In assessing the security situation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, two indicators are usually given the most attention: the volume of crude oil passing through the strait and global oil prices. These two indicators are important, but they are not sufficient to measure the true depth of the energy crisis. A more decisive indicator is the condition of refined petroleum products, where diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel are directly tied to transportation, production, and people’s daily lives. Under current conditions, the price gap between refined products and crude oil, known as the crack spread, has reached unprecedented levels, with the diesel spread approaching $100 per barrel. At the same time, diesel exports from Russia, the Middle East, and Asia have declined, and the global market is facing an increasingly severe shortage of refined products.
The significance of this development is that the Hormuz crisis is no longer merely a crisis of “crude oil supply”; it has become a crisis of refining capacity and access to refined products. Damage to Russian refineries during the war in Ukraine, disruptions at refineries in the region, and limited access to refinery feedstock, combined with reduced traffic through Hormuz, have created a fragile chain. As a result, the Russian Federation, one of the world's major gasoline suppliers, has now itself become an importer of the product. Under these circumstances, crude oil prices may appear relatively contained compared with the scale of the disruption, while diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel prices have experienced unprecedented increases. This is the point at which an energy crisis moves from financial markets into the real economy. Recent reports have also pointed to severe restrictions on diesel supplies and US efforts to source refinery feedstock from more distant suppliers.
China’s behavior is another determining variable in this equation. Official data show that China’s oil imports rose to 8.41 million barrels per day in July, although they remain below last year’s level, and China absorbed part of the market pressure during the previous phase of the crisis by reducing its demand. However, in the physical oil market, information obtained from major traders involved in selling Persian Gulf oil points to an increase in Chinese buying demand in August. Although this information has not yet been reflected in official monthly statistics or public international reports, it has already had a practical impact on the market. According to this information, in some transactions, the offered price for cargoes increased by around $2 per barrel within a single day. If this trend becomes established, it would mean greater competition for available cargoes and, consequently, greater pressure on the price of refinery feedstock and refined products.
This situation takes on greater strategic significance when considered alongside the condition of the US economy. US economic growth fell to 1.5% in the second quarter of 2026, compared with 2.1% in the first quarter. In financial markets, meanwhile, a $25 billion auction of 30-year US Treasury bonds on August 13 was conducted at a yield of 5.216%, the highest auction rate for these securities since 2001. At the same time, the July budget deficit reached $432 billion, while the cumulative fiscal-year deficit approached $1.8 trillion.
In such an economy, higher energy prices can create a multilayered shock: refined-product prices rise, inflation remains elevated, the Federal Reserve has less room to cut interest rates, and long-term rates remain high. As a result, the cost of government financing and debt servicing increases. Therefore, war does not impose only military costs on Washington; it can also create financial, inflationary, and political costs.
From this perspective, Donald Trump’s recent threat to impose “heavy economic pressure” on Iran, if accompanied by increased pressure on Hormuz, creates a strategic contradiction. The US may be able to exert greater pressure on Iran’s revenues, but a counterreaction could prolong energy disruptions, with a significant portion of the cost of that pressure ultimately being passed on to global markets and, eventually, American consumers.
Trump himself has now explicitly acknowledged rising gasoline prices and described them as a cost Americans will have to bear, while recent reports have pointed to growing domestic dissatisfaction and political pressure stemming from the war and fuel prices.
This is where the November congressional midterm elections become a serious constraint for Washington. The effects of a war intended to increase pressure on Iran have come back like a boomerang and have now become an issue of gasoline prices, inflation, purchasing power, and the administration’s economic performance ahead of the elections. Two-thirds of Americans opposed the war in a recent poll, and the economic pressure resulting from it has become one of the Republicans’ vulnerabilities.
From this perspective, the future of the war should not be assessed solely on the basis of each side’s ability to inflict a blow; the more important measure is its ability to absorb the cost of the counterblow. If the war becomes a war of attrition, time could become a decisive variable. Iran will face severe economic pressure, but the US will also have to manage the costs of energy, inflation, interest rates, debt, and the elections simultaneously. Conversely, if Washington seeks to rapidly intensify pressure, it will have to accept the risk of renewed energy disruptions and their transformation into an economic shock.
Therefore, the equation of war is shifting from “the ability to exert pressure” to “the ability to withstand reciprocal pressure.” Trump can threaten to increase economic pressure on Iran, but the more that pressure runs through the energy market and Hormuz, the greater the possibility that it will turn into an economic and electoral boomerang for the US.
Perhaps the most important indicator of the situation in Hormuz is no longer the number of barrels passing through it. What matters is how many dollars this crisis adds to the price of diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel, and how much of the US economic and political capacity those higher prices will consume. In this framework, the war is no longer merely a contest measuring the military strength of the two sides; it has become a test of Trump’s economic and political resilience through the November elections.
NOURNEWS