Almost one month after Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war, Washington has resumed its naval blockade of Iranian ports as of Wednesday, July 15, alongside a new wave of attacks on various parts of the country—particularly southern Iran—that have reportedly killed at least 38 people and injured more than 400. The move appears intended to maximize economic pressure on both the Iranian people and the country.
The initial phase of the U.S. military campaign focused on Iran's southern ports, missile and drone bases, and coastal air defense systems—including Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Chabahar, Bushehr, Sirik, Ahvaz, and other locations—with the aim of blinding Iranian radar and air defense capabilities and destroying air defense sites. In recent days, however, Washington has expanded its attacks deep into Iranian territory, targeting locations such as Khondab, Semnan, energy infrastructure, airports, railway lines, and transportation networks in an effort to force Iran into submission.
At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump warned that the attacks would intensify next week to include power plants and bridges unless Tehran returned to the negotiating table. In recent nights, the U.S. military has acted on those threats by bombing parts of Iran's civilian and energy infrastructure, including power stations and several bridges in the country's south. At the heart of the renewed hostilities lies the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz, which remains the focal point of a crisis extending far beyond the region and affecting global energy security as well as the stability of the international economy.
This has created a strategic deadlock. On one hand, Iran has shown no willingness to surrender to the United States. On the other, Washington is unwilling to accept a new regional order in which Iran exercises unprecedented control over the Strait of Hormuz. For Washington and Tel Aviv, accepting such an outcome in a war they expected to win within days would amount to acknowledging a strategic defeat.
Iran has responded by escalating its threats against the United States and its regional allies, warning that any U.S. strike on its facilities would prompt attacks on infrastructure across the region. Tehran has also warned of broader confrontation and threats to maritime traffic in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Despite the ceasefire and the signing of the Iran-U.S. memorandum of understanding, intermittent U.S. attacks have continued as part of an expanding military campaign. The strikes initially focused on Iranian port cities along the southern coast before gradually spreading to other parts of the country. Iran has, in turn, carried out retaliatory attacks against U.S. military facilities across the region. Under such circumstances, concerns about a return to full-scale war have intensified.
Meanwhile, a new public opinion survey conducted by YouGov and The Economist in the United States shows that 57 percent of Americans believe the decision to launch a war against Iran was a mistake, while only 27 percent consider it justified. Nevertheless, Trump has initiated a new round of attacks without a clear strategy for either beginning or ending the conflict. The campaign lacks public support and imposes significant economic costs on both the global economy and the United States. Trump's recent retreat from his proposed 20 percent tariff on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz is merely the latest example of his inconsistent Iran policy.
The third wave of U.S. attacks has prompted many to ask what Washington ultimately hopes to achieve. After failing to accomplish its objectives during the 40-day war, what purpose does Trump now seek to serve through continued military action? This question has existed since the early weeks of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, when both countries believed that a decapitation strategy—assassinating Iran's leadership, senior military commanders, and top political figures—would topple the government within days, allowing Trump to claim victory, install a government more favorable to U.S. and Israeli interests, and severely weaken Iran's military capabilities. Instead, the Islamic Republic survived the war stronger than before, expanded its regional influence, demonstrated its ability to inflict significant costs on the United States, Israel, and Washington's regional allies, and, in the view of many observers, neither the United States nor Israel emerged as the victor of the 40-day conflict.
The motives behind this latest round of attacks—particularly following the June 17 memorandum of understanding—differ from those of both the first phase (the 12-day war) and the second phase (the 40-day war). As U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance stated: "We're not going to send 150,000 American ground troops to overthrow the Iranian regime. That's a decision for the Iranian people. We don't want another Libya or another Gaddafi."
At this stage, the objective is no longer regime change or halting Iran's nuclear program. Instead, the focus has shifted to restarting negotiations and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which had remained open before the war began on February 28. Washington's goal now appears to be wearing down Iran's missile, drone, and air defense capabilities along its southern coastline in order to compel Tehran to provide security guarantees for the full reopening of the Strait to international shipping and return to negotiations.
To achieve this objective, it cannot be ruled out that Washington may also be considering new plans for southern Iran. Given Trump's political style, it is not inconceivable that he could contemplate seizing Iranian ports or strategic islands in the Persian Gulf—including Khark Island or the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa—although such an operation would undoubtedly face determined resistance and serious operational challenges.
Any attempt by the United States to seize Iranian territory would represent a major escalation and would almost certainly trigger reciprocal Iranian action in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as attacks on U.S. military bases across the region and Persian Gulf energy infrastructure.
According to military analysts, although the United States possesses the naval, air, and amphibious capabilities necessary to seize Iranian islands, the real question concerns the cost of such an operation for Washington, the region, and the global economy. Before occupying any Iranian island, the United States would first need to neutralize Iran's defensive capabilities. Airpower alone, however, cannot permanently eliminate those defenses or secure lasting territorial control. Any occupation would ultimately require the deployment of U.S. ground forces—an undertaking that could become a nightmare for invading troops.
Moreover, capturing an island is fundamentally different from holding it and extracting strategic value from it. Even if small islands could be seized, they would remain vulnerable to Iranian drones, missiles, artillery, and fast attack boats. U.S. troops stationed there would become fixed and exposed targets, potentially suffering heavy daily casualties. The return of American soldiers' coffins from the Persian Gulf would seriously undermine Trump's domestic political standing and revive painful memories of U.S. failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such an operation would require substantial combat forces and logistical support operating under constant missile, drone, mine, and artillery fire. Given the political cost of deploying U.S. troops, particularly among Trump's MAGA support base, and fears of another Iraq-, Afghanistan-, or Vietnam-style conflict, the likelihood of such an operation appears relatively low.
Furthermore, seizing one or more Iranian islands would not facilitate the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, it would likely lead to its complete closure. Any attempt to occupy Iranian territory would transform a limited military confrontation into a broader war of national survival, mobilizing the Iranian population against a foreign occupier.
Such an escalation would also expose U.S. military bases across the region and beyond to sustained Iranian attacks. Oil terminals and refineries in neighboring countries allied with Washington could become targets, triggering an unprecedented oil shock and a global economic crisis while reinforcing perceptions of the United States as an occupying power.
The rise in energy prices following the latest U.S. attacks on Iran—and the resulting increase in gasoline and commodity prices inside the United States—is another factor that Trump and the American political establishment will have to consider in the months leading up to the November elections. Any further escalation could significantly worsen the situation. In U.S. domestic politics, few issues influence ordinary voters more immediately than gasoline prices at the pump.
Thus, although the United States may possess the military capability to occupy territory, the broader political consequences—including destabilizing energy markets, straining relations with Persian Gulf allies that seek the reopening of the Strait but fear becoming targets of Iranian retaliation, and unsettling allies across the Arab world—make such a scenario politically difficult to justify. Nevertheless, past experience suggests that the Trump administration should not be underestimated. Such an operation would also carry serious political costs for Trump and his Republican allies as they prepare for the November midterm elections.
Taken together, these considerations place Washington in a difficult position. While unwilling to accept the new strategic reality in the Strait of Hormuz, the United States appears to believe it can restore the pre-February 28 status quo through coercion and military pressure.
Guided by his doctrine of "maximum pressure," Trump appears to believe that a third wave of heavy airstrikes combined with the reimposition of a naval blockade can force Iran to submit and restore U.S. control over developments in the Strait of Hormuz. Developments on the ground, however, suggest that the balance of power in the Persian Gulf has shifted. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to absorb substantial costs while imposing significant reciprocal costs on its adversaries and their allies, and it has shown no indication of yielding to Trump's pressure.
Trump should recognize that the era of imposing unilateral will in the Persian Gulf has come to an end. Any continued reliance on military coercion is likely only to draw Washington deeper into an open-ended war of attrition with no clear exit.
Nournews