Nournews: On Friday, at the Bürgenstock resort in Switzerland, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly, and J.D. Vance, Vice President of the United States, are expected to sign a memorandum of understanding ending the war. According to the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the agreement signifies only the end of the war and is not intended to alter the fundamental nature of Iran–U.S. relations.
This emphasis is key to understanding the forthcoming agreement correctly. Contrary to some interpretations, Bürgenstock is not expected to mark the beginning of a new chapter in relations between Tehran and Washington. There are no signs of normalization, nor has such an objective been placed on the agenda of either side. What will be signed in Switzerland is, above all, an agreement to end a war and create the framework for negotiations aimed at achieving a final agreement between the two countries over a 60-day period, with the possibility of extension.
For this reason, the true significance of the memorandum will become apparent not on the day it is signed, but on the day after.
The experience of many international conflicts shows that ending a war is not the same as establishing peace. A war can be halted through an agreement, but peace endures only when various actors conclude that maintaining stability serves their interests better than returning to crisis and confrontation. From this perspective, the Islamabad Agreement should not be viewed merely as an understanding between Iran and the United States; rather, it should be seen as the beginning of a new phase of regional and international responsibility.
The recent forty-day war revealed an important reality. Unlike many previous crises, nearly all major regional and international actors—despite their extensive differences and rivalries—ultimately agreed on one point: the continuation of the war benefited no one. Regional countries faced direct threats to energy security, trade, and investment. The global economy was exposed to disruption. Energy markets became unstable, and the risk of the conflict spreading across the region increased. Even for the United States, as the initiator of the war, the costs of continuing the conflict soon outweighed any potential benefits.
However, this reality also raises an important question for regional states. If nearly all governments in the region now welcome the end of the war, it is fair to ask whether they exerted the same level of effort to prevent the conflict before it began.
The reality is that many countries in the southern Persian Gulf, while not supportive of the war, largely viewed it as a confrontation between Iran and the United States. Some, due to geopolitical rivalries with Iran, believed that a weakening of Iran would not necessarily conflict with their own interests. Consequently, opposition to the war remained mostly at the level of political statements and diplomatic declarations and did not evolve into coordinated and effective pressure to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The recent war demonstrated how costly such assumptions can be, as the first victims of any major crisis in the Persian Gulf are the security, economy, and development prospects of the regional states themselves.
From this perspective, the Islamabad Agreement is less the product of a transformation in Iran–U.S. relations than the result of an unspoken global demand to stop the war. Yet this very reality imposes a new responsibility on the international community.
If yesterday’s primary challenge was ending the war, tomorrow’s primary challenge will be preventing its return. This responsibility cannot be borne by Tehran alone, nor by Washington alone. Preserving stability requires the active participation of a range of actors who regard themselves as stakeholders in peace.
At the forefront of these actors are the countries of the southern Persian Gulf. Having experienced the direct and indirect costs of war, they must now move from being observers of events to becoming active participants in consolidating peace. Supporting the negotiation process, helping to establish regional security arrangements, expanding economic cooperation, and countering any actions that could provoke tensions will form part of their new responsibilities.
At the international level, the situation is no different. China, Europe, and other major powers that benefit from regional stability now face an important test. If their priority during the war was to prevent the crisis from expanding, their priority after the agreement must be to support successful negotiations and the consolidation of peace. Experience has shown that no agreement endures solely through signatures and political commitments. What sustains agreements is the development of a network of economic, security, and political interests that raises the cost of returning to crisis for all parties involved.
Another reality should not be overlooked. While nearly all regional and international actors have concluded that ending the war serves regional stability and the global economy, the one actor that continues to see its interests in the perpetuation of crisis and the prevention of an agreement is Israel. For this reason, the 60-day period of Iran–U.S. negotiations aimed at reaching a final agreement is not merely a diplomatic process; it is also a decisive test of the willingness of various actors to support peace.
If regional states, global powers, and international institutions fail to play an active role in supporting negotiations and stabilizing the political process after the memorandum is signed, they will effectively leave the field open to those seeking to undermine the agreement. Under such circumstances, any security incident, provocative action, or attempt to erode trust could jeopardize the negotiation process.
The principal guarantor of this agreement is neither the mediating country, nor the location where it is signed, nor even international legal mechanisms. Its true guarantor is the unprecedented consensus that has emerged after the war—a consensus in which the overwhelming majority of regional and global actors have concluded that the cost of returning to war is far greater than the cost of preserving peace.
Accordingly, the Islamabad Agreement should not be regarded as the end of a crisis. At best, it marks the end of the military phase of the crisis and the beginning of its political phase. If the war is halted by a decision of Iran and the United States, preserving peace and ensuring the success of the negotiations ahead will require the active participation of both the region and the international community.
On Friday in Bürgenstock, the final page of a war may be closed. But on Saturday, a far more difficult chapter will begin—a chapter in which all actors must demonstrate whether they merely wanted the war to end, or whether they are also prepared to accept responsibility for building and preserving peace.
Nournews