Nournews: Rezaei’s remarks last night about designating a restricted zone outside the Strait of Hormuz cannot be viewed simply as a maritime warning. He said the zone would begin at the line of the U.S. naval blockade and extend across parts of the Persian Gulf, with vessels entering the area potentially being placed on Iran’s sanctions list.
Combined with his comments on new arrangements for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the statement points to a major shift in Iran’s strategy. The issue is no longer simply whether Hormuz is closed or left open; it is about setting the rules for passage and raising the costs for those who disregard them.
Blockade for a Blockade
The United States is seeking to impose a blockade on Iran’s exports and trade by relying on its naval power. Tehran can now put forward a different logic: If a vessel operates within the framework of the U.S. blockade and disregards Iran’s declared arrangements, it could expose itself to restrictions imposed by Iran.
Under such a strategy, Iran does not necessarily need to resort to direct military action against every vessel. It may be enough to raise the cost of complying with the U.S. blockade.
In this model, the “restricted zone” is not merely a line on a map; it represents a risk zone for the shipping industry.
Sanctions Target More Than Just the Ship
Another important aspect is the potential chain of measures Iran could take. Rezaei’s comments on new passage rules suggest that the policy is not aimed solely at the vessel in violation.
The ship’s owner, operator, flag state, insurer and classification society could also face sanctions or countermeasures if their involvement and the necessary conditions are established.
This means Iran could move from the logic of “sanctioning a ship” toward sanctioning the network of service providers that support it.
That matters greatly in the shipping industry. International maritime operations depend on insurance, classification, flag registration and a range of specialized services. Therefore, if using the services of a sanctioned entity also carries consequences for other vessels, the deterrent effect could extend far beyond a single ship.
From this perspective, the approach could eventually go beyond the Hormuz issue and serve as a strategic model for countering unilateral U.S. sanctions and countries that comply with them. In other words, any economic actor that participates in enforcing U.S. sanctions against Iran could expose itself to Iranian countermeasures, increasing the cost of complying with Washington’s sanctions.
Under such an approach, Iran would no longer simply accept the unilateral sanctions regime imposed by the United States; it would seek to impose costs for the other side’s sanctions-related conduct as well.
The Risk Moves From the Sea to the Shipowner’s Office
Under such circumstances, a shipowner would have to calculate a range of risks before deciding whether to pass through the area: Is the intended route consistent with Iran’s arrangements? Has the ship’s insurer been blacklisted? Is its flag or classification society subject to restrictions?
This is where Iran’s measures could begin even before a vessel enters the Strait of Hormuz—and potentially continue even after it passes through.
The objective is not necessarily to stop every vessel. Rather, it is to make the shipping company itself conclude that passing through without complying with Iran’s rules is a costly decision.
Nationality Doesn’t Matter; Conduct Does
Another key element of this mechanism is the distinction between nationality and conduct. The main criterion would not necessarily be the owner’s nationality or the place where the vessel is registered. Instead, the vessel’s conduct and its compliance with the declared arrangements would be decisive.
This approach significantly broadens the range of actors affected by the new policy. The equation would no longer involve governments alone; the shipping market, insurers, shipowners and operators would also become direct participants.
Hormuz Enters a New Phase
If implemented as outlined by Iran’s secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, this policy could fundamentally move the Hormuz equation beyond its traditional binary framework and change the rules of the game.
Until now, the central question was: Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz or not?
The more important question now is: Who is allowed to pass, and under what conditions?
This shift transforms Hormuz from a purely military waterway into a battleground over rules—one in which the United States seeks to impose its rules through a blockade, while Iran seeks to neutralize that blockade by imposing costs on the network that complies with it.
The new strategy can be summed up in one sentence:
The United States wants to blockade Iran; Iran wants to pass the cost of that blockade on to the ships, insurers and companies that participate in enforcing it and effectively comply with U.S. rules.
This is “a blockade for a blockade.” And from now on, Hormuz may become not merely a passageway for oil tankers, but a testing ground for new rules governing maritime trade in the region.
NOURNEWS