The political and legal deputies of the Foreign Minister started a new round of talks with the political deputies of the German, British, and French foreign ministries last Thursday and Friday. These talks, described by both sides as frank and tough, are meant to clarify the lines of potential future negotiations.
These meetings took place while senior Iranian diplomats' statements suggest that Tehran is not optimistic about the European troika, and the reason for this can be seen in their behavior. Iran is not optimistic about Europe because, over the past decade, they have not committed to their obligations on various issues, especially the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). In the past two years, they have taken a series of hostile actions and behaviors against our country. Tehran and European representatives sat down at the negotiating table while four specific factors have influenced their relations in the months leading up to these talks: Europe's lack of commitment to Iran's nuclear program, the rise of Donald Trump in the US, the end of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA, and the possibility of the snapback mechanism and the Ukraine and Gaza wars.
A) The deputy ministers of foreign affairs of Iran engaged in discussions with their French, German, and British counterparts on Thursday and Friday, while these countries had passed a resolution against Iran's nuclear activities in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors the previous week. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the European troika, as parties to the JCPOA, has hardly taken any action regarding their commitments. The recent resolution, which was issued despite Iran's announcement of cooperation, has made the situation more difficult than ever. Therefore, Europe's approach to Iran's nuclear activities significantly weakens any possibility of optimism.
B) Before the session on Friday, Araghchi referred to an important issue in today's interactions between Iran and Europe with the statement: "I am not sure if Iran is talking to the right party." Behind Araghchi’s remark lies Iran's concerns on one side and Europe's fears on the other. This concern and fear stem from the emergence of Donald Trump as the new President of the United States. Iran's ambiguity about the Europeans as a conversation partner is due to their previous demonstration that they are unable to fulfill any commitments or responsibilities without the United States, and that they harbor both criticism and fear regarding Trump's policies and actions. Thus, a pessimistic vigilance in negotiating with Europeans, who do not know their position regarding the future American president, might be the most rational approach.
C) The Islamic Republic of Iran will be freed from the clauses of resolutions, sanctions, and threats from the Security Council in October 2025 based on the JCPOA agreement. It is for this liberation that Iran has accepted the JCPOA, despite all its challenges, and has maintained it in the face of the indifference of the opposing parties. However, as this liberation approaches, Iran sees new traps set by the West (Europe and the United States) in its path, with the previously issued resolution and potential resolutions in the coming winter and spring being examples of this. Optimism towards governments that are not committed to the agreement they themselves wrote and signed is the most important necessity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to safeguard national interests and prevent falling into these traps.
D) The two wars in Gaza and Ukraine have not only affected the relationship between Iran and the European Union but also many equations and relationships around the world. Nevertheless, regarding the Ukraine war, three European countries have claimed since the summer of 2022 that Iran is aligned with Russia against Ukraine and that by supplying weapons such as drones and missiles to Moscow, it has effectively impacted European security. In the case of the Gaza war, European parties, due to their unreserved financial, military, and political support for the Israeli regime, criticize and condemn any country or government that stands against this regime's warmongering. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not exempt from this rule, and Europe has chosen the path of confrontation and sanctions against Iran under the pretext of military cooperation between Iran and Russia while appeasing Israel.
The combination of these four factors and the approach of the European troika in each of these areas does not instill optimism in Iran regarding the future of discussions with these three countries. This lack of optimism, on one hand, may leave Iran's options open to alternatives beyond dialogue and negotiation, and on the other hand, it could permanently place the psychological, political, and legal burdens of pressure on Tehran onto the shoulders of the European Union.
The reality is that the list of issues in dispute between Iran and the European Union has changed significantly compared to a decade ago, when nuclear negotiations began, and has, in a way, been updated. These changes are also evident in the statements of Iranian and European officials. Reuters reported that Enrique Mora stated the focus of this round of talks has been on three topics: Iran's support for Russia, the situation in the Middle East, and the nuclear issue. An Iranian senior official also noted that these three topics "are interconnected." This is while the main topic of discussions between Iran and Europe a decade ago was nuclear activities, which did not have the same level of importance and urgency as today’s issues. The range of topics mentioned requires several rounds of tough and explicit discussions, and for this reason, both sides have announced and emphasized the continuation of this process in the future.
Although the number of open cases in the relations between Iran and Europe has increased compared to the past, Tehran's experience and vigilance regarding Berlin, London, and Paris have also heightened. This can be partially observed in Araghchi's remarks on Thursday (November 29), where the Foreign Minister warned the Western parties about the continuation of the confrontational approach and explicitly stated: If the European countries reimpose sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council, then everyone in Iran will be convinced that Iran's doctrine has been wrong until now, and if this happens, I believe everyone will be convinced that we have taken a wrong path, so we must change course. I believe that if a snapback occurs, we will face a crisis; the nuclear discussion within Iran will likely lean towards acquiring (nuclear) weapons.
Araghchi also emphasized regarding Europe's threatening approach to the trigger mechanism that after the recent resolution of the Board of Governors, Iran has decided to bring thousands of new and highly advanced centrifuges into operation. Gas injection into these machines has begun. This is the result of their pressure. The Foreign Minister explicitly stated regarding Europe's accusations of military cooperation between Iran and Russia that Iran has not provided ballistic missiles to Russia. Tehran's military cooperation with Moscow has been longstanding and is entirely legitimate. Of course, Iran has supported and continues to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Despite the existing challenges in Iran-Europe relations, Tehran prefers engagement, and according to the political deputies of the three European countries, it seems they also desire the continuation of this engagement in their relations with Iran. It appears that outlining Iran's perspective in the four mentioned areas, as well as Tehran's red lines, has been established as the main objectives for the first round of discussions, and one should expect a new agenda for the upcoming negotiations.
NOURNEWS