Nournews: The US war against Iran is not over, despite the guns and military hardware having fallen silent. It has simply moved from the skies to the ground — and into the economy. If military commanders and operation rooms were decisive during the first phase, namely the two 12-day and 40-day wars, the initiative has now shifted to the US Treasury Department. The shift in the center of decision-making from Pete Hegseth and the Pentagon to Scott Bessent and the Treasury is no simple development. It means Washington has concluded that what it could not achieve through military power, it may be able to achieve through financial, banking and trade pressure.
A Consistent US Approach Toward Iran
The new US plan is built precisely on this logic: a broad economic blockade, restrictions on trade and oil exports, targeting Iran’s financial network, and forcing other countries to choose between cooperation with the United States and cooperation with Iran. Most recently, Britain has announced that it will join the campaign, while China, the world’s second-largest economy, has refused to do so and once again reaffirmed its opposition to unilateral sanctions. It is also important to note that the economic, financial and social pressures facing the United States are by no means less serious than the problems Iran has faced as a result of war, sanctions and blockade.
Against this backdrop, the three-hour meeting held by Masoud Pezeshkian at the Central Bank of Iran takes on particular significance. During the meeting, the president spoke both of “understanding and negotiations” and of “standing firm against economic pressure.” Perhaps his most important point was that just as the United States failed to achieve its objectives through military force, it would also fail in an economic war. If this is merely a political slogan, it may have little value. But if it is understood in the context of US behavior and the experience of recent months, it could amount to a strategic assessment.
The reality is that US behavior in recent months has followed a relatively clear pattern. In the military conflict, maximum pressure was initially applied, the level of threats was raised, and there was an assumption that Iran would be forced to retreat within days. But as time passed, the costs of the war increased for all sides, and eventually the same Washington that had called for escalating pressure moved toward halting the conflict and returning to an understanding. There are now signs that the same logic is being repeated in the economic sphere. In other words, the United States is pursuing maximum pressure not necessarily as an end in itself, but as a tool to alter Iran’s calculations.
That, of course, should not be taken as proof that the United States is about to return to negotiations. US foreign policy is more complex than can be explained by any single pattern. But experience shows that whenever the costs of a strategy begin to outweigh its benefits, Washington tends to activate diplomatic channels as well. The difference at this stage is that the pressure is more prolonged and time-consuming. An economic war will not be decided within days; its purpose is to erode economic decision-making capacity, increase market instability and transfer the pressure into people’s daily lives.
Calculating According to the Rules of Economic Warfare
For this reason, perhaps the most important part of Pezeshkian’s remarks was not his emphasis on resistance, but his focus on containing inflation expectations, stabilizing the foreign exchange market, and engaging in frank communication with the public. In an economic war, expectations can sometimes be more dangerous than reality. If society perceives the future as unstable, people’s own economic behavior can become a factor that deepens the crisis — from rushing into foreign currency and gold markets to capital flight, hoarding and reduced investment. Under such circumstances, managing public perceptions is no longer merely a media issue; it becomes part of economic management.
But this is where another important reality must be taken into account. In an economic war, social capital is a country’s most important asset. Social capital cannot be created through slogans; it is built through trust. Trust emerges when people feel that the government is not hiding realities, that decisions are predictable, and that the costs of external pressure are being distributed fairly. If society believes that certain groups are benefiting from privileges and rents while the main burden falls on the middle and lower classes, that creates precisely the conditions an economic war seeks to produce.
This is why the biggest mistake would be to manage an economic war solely through the language of military resistance. Resistance is necessary, but it is not enough. What matters is strengthening economic resilience — making the economy more capable of continuing to function under pressure. Resilience means a predictable foreign exchange market, allowing producers to plan for the coming months, ensuring that essential imports continue without shocks, preventing exporters from facing new regulations every day, and giving households confidence that the government has a plan for difficult times rather than merely promises.
Iran’s strategy in the economic war must be both proactive and flexible. Proactive, because Tehran cannot simply wait for Washington to grow tired of economic pressure and move toward an understanding on its own. Flexible, because every new pressure should not be turned into a political dead end. Washington’s most important objective is to create a global consensus against Iran. One of Tehran’s key tasks, therefore, should be to break that consensus. China’s refusal to join the US plan shows that not all actors — particularly key players — are willing to bear the cost of Washington’s strategy. This divide should be widened through economic and political diplomacy, not through policies that turn every potential partner into an active opponent.
At the same time, domestic policy must move away from a reactive approach. A wartime economy is not an ordinary economy. Under conditions of economic warfare, the government must clearly define its priorities: monetary and currency stability, protecting livelihoods, maintaining trade, supporting production and preserving public trust. Holding regular meetings with economists and drawing on academic expertise is precisely the kind of practice that, if taken beyond individual meetings and institutionalized, could improve the quality of decision-making. Economic warfare requires expert decisions more than ever — not merely political ones.
Perhaps the most important lesson from recent experience is that understanding and resistance are not contradictory concepts. An understanding has value when it is the product of strength and resilience, not exhaustion and desperation. Likewise, resistance is effective when it does not close off political and diplomatic avenues or push the economy to the point of exhaustion. If the United States once again moves toward an understanding after a period of maximum pressure, that understanding will only be an achievement for Iran if, in the meantime, the country has managed to keep its economy more stable, its society more cohesive and its diplomatic position stronger.
The outcome of this war will be determined less in Washington than in Tehran. The United States can exert pressure, but it cannot determine the quality of Iran’s economic governance. Victory in this arena does not mean defeating the United States; it means frustrating a strategy designed to erode Iran’s political and social will through economic pressure. If that erosion does not occur, a possible US return to the path of understanding would not be a concession to Iran, but an acknowledgment of the limits of economic pressure.
Nournews