Ahead of each sensitive round of negotiations between Iran and the United States, a recurring yet purposeful pattern is activated — one that unfolds not at the negotiating table, but in the arena of perception, emotion and narrative. This arena is the field of “cognitive warfare,” where media actors — and especially “human media” — assume the driving role in operations, seeking to fix their desired outcome in the audience’s mind before any negotiation has even begun or concluded.
At such critical junctures, pseudo-media outlets such as “Axios” enter the field with a high volume of breaking, sensational and allegedly “exclusive” reports attributed to unnamed “informed sources.” The issue is not merely the publication of a false report. Rather, it is the creation of a psychologically unstable atmosphere, the suggestion of deadlock, and the construction of a narrative that negotiations are either on the verge of collapse or that Iran will inevitably be forced into retreat under pressure. In the literature of cognitive warfare, this technique is known as “directed news saturation” — filling the audience’s mind with pre-emptive negative narratives before reality has the opportunity to manifest itself.
Meanwhile, “human media” figures such as “Barak Ravid” function as intermediary nodes. These individuals are not merely journalists but narrative actors — people simultaneously connected to specific political sources who, by virtue of their media credibility, amplify a preferred narrative with high intensity. The highlighting of Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline positions against negotiations can be analyzed within this framework: the transmission of a threatening message through a media channel without incurring formal diplomatic costs.
Another layer of this operation lies in the dissemination platforms themselves. A network such as “X” is not merely a neutral tool. Platform-level decisions — from restricting accounts to removing verification badges — can tilt the balance of narratives in favor of particular actors. When the accounts of official Iranian figures such as Abbas Araghchi or Ali Larijani face limitations, the space becomes more open to fake accounts and unofficial narrative-builders. Elon Musk’s role in shaping the policies of this environment, while not directly related to content production, is nonetheless influential in designing the architecture of the field.
Importantly, these operations are activated precisely in the period immediately before and after negotiations — whether talks begin with Omani mediation or when a city such as Geneva in Switzerland hosts discussions. The objective is not information-sharing but expectation management and the psychological attrition of domestic and foreign audiences alike.
In response to this situation, three strategic imperatives emerge. Ignoring any one of them effectively cedes the playing field to cognitive operations rooms.
First is the responsibility of domestic media to avoid the emotional, hasty and unverified re-publication of narratives produced abroad with specific objectives. The raw reproduction of pseudo-media reports — even with the intention of critique or warning — often constitutes the final link in a psychological operation. Professional media must be capable of distinguishing between “news,” a “pressure signal,” and a “perception operation,” and before republishing, must identify each narrative’s place within the broader puzzle of cognitive warfare.
Second is the enhancement of domestic media literacy — no longer merely a cultural recommendation, but a component of national security. An audience that understands that not every “breaking news” alert is truly news, that not every “informed source” necessarily exists, and that not every dramatic narrative reflects the actual state of negotiations, is less likely to fall prey to targeted atmospherics. In the context of negotiations, managing collective emotions is as important as managing the text of any agreement — and this is impossible without a mature, media-literate public.
The third — and perhaps most decisive — imperative is rapid, accurate and purposeful communication by the institutions responsible for guiding negotiations. Experience has shown that information vacuums provide the ideal breeding ground for pseudo-media and narrative-building human media. Any prolonged gap between an event and official communication is quickly filled with fabricated reports, biased analyses and suggestive narratives. Under such circumstances, even subsequent denials may fail to fully repair the damage, because the cognitive operation has already done its work and the initial image has taken shape in the audience’s mind.
Purposeful communication does not mean disclosing the details of negotiations; rather, it means intelligently managing the flow of information — providing timely general frameworks, defining narrative red lines, and preventing the emergence of rumors capable of inflaming the psychological climate of society. When an official reference point acts proactively, accessibly and in a timely manner, the maneuvering space of pseudo-media naturally shrinks, and public opinion is less inclined to turn to unreliable sources.
It must be acknowledged that society’s psychological calm and perceptual cohesion constitute an inseparable part of the country’s strategic capital in the negotiation process. This capital is preserved neither through censorship nor through abandoning the media field, but through a combination of responsible media, an informed audience, and precise, timely official communication. If these three pillars are not simultaneously strengthened, the result will be that before negotiations conclude in the conference room, their outcome will already have been written in the minds of audiences by external actors — a situation whose costs extend far beyond a fleeting news cycle.
NOURNEWS