For months, the conduct of the United States and Israel toward Iran has shown that their main disagreement is no longer over the basic objective of applying pressure to change Iran's political system. Rather, the disagreement is increasingly over how to achieve that goal. One side has emphasized military strikes and the erosion of Iran's defensive and strategic capabilities, while the other is seeking to pursue the same objective at lower military cost through economic pressure, a naval blockade, cutting off oil revenues and restricting financial channels.
This shift in tactics, particularly after months of war, carries important implications. The United States is now openly talking about intensifying its "economic war" while simultaneously turning the naval blockade of Iran's oil exports into its main instrument of pressure. US officials have even spoken of maintaining the blockade indefinitely.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an article today titled, "Regime Change in Iran? Why It Might Actually Work This Time," which, given recent developments, should be viewed as more than simply a press analysis. The Israeli outlet argues that the Islamic Republic has weathered war and sanctions but now faces a blockade of its oil exports, a situation that could, this time, strike at one of the government's main pillars of power.
The significance of the article lies precisely in the phrase "this time": the assumption that previous forms of pressure failed to produce the desired outcome, but that a new combination of war, sanctions, an oil blockade and economic pressure could bring Iran to a different point.
But this is where the United States and Israel are making a fundamental miscalculation: Iran is not merely the object of pressure in this equation; it is an actor.
The model envisioned by Washington and Tel Aviv appears linear: more pressure means less revenue; less revenue means greater public dissatisfaction; greater dissatisfaction means deeper political divisions; and ultimately, regime change.
But in the real world, there is a variable between each of these stages that cannot simply be removed: Iran's own initiatives.
Over the years, Iran has repeatedly shown that precisely when the other side believes Tehran has reached its "end point," it can use initiative, surprise and a change in the battlefield to alter the equation. Iran's experience is not merely one of "withstanding pressure"; it is also an experience of shifting pressure onto the other side.
This is particularly important in the context of a naval blockade. Even assuming that the United States could severely restrict Iran's oil exports through its southern routes, Iran is not a country whose economic and geopolitical channels all terminate in the Persian Gulf. To the east, west and north, Iran is connected to a network of neighbors, markets, land routes and trade corridors.
These routes cannot easily replace the enormous capacity of maritime transport, but they underscore an important reality: closing one chokepoint is not the same as imposing a complete blockade on an entire country.
But even that is not the most important issue.
The main issue begins when pressure moves beyond "economic costs" and, from Iran's perspective, becomes a threat to its survival and existence. At that point, Tehran certainly will not play by the rules of the game that the United States believes it has designed.
If the United States designs the blockade to transfer pressure onto Iran, Iran, through its own initiatives, will also transfer the cost of the blockade onto the other side, from energy markets and maritime security to US and allied interests in the region and even the political and economic situation inside the United States. Under such circumstances, a blockade intended to serve as an "alternative to war" could itself become a catalyst for a new cycle of confrontation.
Recent remarks by Esmaeil Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, are noteworthy in this context. Responding to a question about a change in Iran's behavioral pattern, he spoke of a combination of "chess" and "poker," stressing that Iranians are both professional chess players and good poker players.
This expression can be understood as more than a media metaphor. Chess is a game of calculation, patience and planning several moves ahead. Poker is a game of uncertainty, incomplete information and forcing an opponent to make decisions without knowing the full capabilities of the other side.
The combination of the two means that Iran is not necessarily going to simply absorb pressure. Precisely when the other side believes it has won the game, Iran may change the rules of the game.
This is where the main weakness in Haaretz's premise becomes apparent. The analysis views Iran as being in a position of "withstanding pressure," rather than as an actor capable of shifting the cost of the blockade onto the United States and its allies and thereby changing the pressure equation itself, both in substance and in form.
The United States may be able to start a war. It may even be able to change the way that war begins, from a military attack to an economic blockade. But that does not mean it can also control Iran's response.
Starting a conflict is not the same as determining how it ends.
Washington can choose the timing and tools of pressure, but it cannot guarantee at what point, by what means or on what terrain Iran will respond. In fact, shifting the war from the military battlefield to the economic arena does not necessarily mean greater control over the conflict; it may simply change the form of its uncertainty and costs.
This is where the US and Israeli calculation could encounter a paradox: the more suffocating the pressure becomes, the more likely Iran is to view it as an existential threat; and the more existential the threat becomes, the greater the incentive to change the rules of the game.
The central question, therefore, is no longer simply whether a blockade can put Iran under pressure. Clearly, a blockade creates costs. The more important issue is that pressure does not necessarily remain where it is applied.
If the United States and Israel believe that they can reduce their own costs by transforming military warfare into an economic blockade, they may face a major miscalculation. Rather than containing the conflict, a blockade could shift it into areas that are far more difficult for Washington to control, from energy security and maritime shipping to US and allied interests in the region and even political and economic costs inside the United States.
From this perspective, the main weakness in Haaretz's premise lies not only in its assessment of Iran's resilience, but also in its assumption that Iran is merely a passive variable in response to pressure. Iran can come under pressure, pay a price and suffer damage; but at the same time, it can decide how, where and to what extent to return some of that cost to the other side.
Washington and Tel Aviv may have spent months planning to bring Iran to an "end point." But in the politics of power, one side's end point is not necessarily the end of the game. Sometimes, precisely when one side believes its opponent has no move left, the game is redefined.
This is the difference between imposing pressure and controlling the outcome; and it appears to be the greatest gap in the strategic calculations behind the regime-change strategy toward Iran.
NOURNEWS