After days and weeks of negotiations, complex consultations, regional and international mediation, and continuous diplomatic exchanges, the Iran–US memorandum of understanding on halting the war was ultimately agreed upon by both sides. This development is undoubtedly one of the most important, and potentially historic, political events of recent years in Iran. Although this initial understanding still has a long and likely difficult path ahead before becoming a legally binding document, even at this stage it has achieved its primary objectives: reducing the likelihood of a return to war, stabilizing national security, preserving internal cohesion, strengthening Iran’s deterrent position, and creating an opportunity for national reconstruction after one of the most difficult security periods in recent decades.
Beyond these functional dimensions, the surrounding implications of this development may be as significant as its practical outcomes. In other words, the key question today may not be what the text of the agreement contains, but how the governance process in Iran was managed to reach it. What stands out most in the recent experience is not merely the outcome of negotiations, but a shift in governance approach in handling one of the Islamic Republic’s most sensitive files. Indeed, the value of an agreement is sometimes defined more by how it is reached than by its content. In this regard, several important points merit attention.
Iranian politics and deficit of “national matter”
One of the structural problems of Iranian politics over past decades has been the absence, neglect, or contraction of the “national matter” in key debates and decisions. Almost every major issue has sooner or later been drawn into factional competition or institutional scorekeeping, from foreign policy to the economy, culture, education, environment, and even national security.
In such an environment, the success of a policy is often interpreted not as a national achievement, but as the success of a government or political faction. Likewise, support or opposition is frequently shaped not by national interest, but by political rivalry.
There are many examples of this dynamic, but one of the most prominent is the intensive nuclear negotiations that began in 2013 and led to the JCPOA. Regardless of one’s assessment of the agreement’s outcome, few would dispute that the file gradually shifted from a national issue to a site of factional competition.
In practice, the 11th administration reduced what was a national project into a political project. Instead of mobilizing all political and institutional capacities and distributing responsibility broadly, the negotiations and resulting agreement were increasingly defined within the framework of the government and the Foreign Ministry. As a result, the government was compelled to continuously defend an agreement that, like any international accord, was not absolute, flawless, or free of ambiguity and naturally contained shortcomings.
Moreover, the pursuit of “JCPOA 2” and “JCPOA 3” initiatives in other disputed areas with the US, before Washington’s response to Iran’s goodwill and compliance was clarified, intensified domestic sensitivities. At the same time, the persistent attribution of blame to critics and opponents for obstructing the JCPOA, despite the fact that the main cause of delays and disruptions was US non-compliance and later Donald Trump’s withdrawal, gradually transformed a national project into an internal political dispute. Ultimately, this imposed significant costs on national interests.
After Trump’s withdrawal and the loss of much of the agreement’s limited gains, the absence of broad-based ownership left the file vulnerable to intense criticism and political confrontation. Had the project been defined and managed as a “national matter” from the outset, all factions and institutions would have been compelled to participate not only in its success but also in mitigating its costs and safeguarding national interests.
One reason for this outcome was the transfer of nuclear negotiations from the Supreme National Security Council to the government and Foreign Ministry as the executive arm of one branch of power. While this may have increased focus and speed, it simultaneously distanced the process from its “national” character and reduced it to a governmental project—carrying costs not only in foreign policy but also in public trust, social capital, and the credibility of national decision-making.
Consensus as belief in national matter
In the recent experience, however, different signs emerged. The 14th administration did not seek to keep management of the file exclusively within the government or the Foreign Ministry. Decision-making was not purely governmental, nor was participation limited to a single political current.
The file was centralized in the Supreme National Security Council, a body whose philosophy is to transform strategic national issues into supra-governmental and cross-branch decisions. This choice was not merely administrative; it sent a clear message: the negotiation for an understanding with the US to end the war does not belong to the government, it belongs to Iran. Therefore, it must be understood as a national matter.
At the same time, the use of figures with differing political backgrounds, some of whom do not necessarily align fully with President Masoud Pezeshkian’s political preferences, and the avoidance of monopolizing negotiation management effectively translated the president’s “consensus” slogan from rhetoric into practice. For perhaps the first time in years, one of the country’s most important foreign policy files was managed not on the basis of “political ownership,” but on “national participation.”
This may be the most important distinction of the recent experience. In many countries, governments naturally seek to claim major achievements for themselves, as political success becomes electoral capital. But under conditions in which Iran faces complex security threats, external pressure, and an increasing need for internal cohesion, building national capital may matter more than political credit.
The 14th administration appears to have deliberately chosen this path. If sustained, this approach could represent one of the most important reforms in governance within the Islamic Republic, not through legal change, but through a transformation in decision-making culture. In such a model, the government is no longer the sole actor, but the coordinator of national capacities.
The discourse of “consensus” becomes meaningful precisely here. Consensus does not merely mean the presence of multiple political figures in government, but acceptance of the principle that major national issues are larger than any government. If national security, foreign policy, macroeconomics, energy, water, environment, and Iran’s future are treated as national matters, then no change of government would equate to a change in national direction. Many successful countries operate on this logic: governments change, but national strategies remain stable.
Responsibility of opponents in strengthening national matter
The most important test now is not for the government alone, but for all political factions. If government supporters frame the agreement as a factional victory, they would repeat the same mistake that previously led to polarization of national files. If opponents target the agreement solely to weaken the government, they will in practice undermine a national asset belonging to all Iranians. The difference between responsible politics and corrosive competition becomes clear at precisely this point.
Iran’s future depends more than anything on reviving national matter.
It is still too early to judge the final success of this memorandum. Experience in Iran–US relations shows that no agreement is definitive until implementation and consolidation, and crises can always return. However, even if the future of this understanding faces challenges, one important achievement has already been made: demonstrating that even the most sensitive national files can be managed outside governmental or factional monopolies.
The 14th administration has taken a valuable step by nationalizing the negotiation process and avoiding political exclusivity. Now no political group has any excuse to disengage from responsibility for supporting this national matter.
If this experience becomes a lasting model, its effects will extend far beyond foreign policy. The same logic could be applied to economic reform, development planning, population policy, water governance, energy, education, and even culture, areas long suffering from a lack of national consensus.
At the same time, all political currents, institutions, elites, and public actors must consider maximizing the outcomes of the initial understanding and achieving an agreement that serves Iran’s fullest national interests as a shared responsibility.
Undoubtedly, adversaries will not abandon hostility and will attempt to deprive Iran of its rights and interests in the course of future negotiations. Under such conditions, just as during the Iran–Iraq War national defense was a collective responsibility, safeguarding national interests in diplomacy today also requires shared political commitment and sacrifice.
On the path ahead, victory or failure, gain or loss, will belong to the entire nation. From this point forward, no one is solely a creditor and no one is solely a debtor, all are partners in Iran’s future.
NOURNEWS