For decades, the US has employed aircraft carriers as symbols of military dominance and as central instruments of psychological warfare. These massive vessels are not merely weapons but part of a broader narrative of American power—a narrative suggesting that wherever a US carrier appears, the outcome of conflict is already decided. Media emphasis on their capabilities serves two simultaneous objectives: instilling fear in adversaries and reinforcing the notion that no effective countermeasure exists against them.
This pattern has repeated itself in the recent tensions between Iran and the United States. Continuous focus by American officials and media outlets on the presence of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the region, along with similar assets reportedly heading toward the area, reflects a familiar attempt to signal decisive superiority and prepare public opinion for maximum pressure. Yet this narrative rests less on the realities of modern battlefields and more on imagery rooted in the classic wars of the twentieth century. The dynamics of naval warfare—especially in confined and complex environments such as the Persian Gulf—have undergone fundamental transformation.
On the opposite side of this narrative stands Iran’s unique experience, shaped by the eight-year war with Iraq and decades of comprehensive economic and military sanctions. This accumulated experience led Tehran to conclude that reliance on costly, conventional models of power projection is neither feasible nor desirable. The outcome of this strategic understanding has been the development of an innovative defense doctrine centered on precise threat recognition, intelligent use of national capabilities, and the conversion of limitations into advantages. This doctrine finds meaning not in displays of power, but in the genuine capacity to respond and impose costs on an aggressor.
The effectiveness of this approach has not remained theoretical. The recent 12-day war served as a practical demonstration of this strategy against two heavily armed nuclear powers, where a combination of drones, missiles, electronic warfare, and decentralized command networks drew the attention of military analysts both domestically and abroad. Many observers explicitly described this model as “penetrating” and “effective,” showing that superiority does not necessarily lie in larger and more expensive equipment, but in how capabilities are organized and employed.
One significant piece of evidence is the replication of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone by Russia, the United States, and China—three of the world’s most dominant military powers. This move clearly indicates that Iran’s defense innovations are not only indigenous and effective but also inspirational. When major powers turn to Iranian models, it becomes difficult to speak of absolute imbalance on the battlefield.
The same logic applies in the maritime domain. The fast-boat strategy, whose roots date back to the years of the Iran-Iraq war, is built on mobility, agility, maneuverability, reduced vulnerability, and the element of surprise. Rather than investing in a single heavy and costly aircraft carrier, Iran has distributed equivalent capabilities across fleets of fast attack craft. Naval cruise missiles with varying ranges, subsurface torpedoes, radar and electronic warfare systems, high–rate-of-fire weaponry, reconnaissance, combat and suicide drones, multi-purpose quadcopters, air defense systems, small stealthy “wet” submarines, and explosive-laden fast boats are all integrated into the offensive order of battle of the IRGC Navy’s flotillas.
In addition, heavy shore-to-sea missile fire, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and networks of heavy drones simultaneously support naval units. The result is a combat structure that, due to the multiplicity and dispersion of its units, possesses operational capacity equivalent to several aircraft carriers—without bearing the inherent limitations of such massive vessels, including size, limited mobility, and high vulnerability within the narrow geography of the Persian Gulf. This structure is precisely tailored to Iran’s naval defense doctrine in confined waterways and offers a high degree of surprise capability.
By this definition, Iran today effectively possesses multiple “aircraft carriers” in the region—carriers that are asymmetric, dispersed, low-cost, and less vulnerable. The presence of highly trained forces deeply familiar with the region’s geography further amplifies this capacity. Under such conditions, psychological warfare based on showcasing US aircraft carriers not only loses its former effectiveness but may even work against its architects. As senior Iranian military officials have previously emphasized, an accumulation of equipment does not necessarily guarantee success; at times, it simply increases the number of available targets.
NOURNEWS