation in the Strait of Hormuz does not necessarily impose costs only on Iran; it could also generate costs for energy markets, shipping and U.S. allies in the region.
At the same time, economic pressure has taken on a dual character. Rising energy prices, inflation, interest rates and pressure on the bond market, on the eve of the U.S. election, are not merely economic indicators; domestically, they have become political issues. The longer the war continues, the more public attention will focus on its costs for the U.S. budget, energy prices and the economy. The White House therefore cannot assess the costs of putting pressure on Iran without also calculating the domestic costs that pressure could generate in the United States.
Perhaps the most important difference from the early months of the war, however, is the change in Iran’s military pattern. Over the past 40 days, reports have emerged of Iranian attacks on U.S. targets and interests in the region, including Jordan, and in some cases Iran has taken preemptive action for the first time. Even if limited from a military perspective, this development is significant in terms of strategic calculations: re-entering the war would not necessarily mean repeating the scenario of its first phase.
As a result, the United States is facing a different set of circumstances. Iran has gone through six months of war, gained a better understanding of its own vulnerabilities and those of its adversary, and in recent weeks has sought to shift its operational approach from simply responding to attacks toward conducting preemptive operations. Any decision to resume large-scale attacks could therefore trigger a response whose costs for the United States and its allies exceed initial calculations.
This is where Trump’s comments about negotiations become significant. If he is genuinely considering a military option, why does he simultaneously speak of Iranian contacts and their interest in reaching a deal? Why does he intend to hear the views of Persian Gulf leaders before making a final decision? And why, at precisely this juncture, have the China channel and diplomatic consultations also become active?
There is no definitive answer to these questions. But one possible interpretation is that Trump does not want negotiations to take place without a threat hanging over them.
For Trump, a military threat serves an important political purpose. If negotiations succeed, the outcome can be presented as the result of U.S. pressure and threats; Washington can claim that Iran came to the negotiating table not on the basis of an equal agreement, but because it feared a resumption of attacks. In this way, even a diplomatic agreement could be presented in Trump’s domestic political narrative, on the eve of the election, as a “victory achieved through pressure.”
This does not mean, however, that the threats are merely a bluff. The risk of miscalculation remains real. When one side continually raises the level of threats in an effort to strengthen its bargaining position, it may eventually be forced to choose between a costly retreat and carrying out the threat. More importantly, the other side may interpret the threat in a way that makes a stronger response appear necessary.
From this perspective, Trump’s problem is not simply choosing between war and negotiations. The greater challenge is finding a way to negotiate without paying the political cost of negotiating. He wants to be able to present any eventual agreement as the product of his pressure, while keeping the military option on the table if no agreement is reached.
But one fundamental question remains: If military action has failed to resolve the equation over more than six months, why should repeating it produce a different result when Iran has become more aggressive, the region has become riskier, and the economic costs of war for the United States have increased?
The war card remains on Trump’s table. But this time, that card comes with far greater costs. The more the military threat is used to extract concessions in negotiations, the narrower the gap becomes between a “lever of pressure” and an actual war. And perhaps that is precisely why Trump wants to know what Tehran, Beijing and the six Arab capitals will do before taking the next step.
Nournews