In a war that has evolved into a “war of resilience,” one of the most important battlefields is no longer the sky or the ground, but time. Yet one major analytical mistake is to assume that time inherently works in favor of one side and against the other. Time itself is neither Iran's friend nor the enemy of the US and Israel. What determines the direction of the clock's hands is the conduct of the parties, their decisions, and their ability to turn the passage of time into an instrument of power.
For this reason, the more precise question is not, “Whose side is time on?” but rather, who can shape the effects of time?
Today, all three parties face different clocks. The US is confronted with the November midterm elections, the economic costs of the war, energy prices, turmoil in the Treasury bond market, and public opinion. Trump has even explicitly said that the war with Iran will end immediately after the November elections, a position that at the very least shows that ending the war has become a political issue on the eve of the elections. At the same time, the promise to pay $5,000 to every American adult if Republicans win, alongside the promise to end the war, presents an image of an effort to manage public opinion through a combination of “ending the costs” and “economic reward,” as if voters are expected to bear today's costs so that after the elections, both the war will end and they will receive a share of its outcome.
Israel, too, has its own political clock. On the eve of the October elections, Netanyahu must answer to Israeli society what the war with Iran has achieved and why the Iran file has still not reached its conclusion. Promising to continue the pressure or to “finish the job” may be part of an effort to manage this political demand. Indeed, when presenting a complete and decisive victory on the military battlefield becomes difficult, promising to achieve such a victory in the future can become a tool for managing public opinion.
By contrast, Iran does not face an electoral constraint similar to that of the US and Israel. This is an important advantage, but it should not be mistaken for having unlimited time. Iran, too, faces economic pressure, sanctions, infrastructure damage, reconstruction costs, and pressure on people's livelihoods. Therefore, time can be an opportunity for Iran, but only if it is turned into position, capacity, and initiative.
This is where the concept of the “war of time” becomes more complex.
The US wants to produce a presentable result before the costs of the war become a decisive issue in the elections. Israel, too, needs a clear achievement to present to its public. Iran, however, can seek to turn these time constraints into a weakness for its opponents, not through passive waiting but through a set of calculated measures that increase the cost of delay for the other side.
Every day that the current situation continues, if it means greater pressure on energy, the economy, and domestic politics for the US, is not an ordinary day; it is a unit of political pressure. Likewise, every day for Iran, if accompanied by worsening livelihood problems and social erosion, carries a real cost.
Therefore, in a war of resilience, the central question is not who can endure longer, but who wears down faster and who can reduce the pace of their own erosion while increasing the pace of their opponent's.
This is also where the importance of the social and cognitive domains becomes greater.
The US and Israel had expected in their initial calculations that, during the 12-day war and the 40-day war, military pressure would turn Iranian society against the country's governing system. However, the continuation of the war and the emergence of social resistance in the face of foreign attack demonstrated the miscalculation. Under such circumstances, economic pressure, the war of narratives, and efforts to magnify social divisions naturally become more significant, particularly at a time when the element of time has become critically important for the US and Israel.
From this perspective, at a time when Washington and Tel Aviv have concluded that achieving their desired outcome quickly on the military battlefield is not possible, creating or intensifying pressure on the domestic front can become one of their important options.
The purpose of such pressure is not merely to create dissatisfaction; it is to construct an image of Iran as unstable, exhausted, and weak, an image capable of making Iran's defeat and the end of the war believable to American and Israeli audiences.
In other words, if presenting a “decisive military victory” is difficult, a domestic crisis can play the same role in the political narrative as such a victory: Iran is under pressure, society has become divided, its capacity to continue resisting has diminished, and therefore the continuation of pressure has produced results. Within such a framework, a domestic crisis may not necessarily be the ultimate objective but can serve as a narrative bridge between external pressure and a claim of victory.
Of course, not every instance of social dissatisfaction or economic protest should be reduced to a foreign project. Livelihood problems are real and must be taken seriously. However, in wartime conditions, these same problems can become targets for political and cognitive exploitation. Social cohesion is therefore not merely a domestic issue; it is part of national power and one of the most important battlefields of the war.
This is the point at which Iran must act more vigilantly than ever.
Iran's advantage in this race is not merely its ability to withstand pressure. Its greater advantage is that, unlike the US and Israel, it does not face an immediate electoral deadline for determining the fate of the war. This opportunity can allow for longer-term decision-making and help avoid hasty decisions.
But this advantage has value only if it is turned into strategic initiative.
Iran should not wait for time to do its work. It must make time more costly for the other side and more productive for itself. Every diplomatic, economic, security, or regional initiative that changes the opponent's calculations is, in fact, a form of “time management.”
In diplomacy, Iran must make use of the windows created by differences between the US and its allies, potential disagreements between the US and Israel, and regional countries' concerns about the continuation of the war. In the economic sphere, it must neutralize the pressures resulting from sanctions and blockade by activating alternative routes, diversifying trade partners, and reducing domestic vulnerabilities. In the military and security spheres, every action must be accompanied by the calculation of how it can increase the military, economic, and political costs for the other side without drawing Iran into the kind of attritional conflict its opponent seeks.
Above all, however, the external war must not be allowed to turn into internal division.
If the enemy cannot achieve its desired result from outside, it will naturally look for a point within the country from which to change the equation. Preserving social cohesion, reducing livelihood hardships, managing public opinion, countering destructive narratives, and strengthening the sense of participation and trust within society are therefore part of the war strategy, not peripheral issues alongside it.
Indeed, Iran's most important asset in the war of time is not merely its missiles, drones, energy, or geographical position; it is the ability to preserve cohesion and turn pressure into political power.
From this perspective, Iran must do three things simultaneously: strengthen its own points of strength, target the enemy's vulnerabilities, and repair domestic weaknesses before they can become instruments in the hands of the enemy.
This means that time should not merely be “bought”; it must be used strategically.
The coming weeks may pass without a fundamental development, only for a single event to then change all the calculations. For this reason, vigilance, speed in decision-making, and the ability to identify opportunities become critically important. In a war of this level of complexity, one correct decision at the right time can be worth weeks or even months of resistance, just as a single miscalculation can eliminate a significant part of the advantage that has been created.
Thus, the hands of the clock today are not necessarily turning against Iran or against the US and Israel. They turn in the direction that the actions of the parties lead them.
The US and Israel need results to get past their electoral deadlines. Iran needs cohesion, initiative, and timely decisions to preserve its advantage.
Therefore, Iran's strategy should not be “waiting for the enemy to wear itself down.” Rather, it must be the activation of time: seizing opportunities, exploiting the opponent's weaknesses, strengthening domestic strengths, opening new paths, reducing its own costs, and increasing the costs for the other side of continuing its pressure.
In a race against time, the winner is not the one who simply gets tired later. The winner is the one who brings about the greatest change in the equation before the windows for decision-making close.
And perhaps this is the most important principle for Iran: time should not be waited for; it must be made.
NOURNEWS