Nournews: In assessing recent developments, a common misunderstanding persists: excessive focus on U.S. logistical readiness. The reality is that Washington’s core challenge is not a lack of military capability, but the inability to construct a predictable operational scenario. The United States can strike, but it does not know what will happen afterward—and this “unknown” is precisely the deterrent point.
Contrary to common perception, the U.S. problem is not how to start a war; it is how to manage the chain of consequences. Any military scenario against Iran faces a web of interlinked uncertainties that no operations room can fully contain.
The first and most critical uncertainty is Iran’s response—not merely whether it will respond, but how, where, with what intensity, and at what time. Experience shows that Iran does not necessarily adhere to symmetrical or immediate response patterns, a trait that minimizes predictability for American planners.
One of the key knots in the U.S. scenario is Israel’s fate. If Israel is targeted and sustains significant damage, the conflict would shift from a “limited action” to a full-scale regional crisis.
At the same time, reactions from the Axis of Resistance could expand the geography of conflict from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean—a situation that would be difficult to control even for a military with U.S. capabilities.
No attack scenario is conceivable without considering energy markets. Disruption of oil flows—an inevitable outcome of a new conflict—would immediately trigger price spikes, directly affecting U.S. domestic politics. Moreover, damage to energy and military infrastructure in Persian Gulf states would turn U.S. allies into vulnerable targets—something neither these countries nor Washington can easily accept.
Inside the United States, sensitivity to wars with unclear endings is high. The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan remain vivid. Any strike that fails to produce a “clear and explainable outcome” could deepen domestic political divisions and increase the political cost for decision-makers.
At the international level, the U.S. is facing multiple simultaneous constraints. The war in Ukraine, the Gaza crisis, and efforts to manage the global order vis-à-vis China have limited Washington’s resources and focus. In this context, the role of the European Union is decisive: Europe is unlikely to act as a fully reliable ally. Energy dependence, retaliatory sentiments over repeated humiliations, economic considerations, and fears of regional instability are pushing Europeans toward caution and practical distancing rather than active participation alongside Washington.
Within this framework, China’s and Russia’s reactions—without direct military intervention—could significantly increase the cost of U.S. action through political, economic, and security tools.
Meanwhile, one of the most neglected variables in military analyses is Iran’s nuclear file. Even in the most pessimistic scenario, the United States cannot confidently claim that bombing nuclear facilities would completely eliminate enriched material, especially stockpiles enriched to 60 percent. This uncertainty undermines the very logic of an attack.
Iran’s nuclear industry is indigenous; its continuity does not depend on imported infrastructure but on Iran’s political and national will. From this perspective, a military strike may not solve the problem but could strengthen domestic motivation and cohesion to continue the program.
Today, the United States faces a strategic paradox: it has the capacity for a first strike, but lacks a credible plan to manage subsequent strikes. The multiplicity of uncertainties—from Iran’s response and Israel’s fate to energy markets, Europe, and the nuclear file—has made the military option far more costly than it initially appears.
Therefore, what we are witnessing is not hesitation born of weakness, but hesitation rooted in awareness of consequences—where real deterrence emerges not from a lack of weapons, but from an abundance of unanswered questions.
NOURNEWS