One of the core pillars of US military doctrine has long been a simultaneous reliance on advanced technology, massive expenditure and psychological deterrence. For years, this narrative was reinforced through the display of multilayered air-defense systems, aircraft carriers and billion-dollar arsenals. The experience of the 12-day war, however, subjected this image to a serious challenge. Iran’s combined drone and missile attacks demonstrated that military superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic superiority.
On the actual battlefield, what proved decisive was not the price of each system, but the “cost-to-effect” ratio. The penetration of low-cost drones through ornate and expensive air-defence walls eroded the long-standing deterrence narrative of the United States and its allies, raising profound questions about the effectiveness of this model.
Shahed-136: From Security Threat to Blueprint for Imitation
The Shahed-136 drone, which for years had been portrayed in official Washington discourse as a “destabilising threat”, suddenly became a model for redesigning US drone capabilities. This shift was not merely a technical decision; it amounted to an implicit acknowledgment of the success of Iran’s defence strategy.
Iran’s doctrine is built on mass production, simplicity of design, low cost and high impact—features that stand in direct contrast to the West’s high-cost approach. Copying this model signifies an acceptance of the failure of one military philosophy and a turn towards a paradigm that had previously been ridiculed and sanctioned.
Depletion of Air-Defense Stockpiles and a Deterrence Crisis
The mass deployment of Iranian drones forced US and Israeli air-defense systems into an unwanted war of attrition. Each successful interception cost several times more than the price of the target, rapidly draining interceptor missile stockpiles at an alarming rate.
The result was the emergence of gaps in defensive layers and increased vulnerability to ballistic and precision-guided missiles. This reality explains why, after several days, all of Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s political and diplomatic capacities were mobilized to halt the fighting. This was not a tactical retreat, but a sign of a deterrence crisis in the face of a low-cost yet intelligent strategy.
A Reactive Trump and Psychological Warfare After the Battlefield
Trump’s recent statements should be analyzed not as expressions of strength, but as efforts to manage a psychological defeat. Widespread protests in the United States and within Western security circles after the 12-day war placed him in a defensive posture. His hasty expressions of gratitude following the targeting of Al Udeid air base and his attempts to shift the media agenda were, above all, reactions to the collapse of an aura that had been promoted for years.
The contradiction between verbally threatening Iran and practically imitating its military model underscores that real wars are settled in minds before they are fought in the skies. In this battle of perceptions, the winner is the actor that changes the rules of the game—and Iran, through low-cost and effective strategies, has brought about that change.
NOURNEWS