The twelve-day conflict that erupted in June and ended with a fragile ceasefire — sought by the opposing side — has created a new balance of risk in the region. Although the exchange of strikes entered an intense military phase, for months now the focus has moved toward intelligence arenas, covert operations, and psychological warfare. In this climate, the recent statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin — revealing that Israeli officials had told Moscow through confidential channels they “do not seek confrontation with Iran” and had asked Russia to convey that message to its “Iranian friends” — reflects a shared desire among the main players to reduce direct tension, while signaling attempts at quiet diplomatic management behind the scenes.
Yet this apparent calm should not be mistaken for de-escalation. The adversary’s decision-making structure is now shaped by a convergence of factors that has made this the “Year of Caution.” Both Israel’s domestic electoral calendar — with Knesset elections scheduled by October 2026 — and the U.S. political cycle — the congressional midterms on November 3, 2026 — push their leaders toward restraint. In the short term, such caution may prevent a direct military flare-up, but it is likely to shift disruptive activity into other domains — particularly intelligence operations, security maneuvers, targeted assassinations, and cyberattacks.
This shift carries two key messages for Tehran. First, the likelihood of “bold operations” by the adversary remains — acts that, if they fail, could carry political and electoral costs in both Israel and the U.S. Second, the nature of the threat has evolved, meaning a lower probability of large-scale military action in the coming months and the emergence of a new phase of unconventional, pinpoint threats.
Domestically, one crucial point cannot be ignored: mounting social pressures inside Iran. Economic shocks, the fallout from conflict, and disruptions in production and supply chains risk fueling discontent that could heighten political and security vulnerabilities. The recent emphasis by Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, on strengthening both “defensive power” and “social cohesion” — and his call on the media to play an active role in fostering unity — indicates that decision-makers recognize the need for simultaneous protective and social management measures. But this message must be implemented in a way that calms public sentiment and prevents pressure from escalating, rather than ignoring or confronting legitimate social demands.
On a practical threat level, in the next two months the possibility of targeted operations — including intelligence-linked assassinations or precision strikes against figures within the resistance axis — cannot be ruled out. The rationale is clear: failure in a high-risk operation could quickly reverberate through election campaigns abroad. Therefore, adversaries may opt for limited, daring intelligence tests that deliver immediate and symbolic impact.
Based on this assessment, four strategic and operational recommendations emerge:
Offensive counterintelligence: In many cases, the best defense is an intelligent counteroffensive — seizing the adversary’s informational ground, disrupting targeting networks, and forcing the competition back onto their own field. This should combine technical and psychological tactics to reduce future threats.
Pessimistic interpretation of intelligence signals: Security and intelligence agencies must assess every suspicious signal with minimal assumptions of goodwill — starting from a presumption of “hostile intent” and designing stepwise responses that carry the lowest collective cost.
Smart protective tightening for officials: Instead of relying solely on visible security measures, protective protocols should be purposefully strengthened — cancelling non-essential travel and meetings, reducing public appearances, and restricting communication channels during sensitive periods. (Note: this should remain a technical and confidential measure, not a media theme.)
Pre-emptive socio-economic measures: To avert social and economic crises affecting basic livelihoods, the government and economic institutions must adopt proactive, not reactive, approaches. Merely trying to stabilize the currency market or control prices without improving institutional efficiency, foreign exchange allocation, and smart import of essential goods will not prevent market instability.
Socio-economic policy should rest on three pillars: increasing the purchasing power of workers and pensioners; ensuring stable access to essential goods; and supporting small-scale production and sustainable employment. In this context, the media and civil institutions should take on a calming, explanatory role to counter feelings of economic insecurity. Social cohesion cannot be strengthened without securing basic living standards — and prolonged instability in this area could lead to dangerous political and security fissures in the months ahead.
The current confrontation is less a traditional battlefield war and more an intelligence and symbolic one. Maintaining maximum protective readiness and enhancing counterintelligence capacity is not only deterrent but also the most effective way to protect civilians, the economy, and critical infrastructure. Balanced diplomacy — coupled with structural and social preparedness at home — can keep the “shadow of war” at bay, but doing so requires efficiency at all levels and swift, coordinated decision-making based on the most pessimistic assumptions.
NOURNEWS