NOURNEWS - Intensive and tumultuous negotiations between the P5 + 1 and Iran in 2015 led to the formation of the JCPOA agreement and the creation of reciprocal commitments for the negotiating parties.
The commitments accepted by Iran were largely restrictive in nature, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was identified as the body responsible for verifying Iran's compliance with increasing access to Iran's nuclear facilities.
In addition, in the text of JCPOA and Resolution 2231, strong guarantees were obtained from Iran to give the other parties full confidence in the fulfillment of Iran's obligations.
The Agency's 17 detailed reports during the implementation of the JCPOA and even after the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement confirmed that Iran has fulfilled all its obligations under the BRICS agreement and has not made any deviations or shortcomings in this regard.
But on the other hand, despite the inclusion of some formal clauses in the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 to oblige the other parties to fulfill their obligations, virtually no precise, verifiable and binding mechanism was envisaged that could provide equal conditions for Iran and other committed parties. The issue meant that even before the US withdrawal from JCPOA, in the words of the former governor of the Central Bank, Iran's benefit from JCPOA was "almost nothing."
Unfortunately, the officials of the 11th and 12th governments, taking an unacceptable and harmful approach from the beginning of the formation of JCPOA, insisted that this agreement would solve all the problems of the country and even the "drinking water of the people", but it was clear from the beginning that JCPOA agreement Its provisions should be implemented without any shortcomings - which, of course, did not happen - do not have the stated capacities, and emphasizing this issue will have no other benefit than conditioning the country's economy on foreign policy, and especially cooperation with the West.
It is important to note that even if the ongoing negotiations in Vienna are successful and the BRJAM is revived and fully implemented, the limited functionality and non-strategic effects of this agreement on improving the country's economic situation will not change.
Undoubtedly, the real and achievable expectation from JCPOA should not exceed the "removal of some artificial obstacles" created for the economic development of the country, because the formation of sustainable economic transformation in the country depends solely on structural reform and intelligent and prudent use of resources and Internal capacities will be realized, and any deviation from this approach is giving the wrong address to society and economic actors.
Maximizing the use of an agreement that removes sanctions and can act as a complement to the activation of domestic capacities for the economic development of the country requires a review of non-constructive approaches in the past.
The pathology of JCPOA 's implementation in the 11th and 12th administrations and the significant difference in the benefits of the agreement with what happened to Iran, as well as why Trump withdrew from JCPOA, confirm the fact that insufficient attention was paid to two key conditions not provided for in the agreement. "Reliability" and "sustainability" prevented the country from benefiting from the minimal benefits of JCPOA.
The new negotiations have provided the conditions for Iranian negotiators to pay more attention to the need to form a credible and lasting agreement, given the bitter experiences of the past.
The Islamic Republic of Iran's continued emphasis on the need to establish strong mechanisms for verifying, verifying commitments, and providing assured assurances by the United States not to repeat the status quo is an inevitable approach to achieving a "good deal."
The complexity of the new round of negotiations, in addition to serious disagreements over nuclear drafts and sanctions, is related to the design of practical solutions for verification and assurances.
So far, Iran has provided the ground for increasing the speed and effective use of time in the negotiations for the Western parties, especially the United States, by presenting innovative and viable proposals that cannot be rejected under the pretext of opposition to Congress and legal problems.
Certainly, if there is a will on the other side to reach a "credible and lasting" agreement, there is enough time for the parties' views to converge.
BY: Mohammad Ghaderi
NOURNEWS