Following the ceasefire that ended the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel, sparked by what Tehran calls the “Sacred Defense,” a critical question now looms for analysts and the Iranian public alike: will the conflict reignite? The answer lies not in political rhetoric, but in battlefield realities and broader strategic calculations—both regional and global.
While many analysts have offered various explanations for the war's sudden halt and speculated on its possible return, a key analytical thread points to a divergence in U.S. and Israeli interests regarding escalation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington, and reports of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s imminent trip for further military consultations, have fueled renewed speculation about a return to open conflict.
Yet, to assess whether war will resume, it is essential to examine why it stopped in the first place—and why both Washington and Tel Aviv ultimately backed a ceasefire, even pushing Tehran to accept it. If they had both the capacity and the will to keep fighting, why the pause?
One overlooked but decisive factor is Iran’s missile strike on the Al Udeid base—America’s key military hub in Qatar. This strike was more than a tit-for-tat response to U.S. actions against Iran. It carried a multilayered message aimed squarely at the American security architecture in the region.
Tehran had easier options. It could have struck American bases in Iraq, sending a limited message. Instead, it deliberately chose Al Udeid—a move loaded with strategic meaning. The choice made clear that if fighting continued, Iran could directly threaten U.S. vital interests in the heart of the Persian Gulf—a region where instability could trigger cascading effects on global energy markets and geopolitical stability.
This message resonated on two levels. First, it warned Washington that any war with Iran would not be confined to the Israel-Iran front but would extend to areas housing critical U.S. infrastructure and personnel. Second, it showcased Iran’s battlefield edge in the Persian Gulf—where short distances, dense target clusters, weaker regional defense systems, and Iran’s specialized military hardware give it a distinct offensive advantage.
The recent war also offered operational insights. Despite the volume and precision of Iranian firepower, its missiles targeting Israeli-held territory had to penetrate layers of regional early warning systems and Israel’s multi-tiered missile defense network. In contrast, the Al Udeid strike faced fewer obstacles. Iran crossed a short distance with lower air defense density and struck with greater accuracy. Crucially, the destruction of one of the U.S.'s most sensitive radar and signals intelligence stations at Al Udeid exposed just how vulnerable American assets in the Persian Gulf truly are—far more so than targets in Israel.
That reality sent a loud and clear warning to Washington: letting the war spill into the Persian Gulf would carry far steeper consequences than the Israel-Iran confrontation alone.
As a result, even as Israel remains keen to prolong or inflame tensions, the United States—mindful of the potential price tag—has moved more cautiously in its calculations.
This concern isn't limited to Washington. Persian Gulf Arab states, alarmed by the vulnerability of their own critical infrastructure—made starkly real by the Al Udeid strike—have become more eager to cool tensions and prevent a broader conflagration.
So while a full resumption of hostilities can't be entirely ruled out, the post-Al Udeid equation has made war a far costlier gamble. Israel lacks the capacity—and perhaps the courage—to go it alone. Without firm U.S. backing, any major military action would risk opening a front that could fundamentally tilt the regional balance of power away from the West.
More than ever, it’s clear that Iran’s strike on Al Udeid marked a turning point. Tehran imposed a new paradigm—one not built on limited engagements, but on threatening vital interests and leveraging active deterrence. The future of this conflict will likely not be decided in Israel, but in the fragile power dynamics of the Persian Gulf—where Iran now holds the upper hand and the strategic initiative.
NOURNEWS