Security developments in West Asia are entering a different phase. After years of war, rivalry, foreign intervention and costly security experiences, countries across the region are facing a common question more than ever before: how and through what mechanisms should the future security of the region be ensured?
In this context, the defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey in Mecca cannot simply be considered a trilateral military agreement. The significance of this pact lies less in its announced provisions and more in the signal it sends about efforts by some regional countries to redefine their security arrangements.
According to the announced terms, an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three, while members have pledged to expand defense cooperation and strengthen joint deterrence. However, the operational commitments of the agreement remain unclear, and it cannot be described as the formation of a “new NATO” in the region. What has emerged so far is less a fully operational military structure and more a political-security framework aimed at enhancing deterrence and diversifying security partnerships.
The composition of the pact’s members is also significant from this perspective. Pakistan possesses considerable military and nuclear capabilities; Turkey has a powerful military, operational experience and a growing defense industry; while Saudi Arabia brings financial strength, energy resources and a unique geopolitical position. Linking these three capabilities could give Riyadh and its two partners greater weight in regional security calculations.
In the initial reactions to the Mecca agreement, some regional and international analysts and media outlets have described it as an effort by Saudi Arabia to strengthen deterrence against Iran and establish a new balance against Tehran’s regional power, particularly after what they describe as the failure of the US in the recent war with Iran and the demonstration of Iran’s indigenous military capabilities in confronting one of the world’s largest military forces.
Under this interpretation, Pakistan’s presence as a military and nuclear power and Turkey’s role as one of the region’s major military and defense actors could allow Riyadh to enhance its deterrence capacity against what it views as potential threats stemming from Iran’s power.
However, reducing the Mecca agreement to an anti-Iran arrangement cannot fully explain all dimensions of this development, because Saudi Arabia’s security calculations in recent years have been shaped by a combination of threats, security experiences and accumulated concerns. Therefore, understanding why this agreement emerged requires examining Saudi Arabia’s security environment as a whole, rather than viewing it solely through the lens of Iran.
Saudi Arabia, on one hand, has experienced the Yemen war and missile and drone attacks by the Houthis; an experience that demonstrated how even a non-state actor, relying on missile and drone technology, could target the strategic depth and critical infrastructure of a major regional power with a modern military equipped and supported by the United States.
On the other hand, regional rivalries and tensions, ongoing wars and instability in the surrounding environment have further complicated Riyadh’s security calculations.
From this perspective, the Mecca pact can be seen as part of Saudi Arabia’s effort to diversify its security options while maintaining cooperation with Washington. This trend does not necessarily mean distancing itself from the US; rather, it may indicate that Riyadh does not want to keep its security dependent solely on one external partner and prefers to maintain a network of powerful partners.
Meanwhile, Iran is undoubtedly one of the important variables in the region’s security environment. However, turning the entire Mecca pact into an “alliance against Iran” presents an oversimplified picture of reality. Tehran-Ankara, Tehran-Islamabad and even Tehran-Riyadh relations have, over the years, been multi-layered, changing and at times based on dialogue and de-escalation.
Therefore, a more accurate assessment is to view the Mecca agreement as part of a broader restructuring of regional power balances and security arrangements; a restructuring in which Iran is one of the main actors, rather than necessarily the ultimate target.
However, what draws more attention than the agreement itself is Tehran’s response to it.
Decline of Trust in US From Historical Experience to Reality on Ground
The countries involved in this process have maintained close relations with the US for years and viewed Washington as one of the pillars of their security. However, recent developments have made the costs of relying entirely on this power increasingly clear.
Recent regional wars, particularly the 12-day war and the developments during Ramadan, highlighted for many countries in the region that, at critical moments, the US prioritizes the interests of the Israeli regime over the security of its regional allies.
From this perspective, the move toward regional security agreements can be seen as a sign of the gradual weakening of the US position in West Asia’s security calculations; a trend accelerated by Iran’s achievements in the recent war and the exposure of the limitations of American power.
Of course, given these countries’ decades-long dependence on US weapons, training and security mechanisms, the emergence of a fully indigenous security system in the short term is unrealistic. However, these steps could serve as a foundation for an order in which the US is no longer the decisive actor in determining regional security.
In this context, the trilateral defense agreement could serve a purpose beyond simply regulating security relations between Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad.
The creation of such a mechanism could, in itself, complicate calculations by the Israeli regime to expand its destabilizing actions and spread insecurity to other Islamic countries, including Turkey and Pakistan. This is because stronger security links among regional countries would increase the costs of any adventurism and attempts to transfer crises into the surrounding environment.
An Alliance Without Understanding the Roots of Crisis Remains Only on Paper
However, regional convergence cannot be achieved merely through the signing of defense agreements and the creation of multilateral alliances.
The experience of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League has shown that the absence of a shared understanding of the roots of crises and the lack of a coherent framework for action can turn even the most powerful agreements into ineffective structures.
The first requirement for lasting security is identifying the main sources of instability in the region, namely the Israeli regime’s occupation and the hegemonic interventions of the US, and adopting a coordinated position toward them.
It is not possible to speak of indigenous security while simultaneously maintaining open or hidden relations with the Israeli regime or considering the US military presence as part of the region’s security equation.
Likewise, countries that speak of regional integration cannot simultaneously act against actors that have played an effective role in maintaining regional security.
Pressure on Yemen and Iraq, efforts to disarm resistance groups, or demands regarding strategic waterways without addressing the real roots of existing limitations will not create security. Instead, they could place the region within a framework designed by the US and the Israeli regime, one aimed at transforming regional disputes into a “brother against brother” conflict.
Equation Iran Has Emphasized for Years
Over recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed convergence among neighbors and the creation of indigenous security arrangements as the only sustainable path for resolving regional crises.
Within this framework, Tehran has pursued a regional approach, from the Hormuz Peace Initiative to expanding regional relations and emphasizing the withdrawal of the US from the region.
Iran has also shown in recent developments that it does not define the management of the Strait of Hormuz solely within the framework of its own national security. Rather, it considers the waterway part of the formation of a new security order independent of the US.
Tehran has continued to extend a hand of friendship toward its neighbors, while at the same time making clear that it will firmly stand against any aggression or threat targeting its own security, the region and the resistance front.
From this perspective, security agreements among Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia can, if they move toward regional independence, be viewed as an opportunity to strengthen indigenous security.
However, allowing these initiatives to become trapped in the calculations of the US and the Israeli regime, or turning them into instruments against Iran and the resistance, would not lead to security. Instead, it would weaken the very foundations of these alliances from within.
The future of West Asia’s security depends on whether regional countries choose to shape their security destiny through a shared framework and genuine participation among neighbors rather than relying on extra-regional powers.
Such an order, if established, would not only reduce security dependence on the US, but could also make the Israeli regime’s calculations for expanding insecurity across the Islamic world more difficult.
NOURNEWS