For more than two decades, Europe has been at the heart of the ongoing, manufactured crisis over my country’s peaceful nuclear programme. In many ways, the European role has reflected the state of broader international power relations. Once a moderating force aspiring to restrain a belligerent America with maximalist aims in our region, Europe is today enabling the excesses of Washington, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi wrote in an article published on The Guardian.
Last week, Britain, France and Germany – or the E3 – said they had activated the process to “snap back” UN sanctions on Iran. The mechanism was set up to penalize significant non-performance under the 2015 nuclear deal signed by Iran, the E3, the US, China and Russia.
The E3’s gambit lacks any legal standing, chiefly because it ignores the sequence of events that led Iran to adopt lawful remedial measures under the nuclear deal.
The three countries want the world to forget that it was the US, and not Iran, that unilaterally ended participation in the joint comprehensive plan of action (JCOPA), the formal name of the deal. The E3 are additionally omitting how they failed to uphold their part of the bargain, not to mention their outrageous welcoming of the bombing of Iran in June.
Britain, France and Germany may appear to act out of spite. But the truth is that they are intently pursuing a reckless course of action based on the logic that it may provide them with a seat at the table on other issues. This is a grave miscalculation that is bound to backfire. President Trump has made clear that he views the E3 as tangential actors. This is evident in the way Europe is sidelined from issues that are vital to its future – including the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The message from Washington is loud and clear: to gain relevance, the E3 must exhibit undying fealty. The recent images of European leaders sat in the Oval Office before President Trump vividly underscore this dynamic.
Things were not always like this. When the E3 was formed in 2003, to rein in the George W Bush administration after its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran welcomed the endeavor. But talks collapsed when Europe could neither offer anything substantial nor stand up to Washington. At the time, my colleagues wanted Iran to keep 200 centrifuges for small-scale uranium enrichment, only to be met with American maximalism channeled through the E3. War did not erupt partly because the US woke up to the heavy price tag – in both blood and treasure – of illegally occupying Iran’s neighbors to the east and west.
Following an eight-year race of sanctions v centrifuges between Iran and the west, during which my country amassed 20,000 centrifuges – 100 times more than in 2005 – two important dynamics enabled unprecedented dialogue: E3 and US acquiescence to enrichment in Iran, and Iranian recognition of America as a negotiating partner. This fundamental realignment directly led to the signing of the JCPOA. The bargain was straightforward: unprecedented oversight and curbs on Iranian enrichment in exchange for the termination of sanctions. The formula worked.
Yet, one decade later, we are almost back at square one. President Trump initiated an avoidable cascade of events when he ceased US participation in the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed all sanctions.
Initially distraught with the sabotage of a landmark agreement, the E3 pledged remediation, publicly recognizing that “the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran constitute essential parts of the agreement”. The French finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, thundered that Europe is not a “vassal” while other European leaders insisted that their “strategic autonomy” would ensure continuation of trade with Iran and that the dividends pledged to my people, including the sale of oil and gas along with effective banking transactions, would follow. None of it materialized.
While failing to uphold its own obligations, Europe has expected Iran to unilaterally accept all restrictions. Exhibiting this mentality, Britain, France and Germany declined to condemn the US attack on my country in June – on the eve of diplomatic talks – and yet are now demanding UN sanctions on Iranians for supposedly rejecting dialogue.
As I have cautioned my E3 counterparts, their gambit will not achieve the result they seek. On the contrary, it will only further sideline them by eliminating it from future diplomacy, with broad negative consequences for all of Europe in terms of its global credibility and standing.
There is still time – and a dire need – for an honest conversation.
It does not make any sense for the E3 to claim participation in a deal pillared on uranium enrichment in Iran while demanding that Iran must disavow those very capabilities. Openly cheerleading illegal military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities protected by international law – as Germany’s chancellor has done – does not constitute “participation”.
While this lawless behaviour is fueling calls for action to ensure “never again”, Iran remains open to diplomacy.
It is ready to forge a realistic and lasting bargain that entails ironclad oversight and curbs on enrichment in exchange for the termination of sanctions. Failing to seize on this fleeting window of opportunity may have consequences destructive for the region and beyond on a whole new level.
Israel may be pitching itself as capable of conducting war on behalf of the west. But as in June, the truth is that the powerful armed forces of Iran are ready and able to once again pummel Israel into running to “daddy” to be bailed out. The failed Israeli gambit this summer cost American taxpayers billions of dollars, robbed the United States of vital hardware that is now missing from its inventories, and projected Washington as a reckless actor dragged into a rogue regime’s wars of choice.
If Europe truly wants a diplomatic solution, and if President Trump wants the bandwidth to focus on real issues that are not manufactured in Tel Aviv, they need to give diplomacy the time and space that it needs to succeed. The alternative is not likely to be pretty.
MNA