The end of wars does not always lead to immediate peace. Sometimes only the form of conflict changes. The guns fall silent, but competition continues; artillery gives way to the negotiating table, while armies remain on alert. This condition is neither war nor peace, but what international relations theorists describe as “armed negotiation.”
If the Iran-US memorandum of understanding to end the war, approved by both sides early Monday, is signed on Friday and formal talks on a comprehensive agreement begin, Tehran and Washington will enter precisely such a phase. Success will depend not only on diplomats, but also on the quality of governance, national cohesion, deterrent power, and strategic judgment.
Negotiation: Neither From Weakness Nor From Victory
One of the most common mistakes in foreign-policy analysis is viewing events through the binary of “war or peace.” Global experience shows that many of history’s most important negotiations took place not after complete peace, but under conditions of balance of power.
The Korean War never formally ended with a peace treaty, yet negotiations continued for decades. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US signed major arms-control agreements while keeping nuclear warheads aimed at one another. Egypt and Israel likewise first reached a form of military balance before entering negotiations that ultimately led to the Camp David Accords.
The common lesson is clear: negotiations become sustainable when neither side believes it can impose its will through war. Under such conditions, diplomacy is not a continuation of war, but a continuation of competition through different means.
It is equally mistaken to view negotiations either as surrender or as total victory. Armed negotiation rejects both assumptions. A country that believes it can impose all its demands through force has little incentive to compromise. Conversely, a country that sees itself as defeated has little left to bargain with. Negotiations begin when both sides recognize each other’s power and accept their own limitations.
From this perspective, if Iran and the US enter talks after a costly war, the key issue is not who claims victory, but that both have concluded the costs of continued conflict outweigh its benefits.
The belief that military power loses importance once negotiations begin is another dangerous miscalculation. In armed negotiations, military strength does not replace diplomacy, but guarantees its credibility and effectiveness. A diplomat without deterrent backing merely makes requests; a diplomat supported by credible power, including defensive capabilities and public support, negotiates.
If society becomes trapped in divisive polarization, if elites deepen political rifts rather than build consensus, and if the media turns domestic rivalry into the main arena instead of external competition, the country's bargaining power will inevitably weaken. More than ever, armed negotiation requires national cohesion, not uniformity or exclusion, but a consensus capable of managing political differences within the framework of national interests.
Negotiating Memory: One of Iran’s Strategic Assets
If Iran is entering a phase of armed negotiation, it should not view this as the beginning of the journey. Over the past four decades, Iran has accumulated some of the world's most complex and costly negotiating experiences, from talks related to the US Embassy hostage crisis, the end of the eight-year war with Iraq and acceptance of UN Resolution 598, to lengthy nuclear negotiations, the JCPOA, efforts to revive the agreement, regional talks with Saudi Arabia, and various rounds of indirect discussions with the US.
These are not merely historical events. They constitute a reservoir of practical experience in crisis management, bargaining, and engagement with major powers.
Major countries transform diplomatic experience into institutional capital. Changes of government do not erase negotiating memory; it is documented, analyzed, and passed on to future generations of negotiators. Iran has now reached a point where these experiences, regardless of factional competition or political judgments, should be revisited as part of the country’s national capital.
Iran’s various negotiations offer important lessons on the timing of strategic decisions, the reliability of major powers, the role of international organizations, and the necessity of preserving domestic cohesion. The JCPOA experience, regardless of differing evaluations, also provided valuable lessons on sanctions mechanisms, verification procedures, enforcement guarantees, the behavior of major powers, the importance of internal consensus, and the role of public opinion in the success or failure of international agreements.
Ignoring these lessons would mean paying past costs again, or failing to fully benefit from future negotiations.
As the prospect of a new round of major talks with the US emerges, Tehran’s greatest advantage is not only its defensive and regional capabilities, but also its generation of managers, diplomats, legal experts, and specialists who carry parts of this historical experience.
Making use of this asset requires setting aside factional considerations and making national interests the primary criterion for drawing on the country's human capital. Successful negotiations are not the product of improvisation; they result from accumulated experience, institutional learning, and historical memory. Only then can this file truly become a national cause.
NOURNEWS