NOURNEWS – As had appeared likely since last March, the Strait of Hormuz has ultimately become the central issue in Iran-US relations, pushing the two-decade dispute over uranium enrichment into the background. The July 7 attack on three vessels south of the strait, for which no party has claimed responsibility, has effectively become the turning point following the signing of the memorandum of understanding.
Citing the incident, the US effectively withdrew from the memorandum, declared the ceasefire void, and revoked the authorization, granted under Article 10 of the memorandum, for the suspension of restrictions on Iran's oil and petrochemical exports. The process of releasing Iranian frozen assets has also been halted. Meanwhile, US military aggression has focused primarily on coastal areas stretching from Chabahar to Mahshahr, as well as several inland provinces, including an attack on a key transportation bridge in Golestan Province. Although the memorandum is currently suspended, negotiations and mediation efforts appear to be continuing, leaving open the possibility of reviving the process.
Iran's starting point on the Strait issue is that "conditions in the Strait will never return to what they were before." After wartime statements during the 40-day conflict emphasizing that "the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed," the Leader said in an April 9 message that "we will certainly move the management of the Strait of Hormuz into a new phase." Since then, Iran's focus has shifted from "closing the Strait" to "managing the Strait," with the concepts of the "Hormuz leverage" and "management of the Strait" replacing calls for outright closure.
Statements by senior Iranian officials suggest that "management" is primarily understood as exercising sovereignty over the Strait. In international maritime law, including Article 42 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), "management of straits" refers mainly to issues such as regulating maritime traffic, environmental protection, and fisheries. By contrast, Iranian officials use the term to describe three sovereign objectives: transferring the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) from its current route, located for the past 60 years in Omani territorial waters, to Iranian territorial waters; requiring ships to use the new route under Iranian supervision and with prior authorization from the "Persian Gulf Strait Organization"; and generating mandatory revenue through the provision of services and associated fees.
From the outset of the Strait crisis, Iranian officials recognized that advancing these policies would require Oman's cooperation. Several high-level visits were made to Muscat, but available evidence suggests little success in securing Omani support. At the International Maritime Organization meeting on July 9, Oman's representative explicitly reaffirmed the "right of transit passage through straits," Oman's commitment to the law of the sea, and opposition to "imposing charges on vessels." Earlier, in a July 1 interview with Radio Monte Carlo Doualiya, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said that "any bilateral understanding between Iran and Oman must remain within the framework of the 1982 Convention." Oman's opposition to mandatory fees indicates that it not only rejects transit tolls but also believes that payment for navigational services should remain voluntary.
Omani officials have previously cited Article 43 of UNCLOS and its implementation in the Strait of Malacca as the appropriate model for service-related costs, which is based on voluntary contributions by ships. Most recently, Omani authorities proposed creating two separate shipping lanes, one in Omani territorial waters and the other in Iranian waters. Under such an arrangement, the Omani route would likely be preferred because of its proximity, greater water depth, more favorable currents, and, most importantly, the absence of additional costs and security or legal complications.
It should also be recognized that Oman, as a party to UNCLOS and a relatively small state, cannot disregard pressure from the US, the UK, and regional countries. On June 29, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated that "if, for any reason, Oman is unwilling to cooperate, the Islamic Republic of Iran will pursue its own course." However, Oman exercises sovereignty over half of the Strait, and any perception of infringing on Oman's sovereignty would provide Iran's adversaries with further grounds to build an international consensus against the country.
Without Oman's cooperation, given its sovereignty over half of the Strait, Iran would naturally face considerable difficulty in asserting authority over the entire Strait of Hormuz. More importantly, whether the TSS passes through the territorial waters of one country or the other is of little practical significance and offers no inherent advantage. For roughly six decades, Oman has derived no special benefit from hosting the TSS in its territorial waters.
What truly matters is Iran's exceptional geopolitical position in the Strait of Hormuz. If subjected to military aggression, Iran would retain the Strait as a strategic lever regardless of the TSS's location. In this context, it is irrelevant which country's territorial waters the shipping lane traverses. As demonstrated in March 2026, the location of the TSS neither constrained nor prevented Iran's actions.
The article was originally published in Persian by Shargh Daily.
NOURNEWS