Nournews: Social statistics, if properly interpreted, are among the best ways to understand the collective mindset of a nation. Among social scientists, it is common to say that social survey data is the “second language of society” — a language that speaks clearly and reveals realities. Social surveys are more than simple statistical reports; they are a kind of collective narrative about the condition of a society.
The recent remarks by Seyed Mohammad Bathaei, head of Iran’s Social Affairs Organization, are also part of this category. In his statements, he presented a set of data that appears to focus on social indicators, but at a deeper level, it provides a relatively accurate picture of the current state of the “social contract” in Iran — a contract that cannot be said to have collapsed, but has been under serious pressure and is being redefined.
According to these figures, social capital in Iran at the national level has declined by around 8 percent over roughly a decade, from 2015 to 2025, falling from about 43.5 percent to nearly 36 percent. However, the important point is that this decline is mainly due to reduced trust in governing institutions, not relationships among ordinary people. In fact, contrary to many pessimistic scenarios, Iranian society at the grassroots level still enjoys considerable cohesion. Trust among families, friends, neighbors, and local communities has not only remained intact but has even strengthened in some cases. This means society has not collapsed from within, and basic social bonds are still active.
Alongside this situation, two other indicators also provide an important picture. First, 64 percent of people feel a sense of social belonging — a figure that has increased significantly compared to previous periods. Second, 76 percent of people say they are proud of being Iranian. Together, these two indicators show that national identity in Iran remains a stable anchor and, contrary to some analyses, economic or political pressures have not weakened it. People may be dissatisfied with certain policies or conditions, but this dissatisfaction does not mean a break with Iran itself. The strong expression of patriotic feelings and the strengthening of solidarity and social cohesion after the 12-day war and the 40-day war are clear signs of this deep sense of belonging and love for Iran. This level of national and social unity was completely contrary to what the United States and Israel had expected in their prior calculations.
However, alongside this relatively stable picture, there are also worrying signs. Only 25 percent of people feel that justice and equal opportunities exist in society. This is one of the most important findings of the survey because justice is not only a moral value but also a foundation of social trust. When the majority of society feels that opportunities are not distributed fairly, even economic growth cannot prevent a decline in public satisfaction. The main issue here is not only poverty or actual inequality, but the perception of injustice — a perception that can gradually weaken social capital.
In the same context, the data related to social hope is also significant. Around 60 percent of people are not optimistic about the future, and at the same time, the same proportion say they cannot tolerate more economic pressure. Together, these two indicators show a form of economic and psychological exhaustion in society — an exhaustion that has not yet turned into social breakdown but could limit social capacity if it continues.
Despite this, another important point in the survey prevents one-dimensional interpretations. Around 70 percent of people believe that some major national policies need to be reconsidered in order to overcome the current situation, while nearly 80 percent oppose the disruption of social order. This seemingly contradictory combination is actually one of the key points for understanding Iranian society: people want change, but they also want stability. They see reform as necessary, while also considering security and order essential.
In such a situation, Iranian society cannot be understood through simple divisions such as “satisfied/dissatisfied” or “supporter/opponent.” It is a society waiting for reform — a society that does not completely reject the existing structure but seeks improvements in performance and policies. In other words, what is happening in Iran today is not a crisis of social collapse, but rather a redefinition of the relationship between society and governing institutions.
From this perspective, the main issue is not the absolute decline of social capital, but the gap in institutional trust. Society still trusts itself, still preserves family and local networks, and still takes pride in its national identity. However, at the institutional level, a sense of distance and declining trust has emerged. If this gap is not properly understood and managed, it could gradually lead to the erosion of social capital, even if relationships among people remain strong.
Therefore, if we want to express the main question in the simplest way possible, we should ask: What do the people of Iran want? The answer lies within these statistics. While remaining loyal to their national identity and maintaining social connections, Iranians want three fundamental things: more justice, more effective governance, and to be heard in the decision-making process. Alongside these three demands, there is also a fundamental desire: preserving stability and social order.
This combination presents an important picture of Iranian society: a society that is neither moving toward radicalization nor living in a state of complete satisfaction. A society that wants reform within the framework of stability, not in opposition to it. A society that still has strong internal capacities but needs rebuilding and repair of institutional trust. Perhaps the most important message of this survey is that Iranian society is not a problem to be controlled, but a reality to be understood. It is a complex, living, and multi-layered society that, if properly understood, can become the foundation for gradual rebuilding of social capital and public trust. But if it is ignored or oversimplified, these institutional gaps may gradually become deeper.
Nournews