As the Daesh issue came to an end, the area was handed over to the Syrian army, and our full presence was no longer necessary. As a result, a large part of our forces returned from there, leaving only the section needed for resistance or to provide assistance to the Syrian army or government.
In an interview with khamenei.ir, Ali Akbar Ahmadian delved into the specifics of Iran's advisory presence in Syria. The logic behind the presence and its prerequisites, the reasons for the reduction of Iran's presence in post- Daesh Syria, the differences between Daesh and the armed groups controlling Syria, Iran's approach to these armed groups in the past and its current view of them, the reasons for Iran's lack of military intervention in recent Syrian events, and ultimately the impact of these events on the axis of resistance and support for it, are among the topics discussed in this detailed conversation.
What is the foundational perspective of Iran and, consequently, the country's security apparatus—whose convergence point is the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council—on the concept of "national security"?
From our perspective, the people are the pillar of national security. The Islamic Revolution triumphed with the people, it was created by the people, and it has remained with the people. All theories and discussions surrounding the concept of "national security" are based on the pillar of the people. By "people," I mean all the people; just as all the people made the revolution. The notion that a particular group in the country made the revolution is not accurate. In the various roles, contributions varied—one might have had a greater share in one place, another in another—but the entire nation of Iran participated in revolution.
This perspective is rooted in both the theoretical foundations and practical stances of the Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. A few years ago, the Leader stated that Iran has no meaning without the people and is nothing without the people. (1) This revolution, from the beginning, was built on the principle of moving with the people, finding its strength in the presence of the people, and seeing the power of the people as its own power. According to him, "religious populism" means that, according to Islam, the "people" are the rulers of society and their own affairs (2), and the 1979 Islamic Revolution has also raised this voice globally. Therefore, wherever the Islamic Revolution has gone, its hallmark has been the rise of the people, not a single individual.
Regarding Syria, we did not uplift the Syrian government, Assad family was existed before us, was strong, and due to the significant and commendable shared interest in resilient resistance to the Zionist regime and resistance against America and Israel, we had mutual interactions and reciprocal support.
The second important point we adhere to is the Leader’s theory of "realistic Idealism." He presented this theoretical theory in contrast to the common "idealism" or "realism" and emphasized that idealism without realism is delusion, and realism without idealism is mundane.
In the past decade, with the intensification of the growth of terrorist groups in the region Iran has also taken steps towards direct military presence or advisory roles outside its official borders to conduct anti-terrorist operations. Iran's military and advisory presence, of course, is subject to certain principles and conditions. What are these principles?
The presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, even where it has originated from idealistic aspirations, has always been guided by a set of principles. There might have been rare instances of error, but the foundation has always been these principles I will mention:
The first principle is the resolute defense of the country, its people, and national interests against foreigners. There has never been any doubt about this principle. Whether the adversary was the US, Israel, a small country, or a neighbor, this principle has always been the basis of action.
Another important principle is that Iran has never been the aggressor. The Leader of Iran has been truly committed to this principle. Many times, others have pushed for action to the point of decision, but when it reached the leadership level, the Leader has prevented it and gradually taught this principle to other officials as well.
The third principle is non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Despite the idealistic slogans and sometimes globalist aspects of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has not interfered in any country due to those ideals or even for national interests—this is a manifestation of realism—unless under three conditions:
Firstly, there must be an official request from the government there. Both in Syria and Iraq, we had official requests from the governments of these two countries for our presence. For example, as you may recall, in the incident of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the Prime Minister of Iraq said that he had invited him to Iraq. During our presence in the fight against Daesh, Mr. Maliki (the Prime Minister of the country at the time) requested our help in combating Daesh. Therefore, an official request was certainly a prerequisite.
Secondly, there must be no conflict with the people. If anyone invites us today to go there, for instance, to fight on their behalf against the people there, we certainly would not do such a thing, and this is one of the principles we adhere to.
Thirdly, there must be a definite interest or principle. There, we must either have a definite national interest or a clear principle, such as "defending the oppressed," which is among our principles and values. If a nation is subjected to oppression and the other two conditions I mentioned are also present, there is no reason for us not to intervene, as we have a religious and humanitarian duty to do so. Of course, there may be times when defending the oppressed is not possible, in which case we can only denounce it verbally; however, when the conditions are conducive, and the people are oppressed and their government is seeking help, there is no reason for us not to assist, while adhering to the principle of support, not replacement; meaning the nation itself must fight and be present on the ground, and we assist them.
The military and security relations between Iran and Syria have not been limited to the past decade. What is the reason behind these relations, Iran's presence in Syria, and later, the reduction of Iran's military presence?
Since the time when the Syrian government, under Hafez al-Assad, sincerely supported the Islamic Revolution and strongly backed us during the war, even though Iraq's ruling party was also the Ba'ath Party, we expanded official and field interactions. One reason for Syria's closeness to Iran was that Egypt and Jordan had compromised with the Zionist regime, but Syria had not accepted this compromise and, therefore, felt a sense of isolation and danger.
However, on the other hand, the governance system in Syria was similar to other Arab regimes in the region. The positive and distinctive aspect of the Assad family was that, despite all international, regional, and even friendly and hostile pressures, they truly did not compromise on resisting Israel and defending the rights of the Palestinian people. If they had made even a slight compromise, they would not have faced any of these events. Therefore, everything that happened was the price of their resistance.
Although the system in Syria was anti-Zionist, some inappropriate behaviors were observed in parts of the Syrian government toward its people. These created a gap between the government and some segments of the Syrian population. Some truly supported the system, but others had differing opinions and objections, which had existed even before the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other hand, there was a long-standing challenge and disputes between Hafez al-Assad's government and some intellectual movements in the Islamic world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. From the beginning, during Hafez al-Assad’s time, the Islamic Republic of Iran consistently advised and worked to steer Syria toward social and public unity. This was because the belief that the people of a country are decisive has always been a core principle in the Islamic Republic.
Later, a third phenomenon emerged there: the rise of ISIS, the ISIS sedition. We must completely separate the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the ISIS era from the period before it. Yes, we decisively entered the fight against ISIS, just as we fought ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Even today, if ISIS with its former characteristics and features appears around us, posing a future threat, we will naturally suppress it in the same location, while adhering to the mentioned conditions.
But what were ISIS's features that led us to this conclusion?
First, ISIS was a service-made movement. We were aware and knew where they were released from, which prisons, who worked with them, where they were taken, how they were formed, and how a respectable appearance was given to them. At the beginning, ISIS tried to present a legitimate face and attempted to create a counterfeit version of the entire Islamic Revolution movement. Therefore, ISIS had no true identity of its own.
Secondly, ISIS lacked territory. It did not belong to any specific land or country, and there was no geography or population to associate with it. Wherever we fought them, it was not their land.
Thirdly, ISIS considered all lands as their own, claiming other Islamic and regional countries as their property. Therefore, they opposed all regional nations, including Iran.
Fourthly, ISIS had a takfiri ideology against all Islamic sects. Their foundation was based on declaring others infidels—not just Shias, but everyone except themselves. Fifthly, they engaged in mass terrorism. ISIS was a terrorist group by any standard. Their terrorism was not against political or military figures, but against the public, targeting ordinary people. Everyone remembers the Kerman explosion.
When ISIS emerged, there was no room for hesitation. Of course, some of the same opponents of the Syrian government helped the rise of such a movement or later strengthened it by joining, which forced us to confront them as well.
With the end of the ISIS issue, the region was handed over to the Syrian army, and our full presence was no longer necessary. Of course, Bashar al-Assad's government came under intense pressure due to the presence of Iranians, from the Arabs, Israel, and the United States. They used propaganda, claiming that Iran had taken over Syria. As a result, most of our forces withdrew, leaving only those necessary for resistance or to assist the Syrian army and government.
NOURNEWS