Recent developments on the Yemen front, from Ansarullah’s strengthening position in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and missile and drone attacks on Saudi strategic centers to Washington’s military and political moves, have sharpened the question of whether the US is preparing to enter an all-out war against Yemen directly.
One of the most significant signs is the US State Department’s approval of a potential $24.3 billion military package for Saudi Arabia, including 48 F-35 fighter jets and 49 engines, which has been formally notified to Congress for review. Washington claims the deal could strengthen Saudi Arabia’s deterrence, help defend its territory and improve operational coordination among Saudi, US and regional forces, as well as NATO.
At the same time, the US State Department has warned of a possible escalation in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Ansarullah. US embassies in the region have also issued security alerts about the possibility of retaliatory attacks targeting US facilities and interests. Advisories urging US citizens to exercise caution amid the possibility of flight disruptions or cancellations have added to the sensitivity of the situation.
Reports have also emerged of US fighter jets being moved toward West Asia, while Trump’s early return from Camp David to the White House has further fueled speculation. However, these signs alone do not prove that Washington has made a definitive decision to launch a direct war against Yemen. They should instead be assessed within the broader context of regional developments and US domestic affairs.
Washington Seeks to Rebuild Trust
The position of the US’s Arab allies is an important factor. Although Pakistan and Turkey have emphasized their security support for Saudi Arabia, their direct entry into the Yemen war could carry heavy costs for regional relations and the Muslim world, drawing them into a much wider crisis.
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction among some Arab countries with the extent of Washington’s security commitments, along with their efforts to diversify their partners, has placed additional pressure on the US. Jordan’s defense agreements with France, Egypt’s inclination to expand relations with China and remarks by Qatari officials about the limits of security cooperation with Washington are seen as signs of this trend.
Under these circumstances, limited US involvement in the Yemen war could serve as a means for Washington to rebuild its Arab allies’ trust in the short term. This is particularly significant because the scope of potential targets may no longer be confined to retaliatory operations. It could extend to command and control, missile and drone production capabilities, air defenses, ports and even Yemen’s senior leadership.
Two Straits, One High-Risk Calculation
Trump is facing challenges in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, two strategic waterways whose developments directly affect global energy security and trade. At a time when the US is struggling to contend with Iran’s determination to uphold its conditions for reopening Hormuz, changing the equation in Bab el-Mandeb may appear attractive to Washington.
But the central issue is the difference between the “ability to start a war” and the “ability to end one.” The US military’s weapons superiority over Yemen does not necessarily mean it can impose a lasting political outcome. Experience over the past several years has shown that Yemen’s resistance can drive up the costs of military operations and even turn a threat that was supposed to be contained into a much broader crisis.
From this perspective, an attempt to change the Bab el-Mandeb equation could end up intensifying insecurity rather than reopening trade routes, potentially repeating a scenario similar to the confrontation over the Strait of Hormuz.
A Short War, but Long-Term Costs
The US’s military and economic constraints are also a decisive variable. Recent reports point to considerable pressure on Washington’s weapons stocks. Bloomberg has reported that US allies could face delays of several years in receiving some missile and air-defense systems as Washington replenishes the stocks depleted in its war with Iran.
Images released of damage to US bases in West Asia have also shown the considerable scale of destruction caused by Iranian attacks. A senior US military official told ABC News that rebuilding some damaged facilities could take decades.
Therefore, even if Trump considers direct entry into the Yemen war in pursuit of a short-term gain, serious doubts remain about the US’s capacity to endure a war of attrition. Rather than restoring US deterrence, such a conflict could impose further costs on Washington.
Ultimately, the US may be able to initiate a new phase of the crisis, but it will not necessarily be able to determine its course or outcome. Recent regional wars have shown that entering a military conflict is easier than managing its consequences. Any calculation concerning Yemen that fails to account for the country’s resistance capabilities and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait’s strategic position could repeat the same miscalculation that is now confronting Washington in the Strait of Hormuz.