Noornews:Among the trio of "war, negotiation, and siege warfare," the option that most closely aligns with current realities is the continuation of the third pattern: a form of prolonged confrontation where economic, maritime, and political tools replace direct military engagement. However, the more important point is that, for the first time, the U.S. finds itself in a position where it must choose between "three bad options." None of these, given Iran’s capacities and positions, hold strategic appeal for Washington.
The first option is a return to direct war—a path that, for Donald Trump, is not only politically costly but also requires a redefinition of "necessity" and "possibility of victory." With global public opinion and the political climate in the U.S. more sensitive to the consequences of war, and its economic costs quickly reflected in various markets, especially in the energy sector, justifying a new conflict is not an easy task. Furthermore, Iran’s deterrent capabilities, particularly after the failure of the U.S. and the Zionist regime in the 40-day war, have significantly increased the risks of this option.
The second option is moving toward negotiation—not from an equal footing, but within the framework of previous pressures. This option also faces serious challenges. Iran’s 14-point response to the U.S. proposal indicates that Tehran seeks a fundamental change in the negotiation framework: from a temporary ceasefire to the complete end of the war, accompanied by security guarantees, lifting sanctions, ending the maritime blockade, and even compensation payments. Such a framework would essentially mean a retreat by the U.S. from its maximum pressure policy, something that would be difficult for Washington to accept.
However, the third option, the continuation of the current situation, or the "siege warfare," while seemingly less costly, is gradually becoming a strategic trap for the U.S. In this model, the decisive factor is not the ability to strike but "resilience." Whoever can manage long-term pressures better will have the upper hand. From this perspective, if Iran can effectively maintain and activate its strategic capabilities, particularly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, this scenario could work in Tehran's favor.
In fact, even if Washington opts for the third choice, it still faces a fundamental problem: the shift in global pressure. Signs of this shift are clearly visible, especially in recent positions. China’s representative at the United Nations explicitly stated that the U.S. blockade against Iran must be lifted and that the root cause of the crisis lies in the "unjust" attacks by the U.S. and its allies on Iran. This stance goes beyond diplomatic remarks, signaling the emergence of an alternative narrative on the international stage—one that portrays the U.S. as the destabilizing force.
China has also positioned itself as an impartial international mediator, emphasizing the need to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and stop the war, supporting negotiations under Pakistan's supervision, and warning against continued military approaches. Meanwhile, Beijing has called the U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil-carrying ships "illegal and unenforceable" and formally protested Washington's trade restrictions. China’s Ministry of Commerce has described these actions as a blatant violation of international law and reiterated its opposition to unilateral sanctions.
The significance of these developments is amplified when we realize that the issue of the Strait of Hormuz has become one of the main topics of discussion between Washington and Beijing during Trump's upcoming visit to China. This means that what was once considered a regional lever is now a global issue with wide geopolitical ramifications. In such circumstances, any disruption in this vital passage will not only affect the energy market but the global economy as a whole, further intensifying the pressure on the U.S.
In this framework, siege warfare is no longer merely a tactical tool but has become a "time-based strategy." Iran, leveraging its geopolitical position and capabilities, can increase the costs of this confrontation for the adversary without engaging in full-scale war.
On the other hand, whatever choice the U.S. makes, it faces a kind of deadlock: war is costly and risky; negotiation requires retreat; and the status quo leads to gradual erosion and increasing global pressure.
In other words, the current equation is not merely a competition between two players but a test of crisis management and endurance. In such an equation, superiority does not necessarily mean a decisive victory but rather the ability to shape trends and impose costs on the adversary. From this perspective, it seems that in siege warfare, the upper hand is, at least for the moment, with Iran—a situation that, if managed wisely, could turn into a lasting advantage.
Nournews