As the region’s previous security order continues to erode under the shadow of ongoing tensions between Iran and the United States, the central question is which actors will fill the power vacuum created by a reduced U.S. presence—and through what arrangements. Over the past century, Southwest Asia has largely been a permeable region lacking indigenous security arrangements, with developments shaped more by major powers than by local mechanisms.
Following the end of the Cold War, and particularly after 9/11, the gradual reduction of the U.S. presence and Washington’s growing focus on containing China created a power vacuum that contributed to intensifying tensions and competition among regional powers and non-state actors. In this context, U.S. support for Israel in its aggression against Iran further complicated the situation. Yet there are still no clear signs of a new regional security order or security architecture taking shape. The region remains in a transitional phase, a situation that could persist at least in the medium term and offers no clear outlook for war, peace, or mediation.
U.S. Strategy: Reducing Costs and Managing the Region Remotely
Regardless of the outcome of the war with Iran, the United States appears to be seeking to reduce its security commitments and costs in the region. The formation of agreements such as the Mecca Pact can also be viewed in this context: part of the security burden would be transferred to regional partners, allowing the United States to reduce the direct costs of its presence in the region.
This approach is understandable given the largely asymmetric nature of the threats in the region—threats that do not necessarily constitute a direct and costly threat to the United States. At the same time, Washington is placing greater emphasis on containing China and on the Asia-Pacific, and prefers to manage regional developments remotely rather than through a direct presence.
Within this framework, the United States seeks to turn the region into an arena where the costs borne by rivals such as Iran, Russia, and China increase, rather than a theater requiring direct and costly U.S. intervention. Higher energy costs for China and Europe could also be among the consequences that work to Washington’s advantage under this equation.
From the same perspective, the maritime blockade can be viewed as an effort to increase pressure on Iran and gradually wear down its capabilities—applying pressure without drawing the United States into a broader and more costly war.
U.S. Withdrawal: End of the Crisis or Beginning of New Rivalries?
In the near future, the region is likely to remain largely permeable and without stable security arrangements. Even if the United States withdraws, although a major external intervening power would be removed from the region, this would not necessarily result in the emergence of a new security architecture. Therefore, a reduction in the U.S. presence cannot, by itself, be equated with an end to regional crises.
Within Iran, there is sometimes a view that a U.S. withdrawal would remove some of the constraints facing the Islamic Republic. However, this perspective should be considered against the experience of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. That withdrawal raises the question of whether removing an external intervening power necessarily leads to an improvement in the region’s security environment. For Iran, the same question applies: following the U.S. withdrawal, has the security situation along Iran’s eastern borders and in Afghanistan actually moved toward a more favorable condition?
At the same time, although the U.S. presence itself has been a source of threats to the region and Iran, it has also increased U.S. vulnerability vis-à-vis Iran, allowing Tehran to make strategic use of that vulnerability. Therefore, the issue cannot be analyzed solely through the lens of U.S. presence or withdrawal. The region has historically struggled to reach consensus, and a reduced U.S. presence could, alongside reducing certain threats, create conditions for intensified competition among regional powers.
The experience of 2011 and 2012, coinciding with a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Iraq, supports this argument. During that period, competition among Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia intensified, while the Arab Spring emerged as one of the region’s defining developments. These developments showed that even when the presence of extra-regional powers declines, regional powers still lack sufficient capacity to establish sustained cooperation and interaction with one another.
The Components of Power in the Future Regional Order
Under these circumstances, even with a reduced U.S. presence, the relative position of regional powers will become one of the key factors shaping the future order. In this context, hard and military power alone will not be decisive. Domestic cohesion, legitimacy, endogenous power, the ability to build consensus, soft power, and economic capacity will also influence the position of countries within the emerging regional order.
From this perspective, Iran’s own situation requires serious consideration. If, over the past two decades, the country had properly pursued and achieved realistic and clearly defined objectives based on its Vision Plan, Iran might today have been in a stronger position, with a more suitable platform from which to compete with regional powers and play a role in shaping new regional arrangements.
A comparison of Iran and Turkey in 2005, when the Vision Plan was launched, with their respective positions in 2025, after two decades, could provide a clear picture of this shift in relative standing. Such a comparison suggests that the components of power in the future regional order will differ from those of the past, and that military and hard power alone will not determine the position of countries.
Therefore, as the U.S. role declines, a new round of regional competition should be expected—one in which a combination of political, economic, social, and soft-power capabilities, alongside hard power, will determine the position of regional actors.
China: Maintaining the Balance or Taking a More Active Role in the Region?
China has benefited both economically and in terms of energy security from the order established by the United States in the region. At the same time, Beijing has expanded its relations with regional countries, including U.S. allies. It therefore has little interest in seeing this order disrupted in a way that imposes additional costs on China.
This is particularly relevant as the United States, as part of its growing focus on the Asia-Pacific, seeks to reduce its costs in the region. China, for its part, prefers Washington to continue shouldering a larger share of the region’s security burden.
Accordingly, energy security and economic interests remain the central pillars of Beijing’s approach. For this reason, China is unlikely to seek extensive involvement in regional affairs, as it does not want to jeopardize its strategic relations with the United States and countries such as Saudi Arabia.
The Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is an example of this approach. China helped advance the agreement while simultaneously preserving its interests in its relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, because of its friendly relations with all sides of the crisis, China has some capacity to play a role and mediate, particularly on the issue of energy security. However, such a role is likely to remain limited to protecting existing interests and maintaining the current balance, and expectations of broad-based mediation by Beijing should be tempered.
Delays in Regional Agreements and the Continuation of Diplomacy
Against this backdrop, the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting, which was expected to be held within the framework of the Iran-Oman agreement, with its provisions to be shared with other regional countries, was delayed amid U.S. intervention and influence over regional states, as well as developments on the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the dynamics of the Ansarullah-Yemen war with Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, the Saudi side cannot enter negotiations with Iran from a position that is entirely equal to that of its Iranian counterpart, and this factor may also have played a role in the agreement and the subsequent delay.
Iran, for its part, may also prefer to adopt a more active and assertive posture toward the United States, particularly in light of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s conduct regarding the referral of Iran’s case to the UN Security Council and the prevention of the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization from attending meetings in Vienna.
It appears that these factors have now converged to a point where, in practice, all sides have reached a degree of consensus—at least temporarily—on the need to postpone negotiations.
Nevertheless, as has been evident so far, none of the parties has abandoned diplomacy as a principle. All continue to support maintaining this path, even if the process remains very slow, difficult, and at times effectively blocked.
Nournews