Nournews: Recent developments surrounding the emerging defense framework between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan suggest less the birth of a fully operational security alliance with a clearly defined structure than an effort by the three countries to establish a new political-security framework and leverage its strategic and symbolic potential. The framework is still in its early stages, with details regarding its implementation mechanisms, decision-making process and many of its institutional dimensions still being worked out. At this stage, therefore, its political and symbolic weight is at least as important as its operational capacity.
Against this backdrop, Egypt’s absence from the initial announcement carries significance beyond a mere protocol dispute.
A senior Egyptian military official and a senior political official, both of whom spoke to Nournews on condition of anonymity, have provided an account of why Cairo was absent from the announcement. According to the two officials, Egypt’s main issue was not with the defense cooperation itself, but with the way Cairo was invited and the position it was offered within the initiative.
According to the accounts provided separately by the two officials to Nournews, Egypt had indicated that it would join if it were present at the announcement ceremony as one of the four founding countries. However, according to the officials, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later said that he would not attend the ceremony if Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi were present. In the end, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman proposed that the framework be announced with Erdoğan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and himself in attendance, with Egypt joining at a later stage.
Cairo, however, did not accept that formula.
According to the two Egyptian officials, el-Sisi believed that such an arrangement was inconsistent with Egypt’s historical standing, particularly given that the initiative was being announced in Mecca under Saudi leadership, with two non-Arab countries — Türkiye and Pakistan — occupying founding positions, while Egypt, one of the Arab world’s most important powers and a traditional player in regional security affairs, was left outside the initiative’s initial framework.
One of the two informed officials described Cairo’s position in telling terms: announcing an agreement centered on Saudi Arabia, in Mecca and in the presence of two non-Arab countries, while Egypt was absent from the group of founders, was incompatible with “Arab honor and pride.”
The statement by the Egyptian official suggests that the issue for Cairo is not merely a disagreement over the timing or manner of joining. Rather, it concerns Egypt’s status, prestige and position within the political and security hierarchy of the Arab world.
This point becomes even more significant when the current nature of the framework is taken into account. The three countries are still working out its institutional and implementation mechanisms, and many of its operational details will be determined at later stages. At present, therefore, one of the initiative’s most important assets is its symbolic power and political messaging.
Saudi Arabia can present itself as the driving force behind the initiative; Türkiye, by standing alongside Riyadh, can showcase its military and geopolitical weight; and Pakistan can lend the arrangement a distinct form of credibility through its unique military standing. The initial image of the three countries itself carries a political message: the emergence of a new security arrangement among major powers of the Muslim world.
So what would Egypt gain?
Had Cairo been included among the founders, it could have presented itself as one of the architects of this emerging security architecture and benefited from its political and symbolic value. But if it joins later, the narrative would be different: Egypt would become a country joining a framework that others had already designed and announced.
For a country with Egypt’s historical standing in the Arab world, that is no small distinction.
From this perspective, Cairo’s position can be viewed as a negotiation over status, rather than merely a negotiation over membership. If Egypt were simply seeking membership, the offer to join at a later stage could have been acceptable. But if the issue is Egypt’s position in the region’s future security architecture, subsequent membership cannot carry the same political value as being a founding member.
Recent remarks by Hakan Fidan, Türkiye’s foreign minister, further highlight this distinction. Fidan said he hoped Egypt would join the framework after considering all aspects of the matter. His comments indicate that the door remains open to Cairo and that the disagreement is not necessarily over the principle of defense cooperation, but rather over how Egypt joins and what status it would hold.
In fact, Cairo’s position could perhaps be described as an attempt to prevent itself from becoming “the fourth member.” In regional politics, the distinction between being a “founder” and a “later entrant” is not merely a legal one; it carries political and reputational significance.
According to the two informed Egyptian officials, Cairo does not want to remain absent from the region’s emerging security order, but neither is it willing to sacrifice its position as one of the Arab world’s principal pillars in order to participate. In this context, “Arab honor and pride” is essentially a political expression of that sensitivity.
The central question, therefore, is no longer simply whether Egypt will join the framework. The more important question is whether the architects of this emerging security architecture are willing to place Egypt among its founders, or merely admit it as a country that joins at a later stage.
The answer could determine whether this framework ultimately develops into a broader security arrangement across the Muslim world or remains a trilateral initiative with primarily political and symbolic potential.
Nournews