Nournews: The war between the United States and Iran has entered a phase in which its outcome is no longer determined solely on the battlefield. The central equation is gradually becoming tied to the concept of “resilience”: which side can bear the costs of war for longer, and which side will conclude sooner that continuing the war costs more than it delivers. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the key point connecting the military battlefield to the economy and politics.
Iran has demonstrated its determination and ability to maintain pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, while remaining aware of the economic and political costs of the war for the United States. The sharp decline in maritime traffic through the strait — at a time when around 130 to 140 vessels passed through it daily before the war, while at one point only eight vessels crossed in a single day — shows that the Hormuz issue remains a practical reality. Washington, meanwhile, faces a complex military, economic and diplomatic challenge in restoring the waterway to conditions favorable to its interests.
The significance of this situation becomes even greater when viewed alongside the U.S. economic outlook. A range of strategic indicators suggests that the U.S. economy is entering a period of mounting pressure. U.S. gross domestic product grew at an annualized rate of 1.5 percent in the second quarter of 2026, below economists’ 2.1 percent forecast and down from the 2.1 percent growth recorded in the first quarter. The labor market also showed signs of weakness: contrary to expectations, the U.S. economy lost 23,000 jobs in July, while the unemployment rate remained at 4.1 percent. At the same time, consumer inflation stood at 3.4 percent and core inflation at 2.5 percent, both still above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent target.
But perhaps the most important warning signal can be seen in the U.S. debt market. On August 13, the U.S. Treasury sold $25 billion worth of 30-year bonds at a yield of 5.216 percent — the highest auction rate for such bonds since 2001. This figure alone does not indicate a crisis, but when viewed alongside the widening budget deficit, it takes on strategic significance.
The U.S. Treasury Department has reported that the budget deficit reached $432 billion in July, while the cumulative deficit during the first 10 months of fiscal year 2026 approached $1.8 trillion — exceeding the total deficit recorded in fiscal year 2025. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the fiscal 2026 deficit at around $1.9 trillion, equivalent to 5.8 percent of GDP, and expects net interest costs on the national debt to exceed $1 trillion this year.
The longer-term interest rates remain elevated, the more expensive it becomes for the government to issue new debt, forcing it to devote a larger share of its resources to debt servicing. The war has also pushed up energy prices, a trend that could fuel further inflation. Under such circumstances, the Federal Reserve would have less room to cut interest rates. The war could therefore simultaneously increase government costs and constrain the monetary policy space available to deal with those pressures.
Meanwhile, there is a potentially serious risk: the emergence of a psychological shock in U.S. financial markets. Rising bond yields mean falling prices for existing bonds. If, amid political and economic uncertainty, investors conclude that rates will continue to rise or that the value of U.S. assets will fall further, a “preemptive selling” dynamic could emerge — with bond and stock holders seeking to exit not because a crisis has already occurred, but out of fear that one is coming.
Such a situation could create a self-reinforcing cycle: bond selling pushes prices lower and yields higher; rising yields intensify concerns over financing costs and asset valuations, and those concerns could spill over into the stock market. If the process intensifies, what begins as a psychological concern could turn into a real economic shock.
This matters because China, the wealthy Persian Gulf states and other foreign investors also hold substantial amounts of U.S. assets. China alone held around $659 billion in U.S. Treasury securities as of May 2026. A severe crisis in U.S. asset markets could therefore have international repercussions. At the same time, these countries would also suffer losses from a decline in the value of their holdings, making a sudden exit costly for them. Yet during financial crises, changing expectations and collective behavior can sometimes override conventional economic calculations.
Under these circumstances, Iran’s role as a strategic and calculating actor becomes increasingly important. Tehran understands that a naval blockade of its southern coast does not amount to a complete blockade of Iran. Its northern, western and eastern borders provide avenues for economic breathing room and engagement with its surrounding environment. This does not mean that the war is cost-free for Iran; Iran, too, has paid a heavy price. The strategic question, however, is one of comparing the rate of attrition on both sides.
Iran also knows that Trump faces a serious political challenge ahead of the U.S. midterm congressional elections. Rising energy prices, inflationary pressures, the costs of war and a prolonged conflict could increase the political cost of continuing the war for the White House. From this perspective, time is not a neutral variable; it has now become one of the key instruments of power.
Iran has concluded that its resilience is greater than Washington anticipated. So why should it accept a deal based merely on limited concessions that would allow Trump to escape the crisis before the costs already paid by Iran are converted into strategic gains? Negotiations can certainly continue, but negotiation does not necessarily mean relinquishing leverage. Under such circumstances, negotiations themselves can become part of a strategy for managing time and strengthening bargaining power.
The central issue is that Iran does not need to wait for the U.S. economy to collapse in order to defeat America. It only needs to take the war to a point where the cost of continuing it for Washington gradually rises, while the political and economic cost of withdrawing without concessions also becomes increasingly high for Trump. In this equation, Hormuz is more than just a waterway; it is a lever capable of connecting the military battlefield to energy markets, financial markets and U.S. domestic politics.
The Iran-U.S. war has increasingly become a test of national resilience. Even if the United States has the military capacity to continue the war, it must answer a decisive question: Can it simultaneously bear the military costs, energy pressures, budget deficits, high interest rates, mounting debt and the political costs of the elections? Iran, for its part, must also manage the economic and human costs of the war, but it possesses geographic advantages, popular support, regional depth and the ability to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a pressure lever.
The main danger for the United States is not necessarily a sudden economic collapse, but a gradual slide into a zone where a political, military or psychological shock could connect existing vulnerabilities and suddenly accelerate the crisis. In such an equation, time becomes a strategic asset for Iran: every additional day of war in which Tehran maintains its resilience brings it closer to success, while simultaneously increasing the cost for Washington of withdrawing from a war that has so far failed to deliver meaningful gains.
Nournews