Nournews: As a new round of talks under the nuclear directive begins in Muscat, the capital of Oman—taking place today, Friday, with Steve Witkoff, the U.S. President’s Special envoy, and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, on one side, and the Iranian diplomatic team led by Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi on the other—the surrounding scene of the talks is also meaningfully changing.
Alongside the formal diplomatic process, a series of field maneuvers and security messages from the U.S. can be observed, indicating that Washington is not conducting this round purely as a conventional diplomatic procedure, but rather seeks to define it within a pressure-and-negotiation package. Reports on continued equipment transfers to the region, the approach of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln to operational contact range, the immediate evacuation notice for U.S. citizens from Iran, and the CENTCOM commander accompanying the U.S. delegation all constitute parts of a larger picture.
In strategic terminology, combining diplomatic tools with displays of hard power is a well-known pattern to increase bargaining weight. What is notable at this stage, however, is the level and simultaneity of these signals. The presence of a senior military commander alongside the negotiating team—even in an advisory or security accompaniment role—is unprecedented and meaningful at this level of talks. This move transforms the message from “negotiation only” to “negotiation under credible threat,” conveying that the hard-option is not only on the table but also reflected in operational deployment.
The increase in equipment transfers and the highlighting of strategic assets such as the aircraft carrier serve functions beyond military readiness; they are tools of strategic communication. The goal is to influence the opposing side’s calculations, manage regional allies’ expectations, and shape the media narrative of the talks. In this framework, threats move beyond purely psychological operations toward a direct pressure signal. The difference is that the former targets public perception and awareness, while the latter is aimed directly at negotiators, decision-makers, and strategists of the opposing side.
However, the effectiveness of this pattern depends on a key assumption: that the opposing party is vulnerable and willing to concede. The problem is that Iran’s behavioral record over the past two decades contradicts this assumption. On strategic issues, especially those concerning legal rights, national security, and deterrence elements, Iran has shown that it does not change course under direct military pressure. This historical precedent reduces the effectiveness of threats and, conversely, increases the likelihood of turning them into a “cost-increasing factor for the threatener.”
From a game theory perspective, the U.S. is raising the stakes before establishing the rules of the game. This move may aim to gain initial concessions, change the agenda of the talks, or compel the opposing side to retreat on certain lines. But this tactic works only if the balance of will favors the party applying pressure. Otherwise, increasing pressure can harden positions, reduce flexibility, and shift the game from “manageable bargaining” to “costly confrontation.”
The immediate evacuation order for U.S. citizens from Iran can also be analyzed within this framework. Such announcements usually serve two functions simultaneously: first, a precautionary and legal cover for the issuing government; second, a signal of heightened risk to markets, media, and the opposing side. This tool is part of the pre-negotiation pressure package, not necessarily an indication of a definitive decision for military action. Overall, however, the accumulation of these signals moves the negotiation space away from conventional and balanced dialogue.
In contrast, Iran’s declared stance is based on the non-negotiable defense of legal rights while simultaneously leveraging all political, social, legal, and defense capacities to protect national interests. The Iranian negotiation team operates according to its negotiation guidelines, and past experience shows that external pressure alone does not alter Tehran’s decision-making framework.
The outcome of these conditions is that if the negotiation environment deviates from its natural course and turns into a theater for threat display, the party that introduces military tools into the diplomatic arena will bear the costs. In an environment where Iran possesses significant geopolitical capacity, defensive capability, and a firmly established will to resist, costly military displays are more likely to increase costs for the initiator rather than serve as a leverage for gaining concessions.
NOURNEWS