First, the involvement of the United States from outside the Persian Gulf necessitates military coordination with regional partners, particularly Arab states. Under such conditions, Iran would naturally include US interests in these countries within its scope of response.
Second, this relates to the nature of US power, which contains coercive elements used to compel alignment. However, in the case of a war against Iran, such alignment has largely remained non-offensive and cautious, with no clear evidence thus far of direct military participation by regional states.
Third, Iran’s regional capabilities must be considered. The country maintains a network of allies and aligned actors across the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, including in Yemen, Iraq and among resistance groups, which naturally expands the scope of any conflict beyond a bilateral framework.
Finally, the geoeconomic dimension is crucial. Developments related to energy security—particularly the strategic position of the Strait of Hormuz—have drawn the direct interests of global actors into the conflict, further internationalizing its consequences.
However, one month after the onset of this military aggression, the overall alignment suggests that the United States and the Israeli regime have failed to form a cohesive international offensive front against Iran. No major actors have directly joined military operations.
Five categories of actors can be identified within the current international alignment:
The first includes southern Persian Gulf states, which have entered the conflict indirectly—whether voluntarily or otherwise—primarily through quiet diplomacy. Their positions vary: while some, such as the UAE and Bahrain, have at times expressed positions contrary to Iran’s interests (later moderated), others like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have adopted more cautious, diplomatic stances. Qatar, meanwhile, has pursued a dual-track approach, combining criticism with mediation efforts.
The second category comprises actors within the broader Western bloc, particularly NATO members. These states show little appetite for direct involvement, even defensively, and in practice view the United States as a principal driver of escalation. This perspective is shared by a relative majority within the bloc and extends to some East Asian countries wary of the global economic and security implications of US policies.
The third includes major regional Muslim countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan, which have avoided direct involvement while balancing criticism of US actions with reservations about certain Iranian measures.
The fourth group consists of countries such as China, Russia and Iraq, which openly support Iran’s defensive position at the political and diplomatic level but have not joined any military campaign.
The fifth includes actors directly engaged in support of Iran, most notably Yemen, which has acted in coordination with Iran and resistance groups under a “unity of fronts” strategy.
This configuration suggests three key points: first, the anticipated regionalization of the war has fully materialized, in part surprising the United States; second, despite the expansion of hostilities and attacks on US interests, no unified regional offensive coalition has emerged; and third, Washington has failed to build an international coalition for direct military action against Iran, despite the global economic stakes tied to the Strait of Hormuz.
Three primary factors explain this outcome:
First, Iran’s performance on the battlefield has weakened assumptions of its vulnerability, prompting a shift away from earlier objectives such as regime change or unconditional surrender and raising uncertainty about the war’s outcome.
Second, internal divergences within the Western bloc have led many countries to view the conflict as primarily driven by Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu, and more broadly by Donald Trump’s maximalist policies, rather than as a shared Western war.
Third, growing uncertainty about the future global order has made many countries reluctant to commit to costly alignments.
In conclusion, one month after the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, a key reality has been reinforced: the enduring primacy of geopolitics. Contrary to assumptions emphasizing economics and technology in recent decades, strategic inflection points continue to be shaped decisively by geopolitical considerations.
The Strait of Hormuz stands as a clear example of this reality, as do other critical chokepoints such as the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and Bab al-Mandeb.
Overall, the war conveys a central message: if Iran’s narrative of victory consolidates, the post-war order could evolve in ways that expand Iran’s role and influence not only regionally, but also beyond.
By Hossein Ajorlou
The text was first published on Persian language Iran Newspaper.
NOURNEWS