An explanatory note regarding the Director General's reports to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), titled "The NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2025/53 - 3 September 2025)" and "Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (GOV/2025/50 - 3 September 2025)," has been published.
The text of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's note is as follows:
The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Vienna would like to share its comments and observations on the Director General Reports to the IAEA Board of Governors. Unfortunately, the reports, once again, are out of legal and professional context, based on distorted narrative, a continuation of the past unconstructive approach that has led to a catastrophic outcome. Below are the main points regarding the said reports:
A) Military aggression by the United States of America and Israeli regime on Iran's Safeguarded Nuclear Facilities
Prohibition of Attack and Threat of Attack on Nuclear Facilities in International Law:
The aggressions, in June 2025, are flagrant violation of the principles of the UN Charter, provisions of international law, and international humanitarian law that prohibit the use of force. Numerous documents such as UNSC/IAEA GC resolutions and the NPT Review Conferences, explicitly prohibit attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities. These aggressions, were condemned by a large number of members of the international community in the strongest terms. They have not only endangered regional and international peace and security but have also undermined the foundations of international cooperation. Unfortunately, the Agency did not carry its statutory duties in protecting peaceful safeguarded facilities including what has been stipulated in Article III.B.1 of the IAEA Statute, to “Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation”. Despite Iran’s advance warning, Agency’s negligence and inaction to take required measures, have caused damage to safeguarded Iran’s nuclear facilities as well as heavy human losses. Moreover, the Agency has not fulfilled its duty based on Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute to submit report to the United Nations Security Council, as it is required to: “…if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.
B) Cooperation with the Agency:
The law passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) in June 2025 on the suspension of cooperation with the Agency, is a legitimate and rational response to the act of aggression. It is the sovereign right of any country to protect its integrity, and security and interests of its people, in particular when its supreme national interests security have been endangered as a result of hostile acts of its enemy. The law has also foreseen how to carry out Iran’s Safeguards commitments when the conditions are met.
Iran has so far negotiated three times with the Agency in Tehran and Vienna to adopt practical measures for fulfilling its Safeguards obligations under extraordinary situations created as a result of the aggressions in accordance with its new national law.
C) Nuclear Material:
All Iran's nuclear material is under Agency constant supervision. However, a lull on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities, has been created as a result of illegal aggressions. This situation can be addressed once peace is reinstated and a fair, mutually-accepted framework be agreed upon.
D) Remaining Safeguards Issues:
All Iran's nuclear material and activities have been completely declared to the Agency and has gone through a very robust verification system. Furthermore, there has not been any undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The current complications of Safety, Security and Safeguards are consequences of unwarranted aggressions need to be mutually dealt with.
Past outstanding issues have been resolved and reflected in the DG’s report titled “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme” (GOV/2015/68) on December 2015. On the two remaining issues, Iran has so far presented its technical explanations. The issue could be easily tackled if only technical aspects be taken into consideration, and not politically motivated observations. Iran reiterates that the use and reliance on false and fabricated data provided by its staunch enemy – the Israeli regime, which is not a member of the NPT and do not respect the international principles as well as the Agency safeguards regime, is completely misleading. The insistence on maintaining these fabricated issues in the DG’s different reports is a clear sign of the politicization which damages the credibility and technical impartiality of the Agency. Continuation of this approach would endanger Iran and the Agency’s cooperation.
E) Matters related to the Two Agency Inspectors:
The illegal conduct of the two inspectors in removing highly confidential documents from the facility and transferring them out of Iran, which has also been later reflected in the Agency’s letter MV-IRA-31.1/SGVI/2025-0271 dated 27 may 2025 constitutes a violation of Iran's security protocol. No need to mention that the right to object the designation of the Agency’s inspectors is explicitly recognized in Article 9(a)(ii) (INFCIRC/214): “if the Government of Iran, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the Government of Iran an alternative designation or designations”.
F) New Safeguards Arrangements under Extraordinary Condition
The INFCIRC/214 lacks provisions on implementation of safeguards measures under war condition. However, on a goodwill basis, Iran has entered into negotiation with the Agency to find ways to continue its safeguards commitments under current situation. It is unprofessional that the DG in his report (paras. 14 and 15 of the report- GOV/2025/53), without Iran’s consent, has reflected part of a text on this issue that has not yet been finalized and agreed upon.
Summary and Conclusion:
The Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the NPT and the CSA and has always rendered its full cooperation to the Agency. Parallelly, Iran expects the Agency not to yield to political pressures and to be impartial and technical.
The unwarranted military aggression imposed on Iran has dramatically changed the scene and has affected many areas including the way and procedure of implementation of the safeguards agreement. To address this issue, Iran and the Agency have entered into negotiation, if concluded in a mutually fair and professional manner, the ground will be prepared for the continuation of cooperation.
While there is no limitation on the level of enrichment, the DG has, without any legal basis, in several occasions has expressed his concern on the level of Iran’s safeguarded enrichment activities. Yet surprisingly, the DG resist expressing any regrets on the clear aggressions made against safeguarded Iran’s nuclear facilities, that even has complicated its own verification activities.
As it was said, the continuation of verification activities of the Agency under current war condition, needs a new safeguards arrangement to be agreed upon. Negotiation on this issue is ongoing. It is expected that the Agency continue its negotiation with Iran in a constructive manner and avoid anything that could jeopardize the trend by selectively reflecting part of the contents of the text yet to be finalized.
To finalize these negotiations, Iran’s legitimate concerns particularly the provisions of the recent law passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) should be duly addressed.
IRNA