Araghchi stated that the US-Israeli attack, during which the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and several senior military commanders were martyred, did not occur during the main session of the Supreme Defense Council. Instead, at the time of the attack, one of the council's subsidiary committees, chaired by the council's secretary, was in session.
The key question, however, is what agenda brought the country's top military commanders together on the first working day of the week.
According to documented reports, the Saturday morning meeting chaired by the Secretary of the Defense Council focused on two issues: first, advancing a comprehensive plan to organize resources, structures, personnel, and procure new equipment for managing unrest; and second, assessing intelligence indicating that a US-Israeli attack on Iran was imminent.
The meeting on the morning of February 28, 2026, therefore addressed two dimensions of what officials viewed as a coordinated threat: the growing likelihood of a foreign military attack and the possibility of internal unrest that, based on the experience of the January 2026 disturbances, could be exploited by hostile actors as a complement to military action.
A Longstanding Concern
Understanding the significance of that meeting requires looking back over the years of Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani's tenure as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Throughout that period, the Leader consistently emphasized minimizing harm to civilians and protesters during episodes of unrest.
Between 2017 and 2022, Iran experienced several waves of protests and disturbances. During those events, Shamkhani repeatedly stressed that security forces should manage unrest with minimal use of live ammunition and the lowest possible human casualties.
His approach drew criticism.
Critics argued that his insistence on limiting the use of firearms sometimes constrained military, police, and Basij forces, exposing them to greater risks during confrontations with rioters.
In several meetings, he was directly criticized for restricting the use of force while security personnel themselves were under attack.
Shamkhani nevertheless defended his position. In his view, maintaining security could not come at the expense of civilian lives, and confronting rioters did not justify unnecessary use of lethal force or increased casualties. This approach, according to the report, reflected not merely his personal judgment but a principle consistently emphasized by the Leader.
Documented accounts indicate that during periods of unrest, the Leader personally reviewed daily reports on developments, injuries, and fatalities while repeatedly stressing the need to protect civilians.
This concern shaped Shamkhani's own approach. As secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he sought to ensure that managing social and security crises, even when security personnel themselves came under attack, would not result in uncontrolled loss of life.
He therefore maintained that Iran had to pursue two objectives simultaneously: preserving security and confronting threats while minimizing harm to civilians and protesters.
January 2026: A Turning Point
The events of January 2026 elevated those concerns to a new level.
Official investigations concluded that hostile actors had played a central role in planning and directing the unrest as part of a broader effort to create internal instability and security breaches.
Several months later, during the 40-day war, the Israeli regime openly acknowledged planning for those events. The US president also stated that weapons had been supplied to Iraqi Kurdish groups for transfer into Iran. According to the report, however, evidence of the operation had existed long before those admissions.
During the 12-day war, Israel also bombed the Shahid Meisami Industries, a Defense Ministry facility that initially appeared to have little connection with conventional military production.
Its primary mission was to develop equipment enabling authorities to manage demonstrations and unrest with minimal harm and without relying on more destructive weapons.
The report argues that targeting the facility indicated the enemy's strategy extended beyond conventional military operations. Alongside external attacks, it sought to fuel internal unrest while simultaneously degrading Iran's ability to manage such crises with minimal casualties.
Viewed in this context, the strike on Shahid Meisami Industries, together with Israeli admissions regarding planning for domestic unrest and the US president's remarks about transferring weapons into Iran, reinforced officials' conclusion that the January events formed part of a broader hybrid-threat strategy combining external military action, internal destabilization, security breaches, and efforts to weaken Iran's crisis-management capabilities.
Consequently, officials no longer regarded a repeat of such events as merely theoretical. Iran, they concluded, needed to prepare for externally designed crises that could emerge domestically while targeting both national security and social stability.
Yet even under those circumstances, concern over civilian casualties remained paramount for both the Leader and Shamkhani. Following the January unrest, during which documented accounts say approximately 3,000 people lost their lives, both regarded minimizing casualties as an even greater priority.
Afterward, Shamkhani reportedly referred to those casualties in nearly every meeting involving social or security issues. For both men, the central question became how Iran could respond to future security threats while preserving public order and keeping civilian casualties to a minimum.
That concern, under the Leader's direction, became a priority across Iran's defense, security, and law-enforcement institutions.
A New Crisis-Management Plan
Within that framework, authorities launched a comprehensive plan titled "Organization of Resources, Structures, Personnel, and Procurement of New Equipment for Managing Unrest."
Its objective was to prepare for future crises that could coincide with organized hostile operations and attempts to create security breaches inside the country.
The Defense Council Secretariat was tasked with overseeing the project. Following extensive expert studies and consultations involving senior defense, security, and law-enforcement officials, a comprehensive plan was finalized and submitted to the Leader.
After reviewing it, the Leader approved the plan in principle and emphasized the need for rapid implementation.
Shamkhani proposed transferring responsibility for implementation to the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council. The Leader, however, instructed that the Defense Council Secretariat, and Shamkhani personally, remain responsible until the plan reached full implementation.
Specialized committees subsequently continued overseeing its execution.
February 28: Two Agendas, One Threat
By Friday, February 27, 2026, Shamkhani and several senior military commanders had become convinced that a US-Israeli attack on Iran was imminent.
Around 9:00 p.m. that evening, Shamkhani provided the Defense Council Secretariat's media office with a statement referring to the likelihood of a joint US-Israeli attack and Iran's response.
The following morning, the Defense Council's subsidiary committee convened under his chairmanship.
Its two agenda items were implementing the comprehensive unrest-management plan and assessing intelligence indicating an imminent US-Israeli attack.
Although seemingly unrelated, both issues addressed the same strategic reality: Iran faced a multilayered threat requiring preparation for both external war and internal security crises.
The attack began while the meeting was still underway.
Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani and several senior commanders were martyred during the strike.
As a result, the meeting intended to oversee implementation of a plan aimed at reducing casualties during unrest while preparing for an imminent enemy attack became one of the last high-level sessions before the outbreak of war.
Its significance lies precisely in that convergence: confronting an adversary allegedly preparing both external military aggression and internal destabilization while simultaneously seeking to minimize harm to civilians and protesters during any future crisis.
Araghchi's account now sheds greater light on the nature and purpose of that meeting.
According to this account, it was neither a routine session nor merely a technical discussion. It was a high-level decision-making meeting devoted to preparing for a war that senior military commanders believed was imminent on two fronts: external military aggression and efforts to generate internal unrest.
Following the Commander-in-Chief's instructions, officials considered it essential to complete all necessary preparations before hostilities began, from military readiness against external attack to strengthening Iran's capacity to manage domestic crises while minimizing civilian casualties.
That is why the morning meeting of February 28, 2026, occupies such an important place. Iran's senior military leadership had gathered to prepare for what they believed would be a multilayered conflict involving both foreign military aggression and attempts to create internal instability. Before the meeting could conclude, the enemy attack began, transforming it into one of the defining moments in Iran's national decision-making history.
Source: Foundation of Martyr Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani
NOURNEWS