In light of conflicting media reports—especially the AP’s coverage of the draft of the IAEA’s new report—recent developments in Iran’s nuclear case have once again sparked a wave of speculation and divergent analyses on the international stage. The release of these reports has drawn renewed attention to both the technical and political dimensions of Iran’s nuclear file, prompting consideration of the potential consequences of the report’s publication.
According to the claims in the report, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium has reached over 408 kilograms, marking an increase of 133.8 kilograms since the previous report in February (which recorded 274.8 kilograms). From a technical standpoint, this number is viewed as alarming by Western observers, since, according to the IAEA’s director general, enrichment to 60% is “a short technical step” away from weapons-grade enrichment (90%).
This is not the first time the IAEA has raised such issues and warnings, but the timing—on the eve of the Board of Governors meeting—adds a political layer to the report that cannot be overlooked.
A Political Message from Grossi to Iran?
According to sources familiar with the latest IAEA report, it is filled with overtly political statements. Grossi has claimed that “Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state enriching uranium to this level.” Analysts see this as a clear attempt to increase diplomatic pressure on Iran and reinforce the narrative of Iran as a threat in international discourse. Additionally, Grossi’s emphasis on the need for Iran to demonstrate “full and effective cooperation” with the IAEA reflects the Western powers’ broader objective: pushing Iran to return to the enrichment levels prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018—a demand that, from Iran’s perspective, currently lacks both political and technical justification.
Iran, consistent with its longstanding stance, maintains that its 60% enrichment is entirely within peaceful purposes, aligned with its medical and industrial needs, and based on its legitimate rights under the safeguards agreement. It has repeatedly warned that the political misuse of the IAEA’s technical mechanisms by certain countries—particularly the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK—is illegal and undermines the principles of impartiality and professionalism in the international monitoring system. Tehran also stresses that it reserves the right to respond reciprocally to any illegitimate pressure.
Looking Ahead to Upcoming Board of Governors Meeting: A Decision-Making Challenge
The IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting on June 9, 2025 may prove pivotal in the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear file. Reports suggest some Western countries are working to pass a resolution against Iran—a move that could further complicate any potential return to the JCPOA. Past experience shows that the adoption of such resolutions typically provokes reciprocal measures from Iran, including reduced voluntary cooperation, restricted access for IAEA inspectors, and heightened levels of uranium enrichment. This pattern may once again repeat, potentially ushering in a renewed cycle of escalation.
A core issue underlying the current standoff is the persistent doubt about the IAEA’s independence from Western political pressures. While the agency presents itself as a technical and neutral body, the political tone of Grossi’s recent reports and their timing—coinciding with sensitive diplomatic developments—have cast suspicion over its impartiality. If the true aim of these reports is to restore engagement with Iran, the use of threatening and coercive language may prove counterproductive, further eroding mutual trust.
Iran’s Options in Response
Facing these new pressures, several options lie before Iran:
Maintaining Minimal Cooperation with the IAEA: Iran might opt to continue working with the IAEA on a limited basis while maintaining its red lines. This approach would avoid giving opponents grounds to refer the case to the UN Security Council.
Increasing Enrichment Levels or Installing Advanced Centrifuges: In a show of defiance against the IAEA’s political maneuvers, Iran could take new technical steps to assert its right to peaceful nuclear advancement in the face of mounting pressure.
Unofficial Negotiations with the U.S.: The indirect and secret talks between Iran and the U.S., which have been ongoing in recent months, might be intensified through intermediaries like Oman or Qatar as a way to ease tensions.
Iran’s nuclear case has reached a critical juncture where the decisions of all parties could have significant and lasting consequences. If Iran and the West fail to reach a mutual understanding, the continuation of the current trajectory could lead to a dangerous and irreversible point. The activation of the “snapback” mechanism and the reimposition of international sanctions would undoubtedly add further complexity to an already sensitive issue. However, if the IAEA can fulfill its actual role as a neutral observer rather than a political actor, there remains a chance of achieving a diplomatic solution in the medium term. Any future agreement must, of course, be based on mutual respect, legal guarantees, and a win-win framework—not unilateral coercion.
The Associated Press’s coverage of the IAEA’s new report on Iran’s 60% enriched uranium reserves, while technically detailed, is clearly being used as a lever for political pressure. As the Board of Governors meeting approaches, the only way to avoid deepening the crisis is to return to diplomatic logic and accept the region’s new geopolitical realities—realities in which Iran is a powerful actor with indigenous technological capabilities that cannot be contained through repetition of failed strategies from the past.
NOURNEWS