Nournews: The answer to this question should be sought not in political statements, but in ground-level developments and power calculations.
Polls released in Israel show that Netanyahu’s governing coalition is facing one of its most difficult political conditions in recent years. Contrary to initial expectations, the war with Iran has not strengthened the Israeli prime minister’s political position. Instead, a significant portion of Israeli public opinion believes that the stated objectives of the war have not been achieved. From this perspective, Iran remains a decisive actor in regional equations, the “Axis of Resistance” has not been dismantled, and the level of deterrence Israel sought has not been established.
This perception has shaken Netanyahu’s key political asset—his image as a “security-driven leader.” The rising popularity of rivals such as Gadi Eisenkot and the declining support for the Likud Party also indicate that Israeli society is more than ever judging the government through its security performance. For a prime minister whose political survival is built on security, failure in this domain is not merely a military setback, but a direct threat to his political survival.
In this context, Netanyahu’s options are limited. He must either enter elections under current conditions, which polls do not suggest are favorable for him, or attempt to reshape the strategic environment so that security once again becomes the central concern of Israeli public opinion. Israel’s political history shows that in times of external threat, domestic political arrangements shift, and right-wing forces typically benefit the most from such conditions.
However, the equation is not limited to Tel Aviv. Unlike the early days following the ceasefire, Washington now faces a different set of conditions. Trump had expected that the cessation of hostilities would quickly pave the way for diplomatic progress with Iran, ultimately leading to an agreement he could present as a strategic success. Yet developments indicate that this expectation has not been fulfilled so far.
Disagreements between the two sides on key issues have not diminished; in some areas—particularly maritime security and the future of the Strait of Hormuz—they have even entered a more sensitive phase. Recent tensions and limited confrontations around this strategic waterway suggest that a ceasefire does not necessarily mean the end of strategic rivalry. Trump himself had previously stated after the ceasefire that “the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened by bombing,” reflecting his awareness of the high costs of a full-scale war and the limitations of military tools in resolving geopolitical challenges. Nevertheless, if diplomatic channels remain stalled and field-level tensions escalate, Washington’s calculations could also shift.
Within this framework, Netanyahu’s upcoming visit to the White House should also be seen as more than a routine meeting. Reports of disagreements between the two sides regarding Iran have emerged, yet Trump has also emphasized that his personal relationship with Netanyahu remains strong. This suggests that a shared decision-making channel is still active, and the two are in the process of redefining their strategy toward Iran.
Does this redefinition necessarily mean the start of a new war? The answer is no. The costs of such a decision for the United States, Israel, and the entire region are extremely high, and there is no definitive evidence that a decision for war has been made. However, ignoring the possibility of renewed Washington–Tel Aviv convergence would also be a strategic mistake—especially if Netanyahu concludes that without creating a new security crisis he cannot survive politically, and if Trump concludes that diplomacy is no longer capable of delivering his desired outcomes.
Accordingly, the most likely scenario in the coming months is not an immediate full-scale war, but rather a gradual increase in security pressure, limited operations, efforts to shift the balance in Lebanon, Syria, and the Persian Gulf, and intensified pressure on Iran aimed at creating conditions in which, if the political track fails completely, the military option can be placed back on the table.
Therefore, the central question today is not whether war will definitely begin, but whether political and security developments will once again place Trump and Netanyahu in a position where the cost of avoiding war is judged to be lower than the cost of initiating it. The answer to this question will more than any other factor determine the region’s security trajectory in the months ahead.
Nournews