Netanyahu’s sudden visit to Washington and his meeting with Trump, immediately after the first round of Iran–US talks in Oman, was not merely a bilateral consultation. It was an effort to influence an evolving equation in which three principal actors—Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv—are each redefining their positions through a combination of diplomacy and hard power. The three-hour meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, and their subsequent remarks, made clear that no definitive path has yet been established and that the region remains in a state of “strategic suspension.”
On the one hand, Trump emphasized the continuation of negotiations and his “preference for a deal.” On the other, by reposting a Wall Street Journal report on preparations to deploy a second aircraft carrier strike group to the Middle East, and alongside remarks by the US Treasury Secretary about moving military capabilities closer to Iran, he effectively reinforced a message of pressure. This dual track suggests that Washington has not yet made a final decision; rather, it is testing two paths simultaneously: the possibility of an agreement if acceptable concessions are secured, and readiness to escalate tensions should talks fail.
In this context, Netanyahu sought to raise the ceiling of demands. His insistence on including Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional forces in any prospective agreement would effectively expand the framework of negotiations beyond the nuclear issue and reduce the likelihood of a deal. Tel Aviv is wary of a limited nuclear agreement—one that could entrench other components of Iran’s power. Hence, by underscoring “doubts about a deal” and emphasizing Israel’s “right to self-defense,” the Israeli prime minister is attempting to shape Trump’s calculations.
Yet the third side of this triangle—Iran—is not merely in a reactive position. While keeping the diplomatic channel open and participating actively in the Muscat talks, Tehran has simultaneously strengthened its defensive readiness. Iran’s message has been clear: negotiation does not mean diminishing deterrence. Contrary to the assumptions of some Western circles, Iran’s entry into dialogue is not born of weakness, but rather framed as a strategy of managing tensions and controlling costs.
In the face of American military and psychological signaling—from deploying strike groups to intensifying threatening rhetoric—Iran has not retreated. Instead, by explicitly stating that any limited military action would be met with a broad response, it has made its deterrent posture more overt. Within this framework, it has been emphasized that in the event of conflict, the response would not be confined to a single geography, and that Israel would not remain immune from its consequences. This message transforms the equation of confrontation from a “limited strike” to an “expanding risk.”
Iran’s declared strategy rests on a key principle: if war is imposed, it will neither remain passive nor confined to a purely defensive posture; rather, it will seek to seize the initiative at multiple levels. This approach significantly increases the cost of any decision to pursue military action. Any limited scenario carries the risk of escalating into a broader regional conflict.
This very factor has heightened uncertainty in Trump’s calculations. The US president now faces three simultaneous variables: Israeli pressure to harden the framework of any agreement, the need to project strength to preserve bargaining leverage, and the high risk of entering a conflict whose scope and end point are unpredictable. Under such conditions, the more Iran emphasizes its defensive preparedness and capacity for a broad response, the more costly the military option becomes in White House calculations.
Consequently, the current atmosphere cannot be simply described as a “definitive move toward a deal” or a “slide toward war.” What is emerging is a complex game of leverage-building. The United States, through a combination of threat and negotiation, seeks greater concessions; Israel aims to widen the scope of demands and reduce the likelihood of a limited agreement; and Iran, by synchronizing active diplomacy with overt deterrence, is raising the cost of any hasty decision to confront it.
The Muscat equation now stands at a point where none of the actors can speak with certainty about the outcome. The final decision will not be merely the product of political will, but the result of a cost–benefit assessment shaped by levels of deterrence, internal cohesion, and reciprocal signaling. In this framework, the greater the uncertainty surrounding the consequences of war, the stronger the likelihood that the diplomatic path—albeit limited and incremental—will be preferred.
NOURNEWS