The recent meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, rather than marking the end of disagreements, at least in tone, served as a showcase of hidden yet deep fissures between Washington and Tel Aviv. The encounter was not accompanied by a joint statement, but neither was there complete silence. Both sides spoke separately after the meeting—and it is precisely this “separate speaking” that is meaningful. Trump spoke of continuing the path of negotiation with Iran, while Netanyahu outlined conditions that would, in practice, drive negotiations into a deadlock.
Trump announced that he intends to preserve the path of dialogue with Iran and reiterated the necessity of reaching an agreement. At the same time, he warned that if no agreement is reached, Iran would face “harsh conditions.” This dual posture is not a sign of confusion, but part of Trump’s well-known behavioral pattern: holding both the carrot of negotiation and the stick of threat at the same time. He seeks to maintain pressure at a level that encourages concessions from the other side without entering into war—and without paying the costs of a full-scale conflict.
On the other side, Netanyahu offered a completely different narrative. The Israeli prime minister stressed that any agreement with Iran must go beyond the nuclear file and also curb Tehran’s missile program and regional policies. In practice, this stance amounts to expanding the framework of negotiations to a point that directly clashes with Iran’s declared red lines. Moreover, Netanyahu explicitly stated that Israel reserves for itself the “right to independent action” against Iran—a phrase that, more than a declaration of war, serves as a tool of political and psychological pressure.
The central issue lies precisely here: the gap between the ceiling of concessions Iran is willing to grant and the floor of concessions Israel demands. Iran has clearly stated that the subject of negotiations is strictly nuclear, and that its missile program and regional policies are outside the agenda. This position is not tactical or temporary, but a strategic red line tied to Iran’s logic of deterrence and national security. By contrast, Israel is concerned about an agreement that would “shrink the Iran file” and deprive Tel Aviv of leverage for future pressure.
Yet despite these tensions, why does the option of war remain off the table? The answer lies in cost–benefit calculations. War with Iran, even for the United States, would not be quick or low-cost. Iran’s defense doctrine is based on attrition—gradually increasing costs to the point where the opposing side’s political will is weakened. Under such conditions, military superiority does not necessarily translate into political victory. Even large-scale airstrikes alone would not be capable of ending the crisis, as Iran’s military infrastructure is dispersed, layered, and in many cases underground.
Moreover, the economic balance between attack and defense does not favor the attacker. Low-cost missiles and drones can wear down extremely expensive air-defense systems, and even a limited percentage of successful strikes can generate significant economic and psychological effects. Most importantly, any direct confrontation would quickly become regionalized. The network of forces aligned with Iran across the Middle East could open multiple fronts against U.S. interests and its allies—from threats to military forces to disruptions of energy and trade routes.
Within this framework, Netanyahu’s threat of “independent action” appears less an imminent operational plan than an attempt to shape Washington’s calculations. Israel seeks to push the United States toward greater rigidity and to prevent an agreement that would merely close the nuclear file. The United States, however—at least during Trump’s tenure—prefers not to enter a war whose end is uncertain and whose costs would be heavy.
What has ultimately taken shape is an intermediate condition: neither war nor agreement. A strategic suspension on the edge of crisis, in which each actor seeks to improve its position without paying the price of a final explosion. This suspension, though unstable, remains for now the most likely scenario ahead.
NOURNEWS