From the outset, relations between Islamabad and Riyadh have been a mixture of strategic interests and mutual needs. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has received extensive financial assistance from Saudi Arabia—aid that, although not directly allocated to the nuclear program, allowed Islamabad to cover its current expenditures while channeling domestic resources into building nuclear capacity. For this reason, Saudi Arabia’s role in helping Pakistan withstand sanctions and sustain its nuclear program has always remained vivid in the memory of Pakistani policymakers.
In return, Pakistan has consistently provided manpower, military training, and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia. Decades of cooperation at security and military levels have made the two countries natural partners. Now, the signing of an agreement that treats “an attack on one as an attack on the other” represents an upgrade and formalization of that long-standing tradition. Yet, its major distinction lies in the current global context: declining trust in the United States as guarantor of Persian Gulf security, alongside China’s rising role in supporting Islamabad.
Direct Implications for India and UAE
India may feel more unsettled by this pact than any other actor. New Delhi, which maintains deep economic ties with Saudi Arabia, now faces a difficult question: can its strategic investment in the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), reliant on Riyadh’s central role, still be trusted? If Saudi Arabia leans towards deep defense links with Islamabad, India can no longer easily regard it as a privileged partner. That is why Indian experts warn the agreement could simultaneously strain both India’s security calculations and its commercial strategies.
The United Arab Emirates also finds itself in a sensitive position. Just one day after the Riyadh–Islamabad pact was announced, Abu Dhabi signed a separate security agreement with New Delhi. The timing was a clear sign of rivalry between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed in defining the “main partner of India” in the Persian Gulf. For the UAE, closer Saudi–Pakistani ties mean Riyadh’s weight in security equations has grown—something Abu Dhabi is unwilling to leave unanswered. Consequently, the UAE will likely work to reinforce its defense and economic bonds with India while avoiding deterioration in relations with Riyadh.
Layered Signals to Washington and Tel Aviv
The true nature of the Saudi–Pakistani defense pact is less that of an “operational alliance” and more an instrument of signaling. Riyadh is sending several simultaneous messages. First, to the United States: the era of absolute reliance on Washington’s security umbrella has ended, and Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its alliances. This comes at a moment when Israel’s recent attack on Qatar exposed weaknesses in the Western-oriented Persian Gulf security structure.
The second message is to Israel. The entry of Pakistan—a state with nuclear capabilities—into Middle Eastern security equations is a serious warning for Tel Aviv. Even if Islamabad’s nuclear umbrella is not practically extended to Riyadh, the mere closeness implies an asymmetrical rise in threats. Israeli analysts speak of a “game changer,” whose scope remains undefined but which undoubtedly heightens concerns in Tel Aviv.
The third message is directed at regional actors and public opinion. Saudi Arabia seeks to demonstrate that, contrary to its traditional image, it is not solely dependent on the West and is capable of building diverse security networks. This “multi-vector” policy aligns with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to cement Saudi Arabia’s global role—from hosting international events to shaping new security pacts.
Beyond South Asia: China, Russia, and Future of Regional Security
This agreement is not just a bilateral or regional event but part of the emerging architecture of global security. China, Pakistan’s strategic partner, views the pact as an opportunity to consolidate its influence in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s link with Pakistan indirectly benefits Beijing, placing New Delhi and Washington on the defensive and enabling the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to exploit fresh geopolitical rifts.
For Russia too, the deal is welcome news. Seeking to reduce its isolation from the Ukraine war, Moscow embraces any weakening of U.S. influence in the Middle East. Closer ties between Riyadh and Islamabad open greater space for actors weary of the U.S.-centered order.
Meanwhile, Pakistan aims through this pact to reinforce the army’s role in its domestic political structure and to attract new financial resources from Riyadh. Yet it also accepts the risk of being drawn into Persian Gulf crises. For Saudi Arabia, the pact serves as a trial run for the idea of “Arab collective defense,” which might in the future be extended to the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
More than a full-fledged defense alliance, this pact reflects shifting patterns: the era of unilateral reliance on the United States has ended, giving way to a fluid and multi-layered security architecture. This evolution could bring relative stability through joint deterrence—or intensify geopolitical rivalries. The future of the pact will be determined not in official communiqués but in the real-world tests of regional crises.
NOURNEWS