At first glance, the newly released National Security Strategy may seem like one of those routine bureaucratic documents that U.S. policymaking institutions issue on a regular basis. But a close reading of its provisions shows that a marked—and highly consequential—shift has taken place in Washington’s hierarchy of preferences and priorities. In other words, this document is not merely a security roadmap; it is the United States’ official narrative of a new world and a new order—an order that could be described as the “Trumpian order.”
Although the new strategy appears fresh and distinct compared with earlier iterations, its conceptual and strategic foundations are not particularly novel when measured against Donald Trump’s worldview. In line with the “America First” slogan, it introduces significant shifts toward prioritizing domestic issues such as border security, migration and trafficking control; economic questions tied to restoring U.S. economic and industrial power; international themes such as renewed attention to the Western Hemisphere and a return to the Monroe Doctrine; reducing dependence on international institutions; and, of course, burden-sharing with allies. It is as though the document seeks simultaneously to redefine threats, recalibrate priorities and strategic pivots, re-identify and reassure America’s circle of friends and partners, and contain its global competitors. Altogether, the text suggests that the United States aims to move away from deep and costly engagements and toward the lower-cost management of threats.
The tone of the new document also stands in contrast to the unilateral and maximalist ambitions of the post–Cold War era; for example, it no longer shelters behind slogans such as the “war on terror.” The authors instead try to present an ostensibly realistic, though anxious, depiction of global conditions: the return of great-power competition, the spread of regional instability, the leap in destructive technologies, and the erosion of the international order that Washington itself spent decades designing.
This seemingly simple acknowledgment may be the document’s most important message: the United States no longer lives in a world where all lines converge on Washington. Although the strategy still asserts that the United States is the “leader of the global order,” it effectively concedes that such leadership must now be exercised through more complex mechanisms—mechanisms that require managing several challenges at once: China, Russia, emerging technologies, environmental crises, and a series of regional threats for which no quick solutions exist.
China, Russia, and Europe: Competitor or Threat?
In every U.S. national security document of the past two decades, China has been the central axis of strategic competition. This time, however, the language is notably more balanced. In the new version, China is framed not as an enemy but as a long-term competitor and structural challenge. This tonal shift is not mere wordplay; it reflects a reality imposed by the global economy: China is now the world’s second-largest economy, the top trading partner for dozens of countries, and an actor that cannot be eliminated or fully contained. Trump’s unsuccessful tariff confrontation with Beijing illustrated this point. With its new language, Washington acknowledges that competition with China must be “managed,” not “destructive.” The meaning is straightforward: the United States seeks competition, but not at the price of war or the collapse of the global economy.
The document takes a different stance toward Russia and Europe. Regarding Europe, the new U.S. strategy suggests that Europe must assume responsibility for its own defense. Consequently, Washington aims to reduce its commitments to Europe and views the Ukraine issue as primarily a European matter. As for Russia, the document identifies it as a threat to Europe rather than to the United States.
Middle East and Iran: A Shift in Perspective?
One of the strategy’s notable elements is its revised approach to the Middle East. Unlike the 2000s, when the region dominated every U.S. security agenda, the Middle East is now described as low-priority but high-risk. Three realities shape this new view: first, America’s reduced dependence on the region’s energy; second, the high costs of large-scale military interventions; and third, the emergence of new powers such as China, which now play more significant economic and political roles in the region. Still, the strategy underscores three enduring U.S. red lines: Israel’s security, the security of key waterways, and preventing America’s adversaries from gaining access to the Persian Gulf’s energy resources. Accordingly, Washington is not leaving the Middle East; rather, it intends—by its own account—to make its presence more targeted, limited, and reactive.
The most important section for Iran concerns how Tehran is positioned in the new document. In earlier strategies, Iran appeared more frequently and more prominently. In the new one, references are fewer. Washington adopts an oversimplified and even diminutive view of the Islamic Republic’s role, suggesting that after the 12-day war it now sees an “Iran weakened.” On this basis, the document speaks of a reduced Iranian threat and does not elevate “regime change” as a policy lens. In this framework, Iran is not cast as a major strategic threat but rather as a “disruptive but manageable variable.” Yet a notable point remains: the new strategy mentions Iran alongside China and Russia. This is a clear signal that, despite the minimization, Washington still views Iran as part of a broader equation—an equation stretching from East Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Overall, the new U.S. National Security Strategy indicates above all that the world is crossing a historic threshold. The United States remains a major power, but one no longer able to shape all variables according to the patterns of past decades. In this new setting, China is an actor that cannot be marginalized; Russia is an unalterable reality; the Middle East is a region from which Washington cannot detach; and Latin America and the Western Hemisphere have reemerged as central priorities. The new document claims to impose coherence on a multipolar, complex, and unsettled world. In practice, however, the United States appears more focused on managing an uncertain future than on designing a new order—one in which regional powers will play a more decisive role than ever before.
NOURNEWS