The recent interview of US Vice President J.D. Vance with The Washington Post should be read from a different and deeper angle—not as a clear declaration of policy, but as an attempt to manage a growing set of uncertainties that have turned the decision to launch a military strike against Iran into one of the most ambiguous and high-risk choices in US foreign policy. Contrary to Vance’s resolute tone, the reality is that today neither the timing, nor the scope, nor the form, nor the outcome of any potential military action against Iran is clear for Washington. These ambiguities themselves have become a strategic issue.
In this context, Vance’s emphasis that there is “no possibility” that military action would lead to a prolonged war in the Middle East reflects less a field-based assessment and more an effort to invalidate these very uncertainties at the level of public perception. He seeks to present the military option as controllable, short-term, and low-cost—an image deeply undermined by the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. From this perspective, Vance’s interview should be seen as part of an operation to reconstruct the “credibility of threat” in order to validate a strategy of brinkmanship, rather than as a genuine sign of readiness for war.
Simultaneously with these remarks, a series of practical and media measures were set in motion to reinforce this narrative. Reports of the US aircraft carrier Gerald Ford moving from the eastern Mediterranean—shifting from near Greece toward Haifa—alongside accounts of the withdrawal of some additional personnel from the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, all carried a single message: a display of readiness for military action. Regardless of their actual operational value, the primary function of these moves lies in shaping perception—namely, conveying the impression that the military option is not only on the table, but drawing closer.
Yet this show of force stands in clear tension with domestic constraints in the United States. One of the most significant variables directly weakening the credibility of the military threat is Congress’s increasing effort to limit the president’s war powers. After the costly experiences of the past two decades, a substantial portion of lawmakers—particularly among the Democrats—are reluctant to allow the White House to enter a new Middle Eastern conflict without explicit authorization. This institutional pressure means that even if political will exists within the executive branch, the legal and political path to implementation is far from smooth.
Meanwhile, Iran’s fundamental differences from Iraq and Afghanistan add to the scale of uncertainty. Iran possesses a high capacity for social mobilization in the face of external threats, asymmetric military capabilities, a network of allies, and regional strategic depth. For this reason, the explicit warning by the Supreme Leader that even a limited US strike could escalate into a regional war is not merely rhetorical—it reflects an operational reality. This warning embodies precisely the uncertainty that Vance seeks to erase at the level of discourse, but which cannot be eliminated in reality.
The timing of this atmosphere-building alongside the third round of indirect Iran–US talks in Geneva is also significant. Initial positive assessments by Oman as mediator, as well as by Abbas Araghchi, indicated that negotiations had moved beyond the stage of testing intentions and entered a technical phase—to the extent that it was agreed the talks would continue next week in Vienna. This development clearly demonstrates that the diplomatic option remains alive and meaningful for both sides.
Under these circumstances, the United States faces a structural contradiction: to extract greater concessions at the negotiating table, it requires a credible threat; yet to avoid a costly and uncontrollable war, it must refrain from carrying it out. The result is the simultaneous intensification of threats at the level of rhetoric and display, without crossing the threshold into action. Vance’s interview, limited military movements, and media pressure are all components of this strategy.
What is observable today in Washington’s behavior is not evidence of an inevitable march toward war, but rather a reflection of the absence of a viable operational scenario. The United States now more than ever needs to preserve the image of readiness to act, because actual implementation would confront uncertainties capable of pushing the entire regional equation out of control.
In this context, diplomacy remains the more probable path—one that must proceed under the shadow of a pronounced yet ambiguous threat, guided by a strategy of brinkmanship.
NOURNEWS