Despite the understanding reached between Iran and the United States, military tensions in the Persian Gulf and sporadic clashes have unfortunately continued. Although the agreement reduced the intensity of direct confrontation between the two sides, it soon became evident that their disputes had expanded beyond the nuclear issue to encompass new areas of contention.
Nournews: The Strait of Hormuz, long regarded as one of the world's most critical geopolitical chokepoints, has now emerged alongside uranium enrichment as another major point of dispute. At its core, the disagreement stems from geopolitical and security considerations, but it has recently been further complicated by differing legal interpretations of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the rules governing this international waterway.
From the very first weeks of the war, it was clear that the Strait of Hormuz could become another flashpoint alongside the enrichment issue. In response to attacks by the United States and Israel, Iran maintained that it had the right to prohibit or restrict the passage of vessels belonging to the aggressor states, since, during armed conflict, the law of naval warfare takes precedence over the ordinary law of the sea. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not specifically address wartime situations; in such circumstances, the rules governing armed conflicts at sea, particularly the San Remo Manual, become the primary legal framework.
However, what made the situation even more complex was not merely the dispute between Iran and the United States. Within Iran itself, views emerged that went beyond the legal requirements of wartime and advocated making such measures permanent. Some argued that Iran should exercise permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz and impose transit fees on passing vessels. Estimates suggesting annual revenues ranging from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars attracted considerable public attention inside Iran and were increasingly viewed as a legitimate national entitlement. Outside Iran, however, these proposals created the impression that the Strait of Hormuz might evolve from a temporary wartime measure into a permanent Iranian policy. Consequently, alongside the nuclear dossier, the Strait of Hormuz became the second major source of disagreement between Iran and the opposing parties.
Article Five of the Iran–U.S. Memorandum of Understanding is devoted entirely to the Strait of Hormuz. It consists of three sentences. The first refers to arrangements by Iran to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels and the reopening of the Strait. The second outlines measures Iran is expected to undertake, including mine clearance and the removal of military equipment and obstacles from shipping lanes to complete the reopening process. The third addresses negotiations between Iran and Oman, as well as consultations with other regional states, aimed at defining the future governance of the Strait and maritime services within the framework of "applicable international law."
Different interpretations of this provision have become the main source of disagreement. From Iran's perspective, Article Five grants Tehran the authority to regulate vessel traffic through the Strait, including determining shipping routes.
The United States, Oman, and the other parties, however, argue that the provision was intended solely to restore normal maritime traffic and reopen the Strait of Hormuz—not to grant Iran full authority to determine navigation routes or require other countries to comply with arrangements designed by Tehran. At the same time, there is no evidence that Iran and Oman have reached any specific bilateral understanding on this matter. The core dispute, therefore, lies not in the wording of the agreement itself but in the parties' differing interpretations of its provisions.
The disagreement assumed practical significance when the issue of shipping lanes arose. Under Article 4 of the Law on the Maritime Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran's maritime boundaries with opposite and adjacent states are determined based on the median line, a principle derived from Article 15 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Before the war, traffic separation schemes passed south of the median line within Oman's territorial waters. In the post-war period, however, Iranian authorities appear to favor routing commercial traffic exclusively through Iran's territorial waters by shifting the shipping lanes north of the median line.
Meanwhile, Oman faces limited room for maneuver. As a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and under pressure from major powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, European countries, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—it cannot easily align itself with Iran. Moreover, Iran has yet to clarify precisely what is meant by the phrase "applicable international law" in Article Five of the Memorandum of Understanding and in several joint statements issued with Oman, or which specific legal framework that expression refers to. This ambiguity has provided fertile ground for conflicting interpretations.
The dispute intensified after Oman announced a new shipping route through the Strait. From Iran's perspective, the move was inconsistent with Article Five of the Memorandum of Understanding, and some Iranian officials even described it as a violation of the agreement. Other parties, however, insisted that the sole purpose of the understanding was to guarantee the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and preserve the normal flow of maritime traffic. Reports subsequently emerged suggesting that Iran had sought to prevent certain vessels from using the southern route located within Oman's territorial waters, although Tehran has not officially confirmed those reports.
The U.S. military response to these developments went far beyond the level of the dispute itself. In addition to conducting military operations at several locations along Iran's southern coastline, Washington revoked the suspension of oil sanctions and announced that the ban on Iranian oil exports would be reinstated on July 7. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, while oil contracts concluded before July 20 may still be finalized, the revenues generated from those sales must be deposited into accounts under U.S. control. From Iran's perspective, these actions constitute a practical violation of the Memorandum of Understanding and mark the beginning of a new phase of tension in bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that diplomacy has reached a dead end. The history of Iran–U.S. relations demonstrates that even during the most severe crises, negotiations have remained possible. More than anything else, what is needed today is a shared interpretation of Article Five of the Memorandum of Understanding—one that accommodates Iran's security concerns while safeguarding the rights of other coastal states and upholding the principle of freedom of navigation. Otherwise, the Strait of Hormuz could become every bit as destabilizing as the nuclear issue has been over the past decades, emerging as another major arena of confrontation between Iran and the United States and placing the current fragile understanding under serious strain.
Nournews