On the surface, Iran and the United States have perhaps never appeared closer to an understanding. In practice, however, they may also have never been in such a state of uncertainty. Washington continuously sends signals suggesting that an agreement is near; American media outlets speak of draft proposals and preliminary understandings, while some senior officials in the Trump administration describe the negotiating atmosphere as positive and highly promising. Yet on the ground, US pressure has not been fully eased, the maritime blockade has not been lifted, and Washington has shown no willingness to bear the political cost of entering into a final agreement.
At first glance, it may seem that the principal cause of this prolonged impasse is hesitation in Washington. The reality, however, is more complex. What is unfolding today between Tehran and Washington is not merely American procrastination; it is a clash between two different strategies over “time,” “power,” and the “conditions of an agreement.”
Donald Trump approaches negotiations with the mindset of a dealmaker. He believes that the longer the opposing side remains in a state of waiting, the greater the likelihood that it will retreat and offer concessions. For this reason, the White House simultaneously sends two contradictory messages: on one hand, it speaks of peace and understanding; on the other, it preserves its most important pressure levers. Under this strategy, an agreement must always appear close, yet never so close that the United States is compelled to pay the real costs associated with it.
The issue, however, is that Iran no longer enters negotiations with the logic that governed previous years. The experience of the JCPOA, the US withdrawal from the agreement, and the security developments of recent years have fostered a form of structural skepticism in Tehran toward Washington’s guarantees. As a result, Iran has repeatedly stated that promises and political statements alone are insufficient, and that any understanding must be accompanied by practical and verifiable measures.
It is within this context that the recent remarks by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf take on significance. He stated explicitly that Iran “obtains concessions not through dialogue, but through missiles, and merely communicates them at the negotiating table.” Ghalibaf also emphasized that Tehran does not trust guarantees or statements, and that “no action will be taken before the other side acts.” These comments should not be viewed merely as rhetorical posturing. Rather, they reflect a significant current within Iran’s decision-making structure, one that believes the primary foundation of negotiations is not trust in the United States, but the preservation of deterrent power.
In reality, if Washington is employing a form of “diplomacy of suspension,” Tehran is pursuing what might be called a “diplomacy of strength.” The United States seeks to use time to its advantage, while Iran is attempting to convey that the passage of time does not necessarily translate into greater vulnerability for Tehran. Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed that economic pressure, maritime blockade, and military threats will not necessarily alter the strategic calculations of the Islamic Republic, and that Iran remains committed to preserving its missile capabilities and regional influence.
For this reason, contrary to some Western analyses, the current situation cannot simply be attributed to Washington’s reluctance to reach an agreement. The reality is that Tehran is likewise unwilling to accept just any arrangement. From Iran’s perspective, an agreement acquires meaning only when there are genuine signs of reduced pressure, a change in Washington’s behavior, and acceptance of at least some of Iran’s demands. Otherwise, negotiations become little more than a tool for the United States to buy time.
Perhaps the most significant point of contention between the two sides lies in their differing definitions of “power.” Washington continues to believe that its principal leverage resides in sanctions, economic pressure, and American military superiority. Tehran, however, seeks to demonstrate that it possesses other instruments as well, from its ability to shape regional dynamics to its missile capabilities and its capacity to influence energy security and strategic corridors. This is precisely why the language of deterrence has been maintained in Tehran even as negotiations continue.
From this perspective, what is taking place today between Iran and the United States is not merely a negotiation over the text of an agreement; it is a contest over each side’s strategic calculations. Trump wants to convince Iran that time is working against Tehran. Iran, in turn, seeks to convey that absent a genuine change in US behavior, the passage of time will not necessarily lead to Iranian retreat.
That is why the present situation should be viewed less as a “threshold of agreement” than as a “threshold of decision.” Washington remains unwilling to surrender its instruments of pressure, while Tehran is not prepared to enter into an understanding without securing tangible concessions. The result is the same ambiguous atmosphere that now hangs over the Iran-US file, an environment in which neither war nor peace is certain, neither has an agreement been reached nor have the negotiations failed.
Perhaps the most important reality is that both sides are testing each other’s resolve. The United States, through suspension and ambiguity, seeks to extract greater concessions, while Iran, relying on deterrence and resistance, is attempting to prevent negotiations from becoming a process of coercion. Consequently, the fate of any potential understanding depends not only on the text of an agreement, but also on which side first concludes that prolonging the game of time no longer serves its interests.
NOURNEWS